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Abstract 
 
Compared to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), corporate divestitures receive only little 
attention by the public. Typically, information about big M&A deals dominates the 
business news; however, in recent years, corporate divestitures have become 
increasingly important as a means of corporate strategy. This development underlines 
the need for in-depth academic research in this field. Although there has been 
substantial research undertaken in the US and – to a lesser extent – recently also in 
Europe, the research about corporate divestitures has been widely neglected in 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland (the D-A-CH region).  
 
This thesis, which is part of the capital market studies, investigates the shareholder 
value effects of corporate selloffs and spinoffs for Austrian, Swiss and German publicly 
traded companies during the period from 2000 to 2014. The research applies event 
study methodology, which rests on the assumption of efficient capital markets in the 
semi-strong form, i.e. shareholder value effects are evaluated based on unexpected 
changes in the market value of the seller immediately at the divestiture announcement. 
Moreover, the research identifies several factors influencing shareholder value creation. 
These factors are related to the divestiture transaction itself and the characteristics of the 
parties involved in such transactions.  
 
The results confirm the findings of previous US and European studies and show that in 
the D-A-CH region corporate divestitures are creating shareholder value. The abnormal 
announcement returns in a two-day event window, including the day before the initial 
public announcement, as well as the actual day of the announcement, average 1.24% for 
selloffs and 1.92% for spinoffs. In addition, the research shows that the relative size of 
the transaction in particular, as well as an increase in the corporate focus through the 
transaction, the use of proceeds, the financial situation of the seller and the type of 
buyer, influence the magnitude of shareholder value creation. Corporate management 
should consider these factors prior to making decisions about divestitures. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Aims 
 
“Smart apple farmers routinely saw off dead and weakened branches to keep their trees 
healthy. Every year, they also cut back a number of vigorous limbs, those that are 
blocking light from the rest of the tree or otherwise hampering its growth. And, as the 
growing season progresses, they pick and discard some perfectly good apples, ensuring 
that the remaining fruit gets the energy needed to reach its full size and ripeness. Only 
through such careful, systematic pruning does an orchard produce its highest possible 
yield.” 
(Dranikoff et al., 2002, p. 75) 
 
This allegory described by Dranikoff et al. (2002) can serve as an important message for 
corporations. Whereas most corporations dedicate plenty of their resources to corporate 
growth through mergers and acquisitions (M&A), the topic of corporate divestitures is 
still widely neglected. This imbalance can easily be illustrated: picking a random week 
and counting the number of M&A and divestiture cases that are important enough to be 
reported in business newspapers, the overwhelming majority of cases refer to mergers 
or acquisitions rather than divestitures, although the divesting side is necessarily a part 
of M&A transactions. The reason for this might be the stigma that still encumbers 
corporate divestitures, i.e. that divestitures are seen as signals of weakness or failure 
(Dranikoff et al., 2002). Huyett and Koller (2011, p. 2) argue in a similar way that 
investors may consider “[…] divestitures as admissions of failed strategy […]”, but also 
add that managers may fear that divestitures may result in decreasing economies of 
scale, disadvantages concerning analyst coverage and damaged employee morale. The 
cause of this stigma could lie in the widely applied corporate practice: because of 
psychological biases, such as the sunk cost fallacy, managers often decide to divest an 
asset only if the outside pressure due to heavy losses, high debt burdens, downgraded 
credit ratings or negative analyst comments is already considerably high (Dranikoff et 
al., 2002; Horn et al., 2006). Sometimes, a new CEO is needed to finally exit certain 
businesses (Horn et al., 2006). Hence, divestitures are mostly the result of reactive 
rather than proactive corporate actions. As a consequence, the decision to divest an asset 
occurs rarely and often too late, which again may reinforce the stigma related to 
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corporate divestitures. Dranikoff et al. (2002) found that companies on average acquire 
40% more businesses than they divest; Mankins et al. (2008) state that the majority of 
companies acquire three times more businesses than they divest. However, they also 
argue that this view on corporate divestitures is an expensive mistake and Huyett and 
Koller (2011) argue similarly, stating that not engaging in corporate divestitures may 
result in missed value-creating opportunities. Referring to the allegory of Dranikoff et 
al. (2002), this reasoning makes sense. The argumentation is to some extent related to 
the resource-based view, i.e. through divestitures of even healthy assets, a company’s 
resources can be fully concentrated on the company’s core businesses or those 
businesses where the company has a competitive advantage. By implication, assets that 
do not belong to a company’s core, or that may have a higher value for another owner, 
should be divested. Based on this argumentation, corporate divestitures should be 
activities with a positive net present value.  
 
 
Figure 1: Benefits of Active Portfolio Management1 
 
  
                                                 
1 Source: Dranikoff et al., 2002, p. 76. 
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This perception can be underpinned with empirical findings. Studying the performance 
of the 200 largest US corporations, Dranikoff et al. (2002), for example, found that 
managers that actively review a company’s business portfolio obtain higher shareholder 
returns than passive managers. If one had invested $100 in January 1990, the investment 
would be worth $353 with a passive strategy and $459 with an active strategy by 
December 1999. Solely looking at the active managers, which is actually the more 
interesting point, the figures show that a balanced active portfolio management in 
particular, i.e. acquiring and divesting, pays off. A balanced acquisition and divestiture 
strategy leads to a return that exceeds the return of a divestiture or acquisition-only 
approach (see Figure 1). Mankins et al. (2008) report similar findings. They cite a study 
from Bain & Company with a sample of 7,135 divestitures by 742 companies between 
1987 and 2007. According to this study, $100 invested in the average company in 1987 
would have been worth $1,000 in 2007. In contrast, the same investment in the 
companies, which they describe as ‘best divestors’, would have yielded $1,800. The 
same can be observed when looking at stock indices in general. Also here, some stocks 
are taken out of the index from time to time whereas others taken in. The result is often 
an outperformance of indices towards actively managed investment portfolios, which 
leads to the rise of passive investment strategies. Beyond this evidence, a wide range of 
studies report positive shareholder value effects for corporate divestitures, especially for 
US and UK sellers (see Tables 3–6, pp. 21, 38, 47, 50). 
 
During the last few years, the idea of shareholder value maximisation as the primary 
objective of corporations has been adopted more and more by corporations in the D-A-
CH region (i.e. Germany (D), Austria (A) and Switzerland (CH)), although this 
approach has received some criticism lately with regard to its sustainability (short-
termism, failures of risk management etc.) and to other stakeholders (especially to 
employees, the society and the natural environment) (Grant, 2016). The concept behind 
the shareholder value approach is that the success of listed corporations should be 
evaluated by the economic returns that a company generates for its shareholders 
(Rappaport, 1986). This shareholder value approach was developed by Rappaport 
(1986) because traditional accounting measures do not provide a reliable measure for 
the success of corporations. The shareholder value approach, which will also be used in 
this thesis as a measure for company performance, evaluates the value generated for 
shareholders looking at dividends plus increases in the share price of a company. The 
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dividends and the increases in the share price are determined by discounting the 
forecasted cash flows of a company by its cost of capital (Rappaport, 1986). The 
shareholder value approach implies that if corporate divestitures are shareholder value-
creating corporate activities, divestitures should be viewed by companies as a viable 
strategic option rather than just an emergency option in times of crisis. Therefore, the 
question is whether corporate divestitures can serve as an instrument to create 
shareholder value.  
 
Whereas there has been substantial research on corporate divestitures undertaken in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, the D-A-CH region, one of the most important economic areas 
in the world, has been widely neglected. There are only a few German studies in the 
German language, but this subject is not covered in the Anglo-Saxon literature. Hence, 
this thesis will analyse the divestiture market in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and 
provide knowledge in a thus far largely unexplored field. In order to do so, the research 
investigates two main issues: first, the author will investigate if the positive 
performance impact of divestitures shown in the Anglo-Saxon studies also holds true 
for these countries, i.e. if corporate divestitures on average create shareholder value in 
the D-A-CH region. Second, the author intends to identify and assess which factors 
influence the performance of corporate divestitures positively or negatively. This 
research aims at a more detailed understanding of the sources of shareholder value 
creation in divestiture transactions in the D-A-CH region and to help policy makers 
make better corporate divestiture decisions, thus unlocking shareholder value potential 
that is currently lost through bad divestiture management. 
 
The research is part of the capital market studies. Performance of corporate divestitures 
is evaluated based on changes in the market value of the seller immediately at the 
divestiture announcement using event study methodology. This research emerged 40 
years ago in the US and recently found its way to Europe. For the German speaking 
market, as mentioned above, only a few studies exist and most of them are in the 
German language. The important German studies cover those of Löffler (2001), 
Eichinger (2001), Stienemann (2003), Bartsch (2005), Ostrowski (2007) and Vollmar 
(2014). 
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1.2 Structure of the Research 
 
Following the introduction, chapter two introduces the topic of corporate divestitures. It 
provides an overview of the different forms of divestitures, including corresponding 
definitions, and describes the history of corporate divestitures together with the recent 
development in terms of deal numbers and value. Furthermore, the rationale for 
corporate divestitures and the theoretical framework for shareholder value creation are 
described briefly. The main attention, however, is focused on an exhaustive and critical 
literature review of studies analysing the shareholder wealth effects of divestitures. 
 
Chapter three addresses the research questions and the development of the research 
hypotheses, which will be tested, and provides the theoretical framework for the 
expected outcomes of the research. The chapter structure is based on different research 
hypotheses. 
 
Chapter four includes the research design and methodology. At the beginning, the 
author comments on the research philosophy, the approach to theory development and 
the research strategy. Subsequently, the data analysis, i.e. the event study methodology 
as the central element of the research in particular, is described in depth. Beyond that, 
the multivariate analysis, which constitutes the second step of the sequential analysis, is 
also defined, as well as the sample selection and data collection. The chapter concludes 
with a description of the variables used in the research analysis. 
 
Chapter five covers the research results. As a first step, this includes an exhaustive 
description of the sample regarding the variables collected. In a second step, the event 
study results are reported and bivariate tests regarding the hypotheses formulated in 
chapter three are conducted. Finally, in order to validate the bivariate findings, 
multivariate tests are conducted and discussed.  
 
Chapter six, the last chapter, summarises the main findings and addresses possible 
limitations and scope for future research. 
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2 Literature Review on Divestitures 
 
The following chapter addresses the literature regarding corporate divestitures. First, 
section 2.1 provides an overview about the different forms of divestitures and 
corresponding definitions. Moreover, it describes the historical development of 
corporate divestitures as well as the recent development regarding deal numbers and 
value. Subsequently, section 2.2 highlights the different rationales for divestitures and 
section 2.3 looks at the theoretical framework, which serves as an explanation for 
shareholder value creation in divestiture transactions. Finally, section 2.4 provides an 
exhaustive literature review of studies analysing the shareholder wealth effects of 
divestitures, which aims at providing a full picture of the research undertaken in this 
field so far. The studies are ordered chronologically by economic region and form of 
divestiture. 
 
 
2.1 Forms, Definitions and History of Divestitures 
 
2.1.1 Forms and Definitions 
 
The existing literature does not provide a broadly accepted definition of the term 
‘divestiture’, often also referred to as ‘demerger’, since the term covers different forms 
– mainly selloffs, spinoffs, equity carve-outs and tracking stocks. In contrast to selloffs 
and spinoffs, where the parent company loses control of the divested business, it retains 
control in the case of equity carve-outs and tracking stocks (Figure 2). Because the last 
two categories rarely occur in the D-A-CH region, this thesis will focus on selloffs and 
spinoffs, i.e. the two forms where the divestor gives up control of the divested business. 
 
According to Rosenfeld (1984, p. 1437), “A spinoff occurs when the firm distributes all 
of the common stock it owns in a controlled subsidiary to its existing shareholders, 
thereby creating a separate publicly-traded company.” Cusatis et al. (1993, p. 295) 
define a spinoff as the “[…] pro-rata distribution of shares of a wholly owned subsidiary 
to shareholders.” Hence, spinoffs can be regarded as a stock dividend to the parent 
firm’s shareholders. 
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Figure 2: Types and Characteristics of Divestitures2 
 
Again referring to Rosenfeld (1984, p. 1437), a selloff “[…] occurs when the divested 
assets are purchased and become part of another firm.” Following Alexander et al. 
(1984) those assets include, for example, subsidiaries, divisions or a product line and 
generally can be paid in the form of cash or stock. Thus, in comparison to a spinoff, the 
latter form of divestiture is usually fully taxable and a change in ownership occurs. 
 
In an equity carve-out, the parent company partially floats the subsidiary on the stock 
exchange but retains the majority control (Sudarsanam, 2010). The instrument for 
carving out the minority ownership is usually an initial public offering (IPO).  
 
Tracking stocks represent a new class of shares that track the performance of a 
subsidiary. However, the shareholders of the tracking stock are not direct owners of the 
subsidiary but of the parent. Tracking stocks are chosen if the management wants to 
increase transparency and reduce a conglomerate discount, but does not want to lose any 
control over the subsidiary (Sudarsanam, 2010). 
 
Other forms falling under the broad term of divestitures are, for example, buyouts, 
subsidiary IPOs, splitoffs, liquidations, or splitups. Buyouts constitute a special form of 
selloffs. They are either classified by the type of buyer (management buyout (MBO), 
management buy-in (MBI), employee buyout (EBO)), or by the financing of the deal 
(leveraged buyout (LBO)). In the case of a subsidiary IPO, the parent spins out the 
former subsidiary and sells it to the market via an initial public offering (Ostrowski, 
                                                 
2 Source: Sudarsanam, 2010, p. 275. 
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2007). Hence, subsidiary IPOs are basically the same as equity carve-outs, but in this 
case, the parent has no control after the transaction as the subsidiary is divested 
completely. Splitoffs are similar to spinoffs. The difference between those two forms is 
that in splitoff transactions, the shares of the subsidiary are not distributed on a pro rata 
basis but only to those shareholders of the parent company that exchange shares of the 
parent for shares of the subsidiary (Ostrowski, 2007). In the case of liquidations, partial 
liquidations or splitups, the parent company ceases to exist. Whereas in liquidations, the 
assets of the parent are sold completely and the cash generated is paid out to the 
shareholders or creditors, the parent is split into two or more independent companies in 
splitup transactions and the shareholders get the shares of the new companies in 
exchange for shares in the parent company. 
 
 
2.1.2 History of Divestitures 
 
The market of corporate divestiture shows similarities to the M&A market – over time, 
several divestiture waves can be observed. The first single instances of divestitures 
occurred in the 1920s in the US where they became common since the 1950s onwards 
(Kirchmaier, 2003). In Europe, the divestiture landscape is more difficult to assess. 
Whereas in the UK they are an established instrument, divestitures are a relatively new 
phenomenon in continental Europe (Kirchmaier, 2003). Regarding the rarer form of 
spinoffs, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), who investigated the performance effects 
of European spinoffs, found that during the period from 1987 to 2000, the UK 
accounted for nearly half of all European spinoffs (102 of 230), whereas the D-A-CH 
region was presented with only 30 cases, even less than the Scandinavian countries with 
a lower economic importance. However, the study also reports increasing divestiture 
activity in continental Europe, which is also confirmed by Sudarsanam’s (2010) 
research for the period after 2000.  
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For the analysed period of this thesis from 2000 to 2014, SDC Platinum3 reports 32,180 
announced divestitures of publicly traded European4 parents from which 5,791 (18%) 
account for the D-A-CH region (Table 1). Looking at the deal values instead of the pure 
number, the proportion of the D-A-CH region is slightly higher with 21.07%. 
 
Year GER A CH UK SWE FIN NO FR IT SP NL Total 
2000 318 32 134 1,054 177 109 57 292 97 63 198 2,758 
2001 292 22 138 858 169 102 67 279 113 50 184 2,502 
2002 298 18 115 649 97 88 49 214 98 73 161 2,076 
2003 299 12 149 795 114 71 69 243 107 83 157 2,342 
2004 244 20 125 580 113 67 45 235 112 46 187 2,020 
2005 278 22 93 539 114 56 43 193 112 49 163 1,888 
2006 273 15 116 582 118 71 57 227 157 72 179 2,097 
2007 287 22 112 623 157 76 56 241 122 75 161 2,229 
2008 245 25 102 585 125 68 50 217 142 99 120 2,086 
2009 235 32 94 570 113 53 73 226 91 96 120 2,047 
2010 215 27 69 550 142 56 47 248 133 102 113 2,134 
2011 199 31 101 498 107 80 68 277 76 134 109 2,109 
2012 192 21 92 512 130 82 47 223 74 125 100 1,966 
2013 203 28 96 471 122 72 50 227 74 119 90 1,943 
2014 226 23 101 447 113 72 38 238 86 122 76 1,983 
Total 3,804 350 1,637 9,313 1,911 1,123 816 3,580 1,594 1,308 2,118 32,180 
Table 1: Announced European Divestitures 2000–20145 
 
Regarding the subsample of spinoffs, the picture is similar. SDC Platinum reports 448 
announced spinoffs from which 67 (14.96%) occurred in the D-A-CH region. The 
shrinking share of UK spinoffs moreover depicts the increasing activity of continental 
European firms in corporate divestitures. Table 2 reports the spinoff cases in European 
countries between 2000 and 2014. 
 
                                                 
3 The SDC (Securities Data Company) Platinum database provides detailed information about historical financial transactions, such 
as Mergers and Acquisitions. It contains over 900,000 worldwide M&A transactions since the 1970s and is backed by Thomson 
Reuters. 
4 Excluding Russia. 
5 Excluding Russia; source: Thomson Financial. 
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Year GER A CH UK SWE FIN NO FR IT SP NL Total 
2000 8 1 4 14 3 6 3 2 5 1 1 54 
2001 1  2 10 5  3  4   27 
2002 1   5  1   1  1 9 
2003 3   4 1 1 2  2 1 3 22 
2004 2   6 4 3 2 1 2   35 
2005 5 1 1 6 4 2  3 3  1 32 
2006 5  2 14 7  1 2 3   41 
2007 5 1  12 6  7 2 1  3 50 
2008 4  2 8 2 1 1  6 1  31 
2009 1  1 4    1 1 1 1 11 
2010 1  1 5 5   1 3 2 2 22 
2011 1  4 7 3 2 2 3 2 7 4 44 
2012 2  1 3 5   1 1 1 1 18 
2013 1  1 5 5 2 1 3    22 
2014 2 1 2 6 3  2 3  2 2 30 
Total 42 4 21 109 53 18 24 22 34 16 19 448 
Table 2: Announced European Spinoffs 2000–20146 
 
The development of corporate divestitures, in terms of number of deals and deal value, 
illustrates the importance of divestiture research. As described by Sudarsanam (2010), 
despite some fluctuation, numbers and values are steadily increasing. Especially since 
the soaring increase in the year 2000, they remain on a relatively high level with an 
equally high volatility – Figure 3 for Selloffs and Figure 4 spinoffs show this 
development. The peaks prior to the bursting of the dot-com bubble at the beginning of 
the new millennium and prior to the Lehman crash in 2008 are particularly obviously 
identifiable. Both peaks are followed by a rapid decline in both deal value and number 
of deals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Excluding Russia; source: Thomson Financial. 
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Figure 3: European Divestitures 1990–20147 
 
 
 
Figure 4: European Spinoffs 1990–20148 
 
 
  
                                                 
7 Excluding Russia; source: Thomson Financial. 
8 Excluding Russia; source: Thomson Financial. 
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2.2 Rationale for Corporate Divestitures  
 
Böllhoff (2009) distinguishes between four groups of trigger factors regarding the 
rationale for corporate divestitures whereby their classification is not always 
unambiguous: 
 
• Parent-specific trigger factors (internal) 
• Target-specific trigger factors (internal) 
• Competition-conditioned trigger factors (external) 
• Involuntary trigger factors (external) 
 
Trigger factors caused by the parent company are, for example, failed M&A 
transactions which are reversed, dismantling of conglomerates and increase in corporate 
focus, change in strategic focus, financial distress that forces the company to raise cash, 
personnel changes in the management team and also insufficient organisational 
resources to manage the subsidiary efficiently (Böllhoff, 2009; Sudarsanam, 2010; 
Panda and Rao, 2012). A further rationale could be that the divested business was part 
of an acquired company and the new parent does not want to keep it as it either does not 
fit into its strategic concept (‘preserve focus’) or the parent needs funds to finance the 
acquisition (Sudarsanam 2010). Some companies also use divestitures as a defence 
against hostile takeovers by selling the ‘crown jewels’ (Sudarsanam, 2010; cf. also Loh 
et al., 1995). Also, the so-called ‘buy low and sell high’ strategy as a business model, 
where a company is bought for a low price and sold piecemeal at a higher price, could 
be a rationale for divestitures (Marquette and Williams, 2007; Sudarsanam, 2010). The 
same is true for a ‘buy-operate-sell’ strategy where an underperforming subsidiary is 
bought to turn it around and sell it with profit (Sudarsanam, 2010). Another rationale 
according to Panda and Rao (2012) could also be the desire to reduce internal 
competition. 
 
Target-specific trigger factors are often accompanied by competition-conditioned 
trigger factors. In this case, poor financial profitability, extended capital requirements or 
the end of a product life cycle lead to the divestiture of an asset. According to Böllhoff 
(2009), this is probably the most important rationale. The reason for these trigger factors 
is in many cases caused by cost benefits of competitors, excess capacity in the market or 
Literature Review on Divestitures 
13 
 
shrinking markets. Information asymmetries could be a possible rationale if the parent 
assumes that its subsidiary is undervalued, i.e. the different parts of a company are 
worth more as a stand-alone business, but also, a competitor’s tender offer, who is 
willing to pay an acquisition premium over the market value of the target asset, falls 
under competition-conditioned factors (Böllhoff, 2009). 
 
Finally, there are also involuntary factors which may force a company to divest a 
business. These are, on the one hand, antitrust regulations, which coerce a company to 
divest a business, and on the other hand, also expropriation or nationalisation measures 
by governments (Böllhoff, 2009).  
 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework for Shareholder Value Creation 
 
The reason for the value creation from divestitures seems to be obvious since most of 
the rationale lead to an increase in profitability, the reduction of losses, or ultimately 
secure the survival of a company. Many authors who have researched the sources of 
shareholder value creation, developed theoretical frameworks which serve as a basis to 
explain the shareholder wealth effects. Although there is some variation in the 
classification of the theories between different authors, the content is essentially similar. 
Three suitable approaches for theories explaining shareholder wealth effects, which 
cover and are based on past research, are presented chronologically hereinafter.  
 
Kirchmaier (2003) distinguishes five types of value creation:  
 
(1) Dismantling of conglomerates: The cost of diversified structures could exceed 
the benefits in the form of risk reduction and synergies and hence cause negative 
synergies. A divestiture could increase the corporate focus and remove those 
negative synergies.  
(2) Organisational improvements: The reduction of size through a divestiture could 
reduce the ‘information loss’ and increase information efficiency within the 
organisation. This facilitates a more efficient management of the firm. 
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(3) Capital market improvements: The increase in corporate focus and, as a 
consequence thereof, an increase in profitability could facilitate the access to 
capital markets or attract new investors. This again eliminates barriers to growth. 
(4) Corporate governance improvements: Better managerial incentives and a higher 
transparency lead to the reduction of agency costs and hence create value for the 
divesting firm. 
(5) Bondholder expropriation: Regarding this issue, Kirchmaier (2003, p. 2) cites 
Hite and Owers (1983) and states that a divestiture could lead to a “Value 
redistribution from bondholders to shareholders through a reduction of the 
quality of the collateral provided […].” 
 
Sewing (2010, p. 44) develops three more broad categories which to a large extent cover 
those of Kirchmaier (2003):  
 
(1) Value creation by divesting underperforming and value-destroying parts of the 
business.  
(2) Value creation through participation in the buyer’s value creation potential. 
(3) Value creation through a reallocation of a firm’s resources to better performing 
divisions. 
 
Fischer et al. (2013) also describe five possible theories for sources of value creation: 
 
(1) Transaction price: Divestitures can create shareholder value if the price for the 
divested asset exceeds its present value for the divestor. This may, for example, 
be the case if the transaction creates synergies on the buyer side and, hence, the 
unit is worth more for the buyer than for the seller.  
(2) Negative synergies: If two units or assets influence each other negatively, for 
example, through too high internal competition and/or cannibalisation effects, a 
divestiture can remove those negative synergies.  
(3) Agency costs: As divestitures usually increase transparency for the external 
capital market, management can be controlled more effectively. This reduces the 
possibilities for the agents to act not in the interest of the principals and, hence, 
reduces the agency costs and creates value for the principals. Moreover, the 
agency costs of the internal capital market can also be reduced. 
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(4) Managerial efficiency: With an increasing level of diversification, managing the 
firms efficiently becomes more and more difficult, also since the managers 
probably do not have the expertise for all branches. Reducing the diversification 
level through divesting non-core assets and focusing on the strengths increases 
managerial efficiency and leads to shareholder value creation. 
(5) Information asymmetries: Through the divestiture, more information about the 
divested asset becomes public, allowing a more efficient valuation of those 
assets. If they have been traded before at a discount because of the uncertainty 
due to missing information, the discount disappears and, hence, shareholder 
value increases. 
 
The overview shows that the sources of shareholder value creation are basically 
consistent when comparing the above presented classification schemes, although 
classified in different ways. The different categories cover almost the same content and 
overlap each other. Thereby, the central theories to explain shareholder value creation in 
divestiture transactions are the resource-based view and the principal-agent theory, 
which will be explained in more depth later.  
 
 
2.4 Divestiture Performance Studies 
 
2.4.1 Evolution of Divestiture Performance Studies 
 
The shareholder wealth effects and the different sources of value creation have been 
researched for 40 years. Although the focus was mainly on the US and with some delay 
also on the UK, research has also, only recently, also found its way into continental 
Europe. One of the first studies dates back to 1975 where Boudreaux (1975) 
investigated, probably for the first time, divestiture performance based on the capital 
market theory using event study methodology. Using event studies, divestiture 
performance is defined as the net change in shareholder wealth, i.e. the change in share 
prices during a specific event window surrounding the divestiture announcement that 
exceeds the expected return without the divestiture announcement during this event 
window (cumulative abnormal return)9. Usually, a short-term event window of a few 
                                                 
9 The expected return is estimated using statistical or economic models, which are explained in section 4.4.1.3. 
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days surrounding the immediate announcement day is applied to isolate the divestiture 
event from other unrelated events. Hence, the methodology allows capturing the net 
effect of a specific event like a divestiture on the shareholder value of the company of 
interest. Using monthly data and not distinguishing between spinoffs and selloffs, 
Boudreaux (1975) found positive shareholder wealth effects for voluntary divestitures, 
but negative effects for involuntary divestitures. From a present-day perspective, the 
validity of the results of this study seems to be doubtful since exact announcement dates 
cannot be defined and, at best, the month of the announcement can be localised. 
Nevertheless, it initiated a wide range of capital market based divestiture performance 
studies applying event study methodology.  
 
Whereas the first studies focus on the overall effect of divestitures, i.e. the shareholder 
wealth effects, later studies address the possible sources and factors influencing the 
shareholder wealth effects more and more. Fischer et al. (2013) classify these sources 
and the corresponding variables tested in (1) the financial situation of the divesting firm, 
(2) factors related to the divested asset, (3) factors related to the buyer/new owner of the 
divested asset, and (4) the development of the capital market as an environment related 
factor. 
 
In the following section, the author gives an exhaustive overview of existing divestiture 
performance studies and their central content, chronologically sorted by economic 
region and – where useful – form of divestiture. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
author focuses on the most important US and European studies. European studies that 
solely focus on the D-A-CH region are considered separately from the other European 
studies. Due to practical reasons, in the case of hybrid studies in terms of the form of 
divestiture, the study is listed under the selloff section. The main outcomes of the 
studies, i.e. the average net shareholder value creation for the total samples, are 
summarised in Tables 3 to 6 (pp. 21, 38, 47, 50)10. Table 7 (p. 54) for selloffs and Table 
8 (p. 55) for spinoffs provide an overview of the central variables investigated in the 
different studies, including the outcomes. The review of the divestiture literature is 
unique regarding the extent of studies included and provides a comprehensive picture of 
the different aspects investigated in divestiture research so far. This provides motivation 
for the large set of hypotheses of this thesis and allows comparison of the research 
                                                 
10 Unless otherwise denoted, the reported event windows in the tables refer to trading days relative to the announcement date [0] of 
the divestiture. For a discussion regarding the applied event windows see section 4.4.1.5.  
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results with previous research regarding other economic regions or different points in 
time.11  
 
 
2.4.2 US Studies 
 
2.4.2.1 US Spinoffs 
 
The 1980s 
The first notable studies about shareholder wealth effects of spinoffs were published by 
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983) and 
Rosenfeld (1984). These studies mainly focus on the overall effect of spinoff 
announcements and pay only a little attention to the factors influencing performance. 
All studies find significant positive cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
ranging between 2.84% and 5.56% during a two-day event window. However, they find 
that the size of the divested asset, tax or regulatory advantages, a good financial 
condition and strategic spinoffs of the parent have a positive effect on the 
announcement gains. On the other hand, they reject that the shareholder wealth gains 
come from wealth transfers from senior claim holders.  
 
The 1990s 
Cusatis et al. (1993) criticise the previous research by Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper 
and Smith (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) since investors would not fully 
anticipate an increased takeover activity following the spinoff at the immediate 
announcement and therefore underestimate the extent of shareholder value creation. 
They justify this statement with positive CAARs for the parent, as well as the spinoff, 
up to three years following the announcement. Hence, they also include the returns up 
to three years following the completion of the spinoff. For the parent firms of their 
sample, Cusatis et al. (1993) observe a matched-firm-adjusted return12 of 6.8% (6 
months event window), 12.5% (12 months), 26.7% (24 months) and 18.1 % (36 
months). They also perform a two-day event study with a reduced sample and detect a 
mean-adjusted return of 2.1%. Thus, the results of the long-term event study are in line 
                                                 
11 Please note that the recorded returns are always abnormal or excess returns, i.e. the returns exceeding the expected returns in the 
applied event window. For linguistic purposes, however, the author may sometimes only use the term ‘return’. Moreover, the 
mentioned abnormal returns are always averages for the sample. 
12 The excess return is calculated by subtracting the return of peers from the actual return instead of the expected return. 
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with the positive short-term results and confirm the finding that spinoffs seem to create 
significant shareholder value. 
 
Investigating the spinoff ex-date effects on shareholder wealth, Vijh (1994) delivers a 
different approach compared to most of the other scholars. Vijh (1994) observes a 
significant CAAR of 3.03% on the ex-date and shows that the wealth gains for 
shareholders in spinoff transactions exceed the announcement gains. However, 
information asymmetry could not be the reason for these excess returns as there should 
be no systematically new information on the ex-date. Indeed, Vijh (1994) attributes the 
excess returns on ex-dates to market imperfections such as transaction cost 
considerations or investor interests. 
 
Since the studies of Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983) and Hite 
and Owers (1983) cannot fully explain their observed shareholder wealth gains, Allen et 
al. (1995) develop another approach. Focusing on spinoffs that result from previous 
acquisitions, they try to explain the positive announcement returns as a result of the 
“[…] correction of a prior mistake” (Allen et al., 1995, p. 465). Although their research 
supports previous findings that spinoffs generally create positive CAARs, they find no 
evidence for their ‘correction-of-a-mistake’ hypothesis since the abnormal return for a 
matched sample of spinoffs that did not result from takeovers is nearly the same (2.15% 
compared to 1.85%).  
 
Attempting to gain new evidence for the origins of excess returns, Slovin et al. (1995) 
analyse the announcement effects on rival firms. Regarding spinoffs, it seems that the 
event has no influence on parent rivals with an insignificant announcement return of 
0.18%, but it shows a small influence on rivals of the spun-off entity with an 
announcement return of 0.60% (significant at the 10% level). Parent abnormal returns 
are in line with prior studies. Slovin et al. (1995) explain the positive effect on rival 
firms with the argument that the spinoff may be a sign that the parent firm regards its 
subsidiary as undervalued. Hence, the same might be true for rivals. 
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Seward and Walsh (1996) investigate spinoffs with a focus on internal corporate control 
mechanisms. However, they do not find that these control mechanisms are strongly 
related to the observed positive announcement effects. Overall, their sample shows 
CAAR of 2.6% and therefore confirms prior studies.  
 
Daley et al. (1997) test if cross-industry spinoffs lead to higher abnormal returns than 
spinoffs that do not increase corporate focus, and, if so, if the results are in line with 
improvements in operating performance and/or bonding benefits13. The results confirm 
their hypothesis detecting significant positive CAARs for cross-industry spinoffs (4.3%) 
but not for own-industry spinoffs (1.4%). For own-industry spinoffs, the median excess 
return is even negative with -0.1%. Overall, they observe a significant positive CAAR 
of 3.4%. Furthermore, they find evidence for their hypothesis that value creation derives 
from improvements in operating performance, which is significantly positive for cross-
industry spinoffs, measured via the change in return on assets from the fiscal year 
before to the fiscal year following the spinoff. However, they do not find evidence that 
bonding benefits are related to shareholder value creation. 
 
Following Cusatis et al. (1993), Desai and Jain (1999) use a long-term event window of 
three years to investigate if shareholder value gains in spinoff transactions can be 
explained by an increase in corporate focus. In their sample, parent firms undertaking 
focus-increasing spinoffs perform significantly better, with a CAAR of 25.37% 
compared to those of non-focus-increasing spinoffs with -10.51%. This remains true for 
a three-day event window where the CAAR for the focus-increasing sample is 4.45% 
compared to 2.17% for the non-focus-increasing sample. Similar to Daley et al. (1997) 
they furthermore report that operating performance is positively associated with an 
increase in corporate focus. Investigating the motives for non-focus-increasing spinoffs, 
they only find evidence for their hypothesis that firms often spin off underperforming 
subsidiaries. However, they do not find evidence that possible motives for non-focus-
increasing spinoffs are a reduction of debt or financial distress as well as a possible 
transfer of debt to the spun-off subsidiary.  
 
  
                                                 
13 “[…] bonding refers to a pre-commitment by managers to avoid cross-subsidizing relatively poor performing units […]” (Daley et 
al., 1997, p. 257). 
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Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) investigate the role of information asymmetry 
as a source of shareholder value creation. For their sample, Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) detect a highly significant CAAR of 3.15%. The results support 
their hypothesis that higher levels of information asymmetry before a spinoff lead to 
higher announcement returns than less information asymmetry. Furthermore, 
information asymmetry decreased after the completion of the spinoff. Moreover, the 
information asymmetry argument is even more important for firms spinning off related 
subsidiaries as they may not have as many negative synergies that can facilitate 
abnormal announcement gains as unrelated spinoffs. However, they do not find 
statistical support that regulatory issues or merger motives lead to higher abnormal 
returns. 
 
The 2000s 
Burch and Nanda (2003) try to investigate the costs of corporate diversity, which is 
partially related to the studies of Daley et al. (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999), 
researching the corporate focus hypothesis as the origin of shareholder value creation. 
Supporting those earlier studies, they find evidence that spinoffs reduce corporate 
diversity and, hence, value creation is at least partially related to prior losses caused by 
a conglomerate discount which is mitigated through the spinoff. 
 
Maxwell and Rao (2003) address the hypotheses of Hite and Owers (1983) and 
Schipper and Smith (1983) that the shareholder value gains are related to wealth 
expropriation from bondholders. Although Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper and 
Smith (1983) did not find evidence for their hypotheses, Maxwell and Rao (2003) again 
investigate this issue as the prior studies suffered from a small sample size and 
restricted access to bond price data. For their sample, they find a significant positive 
abnormal shareholder return of 3.59% and a significant negative abnormal bondholder 
return of -0.88%. The overall change in firm value is significantly positive with 1.59%. 
Hence, they conclude that spinoffs on average create shareholder value, but only 
partially at the expense of bondholders. Even though they find that the effect of spinoffs 
for stockholders is negatively related to the effect for bondholders, their wealth transfer 
hypothesis is only weakly significant.  
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Study Sample Period Sample Size Event Window CAAR Divestor 
Miles & Rosenfeld (1983) 1963-80 55 [0;1] 3.34%*** 
Hite & Owers (1983) 1963-81 123 [-1;0] 3.3%*** 
Schipper & Smith (1983) 1963-81 93 [-1;0] 2.84%*** 
Rosenfeld (1984) 1963-81 35 [-1;0] 5.56%*** 
Cusatis et al. (1993) 1965-88 146 2-days 2.1%a 
Vijh (1994) 1964-90 113 [-1;0] 2.9%*** 
   ex-date 3.3%*** 
Allen et al. (1995) 1962-91 94 [-1;0] 2.15%*** 
Slovin et al. (1995) 1980-91 39 [0;1] 1.32%** 
Seward & Walsh (1996) 1972-87 78 [-1;0] 2.6%*** 
Daley et al. (1997) 1975-91 85 [-1;0] 3.4%*** 
Desai & Jain (1999) 1975-91 155 [-1;1] 3.84%*** 
Krishnaswami & Subramaniam 
(1999) 
1979-93 118 [-1;0] 3.15%*** 
Mulherin & Boone (2000) 1990-99 106 [-1;1] 4.51%*** 
Maxwell & Rao (2003) 1974-97 80 [0;1] 3.59%*** 
Burch & Nanda (2003) 1979-96 106 [-2;1] 3.7%*** 
Ahn & Denis (2004) 1981-96 150 [-1;1] 4.03%a 
Marquette & Williams (2007) 1980-unkown 58 [-1;1] 1.35%* 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
a Unknown level of significance 
Table 3: Shareholder Value Effects of US Spinoff Announcements 
 
Ahn and Denis (2004) study the reasons for the conglomerate discount of corporations 
and try to link the discount to inefficient investment allocations within the firm since 
they observe that following spinoffs, the firms are no longer valued at a discount. In 
fact, they find that shareholder value gains following spinoff announcements are 
significantly associated with changes in investment allocation; however, improvements 
in investment allocation only partially explain the observed announcement gains. Ahn 
and Denis (2004) observe a CAAR of 4.03%, whereby the return for multi-segment 
firms (3.29%) is lower than those of single segment firms (5.77%). 
 
Marquette and Williams (2007) investigate the shareholder value changes of 
acquisition-spinoff combinations. Such combinations could either be the correction of a 
mistake (cf. Allen et al., 1995), or also strategic action to extract value from the first 
acquired and then spun-off subsidiary. Their announcement excess returns confirm 
earlier studies. Whereas the acquisitions destroy significant value for the bidder of  
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-2.04%, the spinoffs lead to shareholder value creation of 1.35%. Summing up both 
events, the bidders in the acquisition, respectively parents in the latter spinoff, create on 
average $90.21 million, which is insignificantly different from zero. Thus, they 
conclude that takeover-divestiture transactions neither destroy nor add value to the 
bidder/parent firm, either because these transactions are inconsequential or the bad and 
good deals balance each other.  
 
Table 3 summarises the results of the US studies regarding the shareholder value effects 
of corporate spinoffs. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 US Selloffs 
 
The 1980s 
As in the case of spinoffs, the first studies analysing the announcement effects of 
selloffs focus on the overall effect. Whereas Alexander et al. (1984) only find a slight 
announcement effect for selloffs (0.29%), Rosenfeld (1984) detects a more positive 
impact (2.33%) which is significantly smaller than those of his spinoff sample. 
 
Hearth and Zaima (1984) find significant positive shareholder wealth effects for the 
time preceding the divestiture announcement, as well as for the period of one trading 
week prior to and following the announcement. Their CAAR is 4.8% for the period of 
50 until 10 trading days before the announcement, 3.96% for the period of ten days 
before the announcement, and 3.55% for the announcement date and the ten days 
surrounding this date. During the period following the announcement, the excess returns 
become insignificant. Moreover, Hearth and Zaima (1984) find that divestors with a 
good financial constitution and divestors selling large assets obtain higher abnormal 
returns than their counterparts. The motive, however, seems to have no influence on 
abnormal returns. From a present-day perspective, the finding of abnormal returns 
already in the pre-announcement period somewhat contradicts the assumption of 
efficient capital markets14. In fact, it shows that the market at this time was not as 
informationally efficient as today and some market participants may have possessed 
quasi-insider information as information was not as easily publicly available as today. 
                                                 
14 The assumption of capital market efficiency is discussed in section 4.4.1.1. 
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This justifies the approach of Hearth and Zaima (1984) of also including the pre-
announcement period in the calculation of the abnormal return in order to assess the full 
shareholder wealth effect of the divestiture as long as there were no confounding events 
in this period.  
 
Using monthly data similar to Boudreaux (1975), Montgomery et al. (1984) specifically 
investigate the influence of the strategy behind the selloff on the share prices. During 
the period of one year prior to one year following the announcement, they find positive 
CAARs for strategic divestitures (34.53%, highly significant) and divestitures in 
response to liquidity concerns (25.67%, insignificant). The CAARs are negative for the 
case of the selling of unwanted units (-9.13%, significant at the 7% level), forced 
divestitures (-1.87%, insignificant) and also divestitures where no specific reason is 
stated (-10.81%, insignificant). Overall, the mean announcement excess returns during 
the observation period are 7.25% (significant at the 8% level). Hence, they find 
contrasting results to Hearth and Zaima (1984) who cannot find evidence for an 
influence of the divestiture motive. 
 
Jain (1985) extends the work of Alexander et al. (1984) and analyses the wealth effects 
for both sellers as well as buyers. For sellers, Jain (1985) finds a CAAR of 0.7% over 
the five days preceding the divestiture announcement; for buyers he finds a return of 
0.34% on day [-1] (both statistically significant). Furthermore, he observes that selloff 
announcements are preceded by a period of significantly negative abnormal returns. 
This is in contrast to Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), who find significantly positive 
abnormal returns in the pre-announcement period for parent companies engaging in 
spinoff transactions. Hence, Jain (1985) concludes that pre-divestiture performance may 
decide about the chosen form, dependent on the financial situation of the divesting firm, 
i.e. firms with liquidity problems are more likely to engage in selloff transactions, due 
to the need to generate cash, and spinoffs are more likely to be undertaken by healthy 
firms. Moreover, Jain (1985) suggests that selloffs can be regarded as partial mergers, 
where the target receives an acquisition premium whereas the buyer does not create 
significant shareholder value. 
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Hearth and Zaima (1986) argue that the announcement returns would not fully reflect 
shareholder wealth effects as there may be three sources of uncertainty that influence 
the market reaction: (1) the divestiture may not be completed, (2) the terms of the 
divestiture may change until completion, and (3) there may not be sufficient evidence 
that the benefits of the transaction will actually be achieved. Hence, Hearth and Zaima 
(1986) distinguish between three different periods: the pre-announcement period, the 
interim period between the announcement and the completion, and the post-completion 
period. In fact, they also find evidence for positive abnormal returns prior to the 
announcement date, whereas following the completion date abnormal returns become 
insignificant and random. The CAAR over the period on the announcement day and the 
day preceding is highly significant with 1.42%.  
 
Klein (1986) focuses on the relative size of the sold unit as well as on the announcement 
of the transaction price. Whereas for the whole sample she finds a significant CAAR of 
1.12%, the excess return averages 2.47% for the subsample of firms that initially 
announce the transaction price compared to 0.02% (insignificant) for the subsample not 
announcing a price. Also the difference between the excess returns of the two 
subsamples is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the excess return of the no-price 
announcement group remains insignificant even if the price is announced at a later 
point. Investigating the influence of the relative size, Klein (1986) detects that the main 
excess returns are earned by firms out of the ‘price’ subsample divesting more than 10% 
of their equity value. These findings are in line with prior research. 
 
Hite et al. (1987) compare the announcement effect of selloffs that are completed versus 
those that are terminated. Whereas the CAAR of the sample of selloff announcements 
that are completed is 1.66%, the sample for terminated selloff announcements averages 
1.41% (both statistically significant). However, at the time of the outcome 
announcement – meaning if the selloff is completed or terminated – the first sample 
receives an additional 0.82% (insignificant) abnormal return whereas the effect is -
0.95% (significant) for the termination sample. Moreover, for the latter case, the 
positive announcement returns are followed by a period of significantly large losses. 
Indeed, the excess returns for terminated selloff announcements with follow-up bids are 
more positive on the initial announcement respectively less negative on the outcome 
announcement than terminations without follow-up bids. Combining the excess return 
Literature Review on Divestitures 
25 
 
of the initial announcement and the announcement of the outcome, the completed 
selloffs average 2.28%, the terminated selloffs 0.46%. Hence, it appears that the 
announcement effects for terminated selloff announcements are equalised on the 
outcome announcement. Thus, Hite et al. (1987) claim their findings support the 
hypothesis that announcement gains derive from synergies, but not from removing 
information asymmetries. They also analyse the announcement effects for total 
liquidations and find highly positive returns (12.24%) for this form of divestitures. 
 
Developing a new approach, Tehranian et al. (1987) compare the announcement effects 
of firms with long-term performance plans with those of firms without. Their results 
indicate that firms compensating their managers based on long-term performance plans 
gain significant positive announcement excess returns (0.65% over a two-day event 
window), while firms without such compensation plans gain insignificant negative 
returns (-0.15%). The difference in returns between the two subsamples is significant. 
Hence, their study provides evidence that agency costs can be reduced by introducing 
long-term performance-based executive compensation plans. 
 
Hirschey and Zaima (1989) investigate the effects of insider trading and the ownership 
structure on wealth creation. Whereas the overall effect in their sample averages a 
highly significant 1.64% over a two-day event period [-1;0], they report a positive 
influence on announcement returns of insider net-buy activity as well as for firms that 
are closely held by insiders. During the same period, the CAAR to firms in the net-
buy/closely held subsample (5.26%, significant at the 1% level) outperforms the CAAR 
of the net-sell/widely held subsample massively (insignificant 0.75%). 
 
Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) examine the wealth effects of management buyouts 
(MBOs) and whether this form of divestiture is harmful to the parent company 
shareholders. Such transactions would be characterised by an absence of ‘arm’s length 
bargaining’ and the “[…] possibility of ‘managerial self-dealing’ […]” (Hite and 
Vetsuypens, 1989, p. 954). Indeed, they find that in comparison to interfirm 
divestitures, the wealth gains in MBOs are smaller, but the difference between the 
average excess returns is not significant. Whereas the CAAR for the MBO sample is 
0.55% (significant at the 5% level), the CAAR for the interfirm divestitures is 1.12% 
(significant at the 1% level). Albeit, the slightly positive effects for the MBO sample 
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might be caused by several outliers since sign tests do not show any significant results. 
However, they find no evidence for a harmful influence of MBOs on shareholder 
wealth, even if they distinguish between cases where the buyer belongs to the parent 
management, which might have more influence on the price negotiation and cases 
where the buyers are the managers of the divested division. Moreover, the participation 
of an outside third party also has no statistical influence on wealth effects. A positive 
effect can, however, be attributed to the relative size of the price in relation to the pre-
buyout equity and the stake of the management in the parent’s equity. 
 
The 1990s 
Hirschey et al. (1990) test if bank debt serves as an informal endorsement of unexpected 
corporate decisions like selloffs and can be viewed as ‘quasi-insider’ knowledge. 
Therefore, they compare the excess returns of selloff announcements of firms with zero 
or low bank debt with those of firms with bank debt. They find that sellers with zero or 
low bank debt receive on average 0.83% abnormal return (insignificant), whereas sellers 
with bank debt receive 2% (significant). Looking at the effect of insider trades before 
the announcement of selloffs, they come to a similar result, observing 1.18% CAAR for 
net insider sell decisions and 2.23% for net insider buy decisions (both significant). 
Combining both effects, the zero bank debt and net insider sell sample leads to an 
abnormal return close to zero, whereas the non-zero bank debt and net insider buy 
sample leads to 2.72% (highly significant). However, they do not find evidence that the 
results regarding bank debt are caused by leverage effects since they do not observe a 
relation between financial leverage of the selling firms and abnormal announcement 
returns. Hence, they conclude that bank loans are viewed positively by the capital 
markets regarding unexpected corporate decisions. They expect the banks to take on a 
monitoring function implying that those decisions are endorsed by the respective bank.  
 
In line with Alexander et al. (1984), who only find weak significant wealth effects, and 
opposing other earlier research, Denning and Shastri (1990) neither find any significant 
influence of divestiture announcements on shareholder wealth nor on bondholder 
wealth. However, Denning and Shastri (1990) only investigate a small sample of firms 
with single, and at the same time large, divestitures, which may restrict the 
comparability of the outcomes with previous research.  
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Cakici et al. (1991) observe that the abnormal returns to parent shareholders are 
significantly higher if the assets are sold to foreign bidders rather than to domestic ones. 
Moreover, there are specific industries that perform better than others. Whereas selloffs 
in the electronics, computer and telecommunications industry and in the retail industry 
are regarded favourably by the capital markets, selloffs in the oil/gas industry are 
regarded less favourably. Regarding the form of divestiture, i.e. horizontal, vertical or 
conglomerate selloffs, as well as the financial status, they do not find any influence. 
 
In a theoretical approach, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) explore the determinants of 
divestiture performance looking at the financial situation of the firm and possible 
buyers. They conclude that selling during times of financial distress should destroy 
shareholder value as the firms which would have the best use for the assets to be sold 
are in the same industry and likely to have financial distress themselves in an industry-
wide recession. In these situations, assets are highly illiquid which lowers the price for 
the assets for sale. However, in a liquid market, the seller could profit from the transfer 
of the assets to an owner that is able to use the assets more efficiently. 
 
Similar to Klein (1986), Sicherman and Pettway (1992) investigate the effect of price 
disclosure at the announcement, and also the effect of the financial condition. 
Furthermore, they analyse the influence of those factors on the buyers to determine how 
shareholder gains are shared between seller and buyer. Whereas for the overall sample, 
the seller CAAR yields 0.92%, the CAARs are substantially higher for the subsamples 
of sellers with a good financial condition and sellers disclosing the price on the 
announcement date (1.13% compared to 0.37% and 1.48% compared to 0.31% 
respectively, significant at the 1% level). Combined, the difference is even higher with a 
significant CAAR of 1.89% for firms in a good financial condition that announce the 
price and an insignificant CAAR of 0.13% for sellers subject to a downturn of financial 
strength and not announcing the price. However, looking at US dollar values instead, 
the average gains for firms in a poorer financial condition are higher than for those in a 
good financial condition. In summary, the findings are in line with those of Klein 
(1986) ascribing a direct influence of the disclosure of the transaction price on the 
announcement gains. 
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Pashley and Philippatos (1993) link the announcement gains of selloffs to the life cycle 
stage of the divesting firm. Therefore, they cluster their sample into four different 
groups: (1) the late expansion/early maturity stage, (2) the regenerating maturity stage, 
(3) the late maturity/early decline stage, and (4) the decline stage. However, they only 
find weak results. Comparing the CAAR during a 21-day event window, they find a 
slightly positive but insignificant effect for the first three life cycle stages compared to a 
control sample and a slightly negative effect (also insignificant) for the last stage (3.8%, 
4.9%, 5% and -2%). Also, for the whole sample, they find only a modest 
outperformance of divesting firms over their control group and any significant results 
are at rather low levels and can be explained by a few outliers. Hence, their findings do 
not support earlier studies; therefore, they conclude that an investor will not be better 
off by investing in firms undertaking voluntary selloffs. Indeed, as expected, the 
regenerating maturity stage, as well as the late maturity/early decline stages, seems to 
have the best performance.  
 
Brown et al. (1994) investigate asset sales by financially distressed firms. For their 
overall sample, they find a CAAR of insignificant 0.01% which is contrary to the results 
for healthy firms. Looking at the use of the proceeds, i.e. if the proceeds are used to 
repay debt or to remain in the company, they find significant differences. For the repay 
debt sample, the CAAR is -1.63% (insignificant); for all other purposes the abnormal 
return averages 1.87% (significant at the 5% level). According to Brown et al. (1994), 
this reaction seems to be obvious as the creditors, which seem to have an influence on 
the company decisions, may not believe in the survival of the company if they do not 
allow reinvestment of the money. Dividing the sample further between firms that went 
bankrupt within two years after the event and firms that escaped bankruptcy, the stock 
market reaction is significantly negative for the first case and positive for the second 
case. The influence of the use of proceeds remains the same as in the overall sample. 
Moreover, in those cases where the cash raised is used to pay down debt, bondholders 
seem to gain at the expense of shareholders. 
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Servaes and Zenner (1994) analyse the effects of the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
(ERTA)15 on the returns of target firms in foreign acquisitions in the US. Regarding 
their sample of acquisitions of units, which equals the parent returns in selloffs, they 
observe a highly significant abnormal announcement return of 1.08%. Against their 
expectations, they find neither an influence of the tax reform nor of the changes in 
exchange rate on abnormal returns during their observation period from 1979 to 1988. 
Just as in previous studies, the relative size of the sold unit has a significant influence on 
returns. 
 
As noted in the spinoff section, Slovin et al. (1995) analyse the announcement effects 
on rival firms for different forms of divestiture transactions. Regarding selloffs, they 
measure an announcement return of 1.7%, which is highly significant, whereas the 
effect on parent rivals is insignificant with 0.03%. Also, the effect on subsidiary rivals is 
with 0.04% insignificant. Hence, a selloff seems to have no influence on industry rivals. 
 
John and Ofek (1995) support the corporate focus hypothesis. They observe that the 
excess return for their focus-increasing sample exceeds the return of non-focus-
increasing divestitures by 1.2%–2.4% dependent on the measure of focus increase 
(Herfindahl index, SIC-Code, number of segments). This evidence is supported by an 
increase in operating performance in the years following the divestiture. Moreover, John 
and Ofek (1995) state that the influence of the focus-increasing effect on divestiture 
performance dominates other explanations for shareholder value gains. 
 
As do Brown et al. (1994), Lang et al. (1995) look at the use of proceeds in divestiture 
transactions. Inconsistent with the findings of Brown et al. (1994), their results show 
that firms paying out the proceeds (primarily to pay down debt but also to pay dividends 
to their shareholders) perform significantly better than firms reinvesting their proceeds. 
In the latter case, the proceeds would be discounted “[…] because of agency costs of 
managerial discretion” according to Lang et al. (1995, p. 22), although they do not find 
direct evidence for this hypothesis. Also the relative size has a significant influence. 
Lang et al. (1995) conclude that – contrary to prior research – the performance gains 
would not simply result from participating in the transfer of the assets to higher valued 
                                                 
15 The Economic Recovery Tax Act was a federal law in the US from 1981 aimed to “encourage economic growth through the 
reduction of the tax rates for individual taxpayers, acceleration of capital cost recovery of investment in plant, equipment, and real 
property, and incentives for savings, and for other purposes” (Public Law 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, enacted 13th August 1981). 
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uses, but rather depend on the financing hypothesis, i.e. assets are sold when this is the 
most favourable and cheapest way to obtain funding. The fact that the selling firms in 
their sample are mostly poorly performing supports this assumption.  
 
Loh et al. (1995) reveal that divestitures that are undertaken as an instrument of 
takeover defence may not be shareholder value-creating. Whereas for their overall 
sample of solely large divestitures (transaction value of at least $75 million) the two-day 
announcement return is 1.50% (significant at the 10% level), the return for divestitures 
of firms that were subject to a takeover bid is just 0.93% and insignificant. Regarding a 
seven-day event window, the abnormal return for the latter sample becomes even 
negative. In contrast, the return for divestitures without takeover speculation is 2.58% 
and significant at the 5% level. However, Loh et al. (1995) only look at this single 
factor and renounce multivariate analyses including other variables that have been 
shown to influence shareholder value creation. Moreover, the ‘takeover-speculation’ 
sample is fairly small with just 13 cases. 
 
Blumberg and Owers (1996) investigate whether cross-border selloffs lead to higher 
abnormal announcement returns for the target parent than selloffs to domestic firms, as 
was the case in the study by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) for acquisitions of whole 
firms. For the two-day event window, Blumberg and Owers (1996) find highly 
significant abnormal returns of 1.44%. Nevertheless, the abnormal returns are not higher 
as in previous studies for domestic selloffs. Therefore, they cannot reject their null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in returns between asset sales to domestic and 
foreign acquirers. Also, the variation between different major acquirer regions (UK, 
Germany, Canada, Japan etc.) does not seem to be substantial. 
 
Looking at both stockholders and bondholders, Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) try to 
reveal a more complete picture of wealth effects of corporate selloffs. Despite the 
overall effect, they particularly look at the use of proceeds and three different motives 
for the divestiture. Consistent with the findings of John and Ofek (1995), they find a 
significantly positive effect for strategic (focus-increasing) divestitures and a 
significantly negative effect for divestitures motivated by takeover fears. Financial 
distress seems to have no unambiguous influence on shareholder wealth; however, the 
benefits of selloffs by financially distressed firms are positive for bondholders. The 
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overall announcement effect for shareholders in their sample averages 1.05% over a 
two-day event window (significant at the 1% level). Moreover, Datta and Iskandar-
Datta (1996) document wealth transfers between stockholders and bondholders that may 
depend on the relative size, the use of proceeds and the protection of bondholders by 
covenants. 
 
Guedes and Parayre (1997) present a model that distinguishes between selloffs of 
successful and underperforming divisions, i.e. ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. As they assumed, 
the selloffs of winners lead to significantly positive abnormal returns over a two-day 
event window (3.37%) whereas the returns for the losers are insignificantly different 
from zero (0.58%). Also, the difference between the returns is highly significant. The 
reason for this difference, according to Guedes and Parayre (1997), is that the 
announcement of a selloff of a winner reveals good news about the division, whereas 
the selloff announcement of a loser does not. 
 
Borde et al. (1998) analyse the wealth effects of divestitures of foreign subsidiaries. The 
four-day announcement returns for divestitures of foreign subsidiaries average a highly 
significant 2.28%. However, the returns are not significantly different from divestitures 
of domestic subsidiaries. Going further, they report a positive influence of the relative 
size, if the reason for the divestiture is a strategic reorganisation or to counter liquidity 
problems, and if the country of the divested subsidiary is classified as an industrial 
country by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Borde et al., 1998). 
 
The 2000s 
Hanson and Song (2000) relate the announcement effects of corporate divestitures to the 
firm’s managers’ stock ownership and the proportion of outside directors on the board. 
In a cross-sectional regression, they find no influence for the stock ownership variable 
but a moderate influence of the fraction of outside directors. Looking at the cases with 
positive absolute gains only, both variables have a positive and significant influence on 
the seller’s shareholder wealth. Hence, the results support their hypothesis that stock 
ownership gives managers incentives to act in the best interest of the shareholders and 
that outside directors are effective monitors and advisors (Hanson and Song, 2000, p. 
68). 
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For their sample of 175 divestitures between 1990 and 1994, Kang and Diltz (2000) find 
that filtering the sample for contemporaneous dividend announcements leads to a 
reduced significance of the generally large and positive announcement returns and 
strengthens the negative wealth effects in the respective cases. Based on these results, 
they underline the importance of careful data selection methodologies in order to 
provide reliable results.  
 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) compare the announcement returns of acquisitions and the 
different forms of divestitures (asset sales, spinoffs, and equity carve-outs) in order to 
determine whether the wealth effects are consistent with a synergistic explanation. They 
find significantly positive announcement effects for both acquisitions (total) and 
divestitures (parent), supporting their hypothesis that restructuring events are a response 
to economic change and thus a result of synergistic considerations. Moreover, they 
detect a positive effect of the relative size of the target on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Byerly et al. (2003) focus on different types of portfolio restructuring. They divide their 
sample of firms engaging in corporate divestitures into eight subgroups. First, they 
distinguish between the restructuring strategies of refocusing and repositioning, then, 
they further distinguish between “single/dominant business firms, related-constrained, 
related-linked, and unrelated diversifiers” (Byerly et al. 2003, p. 537)16. Whereas for 
refocusing strategies, they expect the unrelated and related-linked firms to obtain higher 
announcement returns, they expect the single/dominant and related-constrained firms to 
receive higher abnormal returns when following repositioning strategies. Their results, 
however, are somewhat mixed. Regarding refocusing strategies, all diversified firms 
obtained significant positive announcement returns on day [-1], whereas the return for 
related-constrained firms was the highest with 3.43%. Regarding the repositioning 
strategies, the single/dominant, related-constrained and related-linked firms obtained 
significant positive returns. Here, the highest returns were received by the 
single/dominant firms with 6.21% on day [-1]. Looking at the two-day announcement 
returns, the only significant returns were obtained by the related-constrained firms in the 
refocusing sample and the single/dominant and related-constrained firms in the 
repositioning sample. This evidence regarding refocusing at least partially contradicts 
                                                 
16 In related-constrained and related-linked firms, less than 70% of the revenue comes from the dominant business. Whereas in 
related-constrained firms, there are direct links between the different businesses and they share resources or assets, there are only 
limited links and resource/asset sharing in the case of related-linked firms. The latter case represents a mixture between related and 
unrelated diversification. 
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prior evidence that overdiversified (unrelated) firms should benefit most from de-
diversification. However, it might be the case that related-constrained firms obtain the 
highest returns as the refocusing in these firms may be part of a coherent strategy and an 
offensive rather than a defensive behaviour (Byerly et al., 2003). The evidence that 
single/dominant and related-constrained firms, characterised by a low level of 
diversification, benefit most from repositioning strategies is in line with their 
expectations17. 
 
Datta et al. (2003) investigate the divestiture performance dependent on the seller’s 
Tobin q ratio18, the degree of monitoring by private creditors, the relatedness of the 
divested asset and the number of bidders. Datta et al. (2003) find that high q ratios 
influence the announcement returns positively, as the seller is likely to use the proceeds 
in a better way than low q sellers. Also, lender monitoring has a significant positive 
influence on the seller’s announcement returns as the use of proceeds may be effectively 
controlled by the creditors. Surprisingly, the relatedness of the divested unit, as well as 
the number of bidders, seems to have no influence. Regarding the transaction as a whole 
(seller plus bidder), divestitures create the most value when high q acquirers and low q 
sellers are involved; when low q acquirers and high q sellers are involved, the 
transaction is likely to be value-destroying. This can be explained with the view that the 
divested unit is either moved from a poorly performing to a good performing unit or 
vice versa. 
 
Slovin et al. (2005) focus on the form of payment by comparing the performance effects 
of selloffs with equity and cash as means of payment. Contrary to the existing M&A 
literature, equity deals are viewed more favourably by capital markets than cash deals. 
Whereas the CAAR is 3.17% for the equity case (9.77% for the buyer), the excess 
return yields 1.89% (-0.3%) for the cash case, although the difference between the 
returns is not significant at conventional alpha levels. Regarding the combined excess 
returns (weighted), the picture remains the same with an excess return of 0.21% for the 
cash deals and 3.18% for the stock deals respectively. These results are in line with 
changes in operating performance following the selloff. Hence, this case shows again 
                                                 
17 The results of this source are not presented in the table as results are only reported for the eight subsamples and not for the overall 
sample. 
18 Datta et al. (2003) use Tobin’s q ratio as proxy for managerial performance. Tobin’s q is calculated as the total market value of a 
company divided by the replacement value of its assets. 
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that evidence from M&A cannot simply be transferred on divestitures; moreover, it 
supports the evidence that divestitures on average create net shareholder value.  
 
Bates (2005) analyses the announcement returns of divestitures with respect to the use 
of proceeds and the investment opportunities of the seller in cash transactions. The 
highest returns are obtained from the subsample of divestitures, which use the proceeds 
to pay down debt (1.6%), followed by the subsample of divestitures where the proceeds 
are retained within the firm (0.9%). The announcement returns for the equity payout 
sample (either stock repurchase or extra dividend) are the smallest and insignificant 
(0.7%). The difference between the pay debt sample and the other two subsamples is 
significant. Furthermore, the return for firms retaining the proceeds is moderated by the 
growth opportunities of that firm, i.e. firms with better growth opportunities generate 
higher abnormal returns. For this subsample, positive abnormal returns in the two years 
following the transaction suggest that the benefits of this usage are not fully 
incorporated at the announcement date, in contrast to the remaining subsamples. At the 
time of the announcement it is not fully clear what happens to the retained proceeds. 
The positive results for the pay debt subsample are likely to result from the agency costs 
of a suboptimal debt structure which is improved by the transaction. The study of Bates 
(2005) adds further evidence to the studies of Brown et al. (1994) and Lang et al. (1995) 
by incorporating the equity payout option as the third subsample and therefore further 
specifies the use of proceeds as a source of shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Similar to their study from 2000, Hanson and Song (2006) investigated the influence of 
the board structure, ownership structure, insider trading and external monitoring on 
shareholder wealth. In comparison to their findings from 2000 regarding a sample out of 
the same period, they find a positive influence of managerial ownership from inside 
directors, the proportion of outside board directors, an increase in net buying activity 
before the selloff (although still negative) as well as the relative size of the transaction. 
Also, external monitoring, measured by a dummy that indicated whether the selling firm 
becomes a takeover target after the transaction, seems to have a positive influence. The 
use of proceeds to pay down debt, however, has no statistically significant influence on 
shareholder wealth in their regression analysis. Hence, shareholders seem to benefit 
from internal control mechanisms. 
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Kiymaz (2006) looks at a broader set of variables influencing shareholder wealth in 
selloff transactions. He observes a statistically positive influence of the motivation to 
pay down debt, the degree of bank loans indicating external monitoring of the firm, the 
total asset turnover (applied as a measure of managerial efficiency) and the divestors’ 
total assets, suggesting that larger firms’ shareholders obtain higher wealth gains. Also, 
a higher profitability of the divestor, measured by the return on equity (ROE), has a 
slightly positive influence. The increase in corporate focus, however, only has a small 
influence solely looking at the motives for the selloff, but has no significant influence in 
a regression including all tested variables, opposing prior research. Also, unlike prior 
research, the relative size of the transaction has no significant influence on shareholder 
wealth; financial distress, measured by the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term issuer 
credit ratings, has a significant positive influence supporting the bankruptcy avoidance 
hypothesis. Moreover, the announcement returns vary between industries. The highest 
returns are obtained by the firms in the SIC 10–13 group (6.43%). 
 
Bergh et al. (2008) not only investigate the performance effects of corporate spinoffs 
and selloffs, but also the rationale behind a company’s decision for the chosen form. 
They argue that the company should choose the form which mitigates information 
asymmetries and creates most shareholder wealth. For their analysis of the 
announcement effects, they distinguish between selloffs and spinoffs and categorise the 
sample based on the firm’s degree of diversification similar to Byerly et al. (2003) in 
single, dominant, related-constrained, related-linked and unrelated businesses. They find 
that firms divesting related businesses (single, dominant and related-constrained 
businesses) significantly perform better when they choose the form of a spinoff, 
whereas firms divesting unrelated businesses (related-linked and unrelated businesses) 
significantly perform better by choosing the form of a selloff. Overall, the 
announcement returns for selloffs are positive in all of the five categories ranging from 
0.61% (single business) to 3.55% (related-linked business). The diversification level is 
not the only variable that influences the choice for a specific form of divestitures; this, 
however, goes beyond the scope of the underlying thesis. 
 
Hege et al. (2009) look at the form of payment in corporate asset sales. They suggest 
that equity deals should lead to higher abnormal returns than cash deals, in contrast to 
the case of mergers. Their results support this view. Sellers in their sample gain a 
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significant 6.92% when the mode of payment is equity and a significant 1.43% when 
the mode of payment is cash. Also, the difference in returns is highly significant. 
Moreover, in equity transactions, the buyer of the sold asset can also incorporate some 
announcement gains which count for about 40% of the combined announcement gain. 
The results of a cross-sectional regression are consistent with the univariate results. 
Unlike prior studies, other independent variables regarding the characteristics of the 
selling firm (size, firm performance, firm financial status etc.) do not show any 
statistical significance. 
 
Bennett (2010) investigates not only the structure of ownership of the seller in selloff 
transactions, but also those of the corresponding buyer and the nine different 
combinations that may arise. He distinguishes between widely held firms, large outside 
ownership and large inside ownership. Regarding the ownership structure of the seller 
exclusively, the only significant and positive announcement returns occur in the case of 
a large outside shareholder (2.04%). If the buyer also has a large outside shareholder, 
the average excess return increases (3.13%); if the buyer is a widely held firm or has 
large inside shareholders, the average excess return decreases (1.06% (insignificant) and 
1.93% respectively). The results for all other possible combinations are insignificant, 
except for the combination of large inside shareholders on the seller side as well as on 
the buyer side with an announcement return of -1.5%. Using a cross-sectional 
regression on the seller’s announcement returns, Bennett (2010) observes a significantly 
positive influence if the buyer has a large outside shareholder and a significantly 
negative influence if the seller has a large inside shareholder. Interestingly, unlike prior 
research, the variable ‘price disclosure’ at the deal announcement is not significant 
including the ownership variables. 
 
Owen et al. (2010) determine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
likelihood of corporate divestitures and their impact on divestiture announcement 
effects. They find that the likelihood of necessary divestitures is much higher with more 
effective corporate governance mechanisms such as, for example, strong shareholder 
rights, large boards or large management ownership, and that the announcement returns 
are positively related to control mechanisms such as an independent board or 
blockholders owning a significant amount of a firm’s equity. 
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Brauer and Stüssi (2010) investigate the impact of the timing of a divestiture in a 
divestiture wave. For a large sample they find that companies divesting early or late in a 
divestiture wave obtain higher excess returns than companies divesting in-between. In 
contrast to prior findings, they also observe higher abnormal returns for firms with poor 
financial performance, but no influence of the relatedness of the divested asset. In a 
more exhaustive analysis of the same data, Brauer and Wiersema (2012) detect a CAAR 
of 0.2% for divestitures over a seven-day event window. Moreover, they find two major 
moderating effects, which are industry munificence19 and industry dynamism. Whereas 
in low-munificence industries, the influence of a firm’s position in a divestiture wave on 
share price remains relatively the same, but more positive overall, there is a negative 
linear relationship for announcement returns in a divestiture wave in dynamic 
industries. 
 
Clayton and Reisel (2013) find particularly high excess returns for firms with high 
leverage and firms using the proceeds to repay debt. Combining both variables, the 
effect becomes even more pronounced. Despite these variables, the relative size and a 
stock-option based compensation also have a significant positive influence on the 
announcement returns, in contrast to an increase in corporate focus, growth 
opportunities or profitability. However, Clayton and Reisel (2013) use monthly returns 
and the methodology used is not really transparent. 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of the US studies regarding the announcement effects of 
corporate selloffs. 
 
Study Sample Period Sample Size Event Window CAAR Divestor 
Alexander et al. (1984) 1964-73 53 [-1;0] 0.29%* 
Rosenfeld (1984) 1969-81 62 [-1;0] 2.33%*** 
Hearth & Zaima (1984) 1979-81 58 [-5;5] 3.55%** 
Montgomery et al. (1984) 1976-79 78 year [-1;1] 7.27%*b 
Jain (1985) 1976-78 1068-1062 [-5;-1] 0.7%*** 
Hearth & Zaima (1986) 1975-82 75 [-1;0] 1.42%*** 
Klein (1986) 1970-79 202 [-2;0] 1.12%*** 
Hite et al. (1987) 1963-81 55 [-1;0] 1.66%*** 
Hirschey & Zaima (1989) 1975-82 64 [-1;0] 1.64%*** 
                                                 
19 “Munificent industries are characterized by an abundance of resources, reduced resource dependencies, and greater opportunity 
for profitable firm growth […]” (Brauer and Wiersema, 2012, p. 1476). 
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Study Sample Period Sample Size Event Window CAAR Divestor 
Hite & Vetsuypens (1989) 1973-1985 15120 [-1;0] 0.55%** 
  468 [-1;0] 1.12%*** 
Hirschey et al. (1990) 1975-82 75 [-1;0] 1.47%*** 
Denning & Shastri (1990) 1970-1990 50 [-6;6] -0.01%a 
Cakici et al. (1991) 1982-1987 149 [0;1] 1.22*** 
Sicherman & Pettway (1992) 1970-79 202 [-1;0] 0.92%*** 
Brown et al. (1994) 1979-1988 6221 [-1;0] 0.01% 
Servaes & Zenner (1994) 1979-1988 210 [-1;0] 1.08*** 
Slovin et al. (1995) 1980-91 179 [0;1] 1.7%*** 
John & Ofek (1995) 1986-88 321 [-2;0] 1.5%*** 
Lang et al. (1995) 1984-89 93 [-1;0] 1.41%*** 
Loh et al. (1995) 1980-87 59 [-1;0] 1.50%* 
Blumberg & Owers (1996) 1980-90 169 [-1;0] 1.44%*** 
Datta & Iskandar-Datta (1996) 1983-90 73 [-1;0] 1.05%*** 
Guedes & Parayre (1997) 1967-87 370 [-1;0] 3.37%*** 
Borde et al. (1998) 1979-91 11122 [-1;2] 2.28%*** 
Hanson & Song (2000) 1981-95 326 [-1;1] 0.60%** 
Kang & Diltz (2000) 1990-94 175 [-1;0] 0.33%a 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) 1990-99 139 [-1;1] 2.60%*** 
Datta et al. (2003) 1982-92 113 [-1;0] 1.63%*** 
Bates (2005) 1990-98 372 [-1;1] 1.20%*** 
Slovin et al. (2005) 1982-00 258 (cash) 
69 (stock) 
[-1;0] 
[-1;0] 
1.89%*** 
3.17%*** 
Hanson & Song (2006) 1981-95 263 [-1;0] 0.56%*** 
Kiymaz (2006) 1989-02 205 [-1;0] 3.07*** 
Hege et al. (2009)  93 (cash) 
37 (stock) 
[-1;0] 
[-1;0] 
1.43%*** 
6.92%*** 
Benett (2010) 1979-90 332 [-1;0] 0.46%*** 
Owen et al. (2010) 1997-05 797 [-1;1] 1.57%*** 
Brauer & Wiersema (2012) 1993-07 226 [-3;3] 0.2%a 
Clayton & Reisel (2013) 1990-94 435 month [0] 0.99%* 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
a Unknown level of significance     
b Based on monthly data     
Table 4: Shareholder Value Effects of US Selloff Announcements 
 
  
                                                 
20 MBOs. 
21 Financially distressed firms. 
22 Foreign divestitures. 
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2.4.3 European Studies 
 
2.4.3.1 European Spinoffs 
 
In one of the first important studies regarding the announcement effects of European 
spinoffs, Kirchmaier (2003) reported significant positive announcement returns. For a 
three-day announcement period, the CAAR is 5.4%. Interestingly, Kirchmaier (2003) 
shows some results that contrast US findings. For example, small spinoffs outperform 
large spinoffs with a CAAR of 6.4% versus 3.5% respectively. Moreover, countering 
Hite et al. (1987), the CAAR of aborted spinoff announcements exceeds those of the 
completed, and in contrast to Vijh (1994), he does not find significant ex-date effects.  
 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) studied short-run as well as long-run wealth effects 
for a sample of 156 spinoffs. Analysing the short-run effects, they observe a CAAR of 
2.62%. In line with prior studies, they find that announcement returns are positively 
related to an increase in corporate focus. For the information asymmetry hypothesis, 
they do not find evidence. Moreover, the different corporate governance systems in 
European countries and an increase in geographical focus seem to have no influence on 
returns. However, the sample size related to the geographical focus variable is fairly 
small. Analysing the long-run excess returns, they do not find any statistically 
significant results implying market efficiency. Later, Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2009) 
apply the same variables on a meta-analysis of 26 worldwide spinoff studies. The 
findings mostly support prior results. Returns are to be higher for larger spinoffs, for 
spinoffs that increase corporate focus, for tax- or regulatory-friendly spinoffs, and 
interestingly for spinoffs that are announced but not completed. Moreover, they do not 
find significant differences in returns between US and European studies or between 
earlier and more recent studies.  
 
For a sample of western European spinoffs, Vollmar (2014) investigates a large set of 
factors that may influence spinoff performance. On average Vollmar (2014) reports a 
significant positive shareholder wealth effect of 4.58% at the announcement. Amongst 
other findings, Vollmar (2014) finds significantly higher abnormal returns for industrial 
focus-increasing spinoffs, for firms controlled by debt-holders and firms with a good 
financial performance, as well as firms increasing the transparency through the spinoff. 
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The market environment, industry affiliation and size of the divestor, as well as an 
increase in the geographic focus have no effect on shareholder wealth. 
 
 
2.4.3.2 European Selloffs 
 
Cadiou (1988) analyses a sample of 92 divestitures of French firms between 1980 and 
1987. Using weekly returns, he finds a significantly positive abnormal return of 2.52% 
in the week of the announcement. Distinguishing between firms in financial distress, the 
selling of non-profitable units, the need for cash to invest and firms refocusing their 
operations, Cadiou (1988) finds no influence of those factors. However, looking at the 
weeks [0;1] at least the factors financial distress and refocusing have a significantly 
positive influence at the 10% alpha level. 
 
The 1990s 
Afshar et al. (1992) find a CAAR for their UK sample of 0.86% which is statistically 
not significant. More interesting are the findings regarding several subsamples. 
Whereas, as already reported in US studies, the price declaration at the announcement, 
as well as the relative size of the divested asset, have a significant influence on 
shareholder returns, the findings for completed versus only intended selloffs are 
ambiguous. Moreover, they find evidence for the ‘bankruptcy avoidance’ hypothesis 
since the abnormal returns are negatively related to the financial strength of the seller. 
 
Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995) provide the first, albeit preliminary, evidence on 
announcement effects of selloffs in different European countries, analysing a sample of 
UK, Swedish, French and German firms. They find that similar to the US, the size of 
the selloff seems to have the greatest impact on divestiture performance. However, in 
contrast to the US studies, they also find substantially abnormal returns for the period 
after the selloff announcement and for the period before the announcement (the latter 
only for continental European firms), which may be due to considerable information 
leakages. Furthermore, analysing the differences between domestic and foreign 
divestitures, they introduce a new variable into the divestiture research and find 
substantial differences between countries. For Germany and especially for France, 
foreign divestitures are subject to negative abnormal returns.  
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Also, focusing on the UK, Lasfer et al. (1996) find contrary evidence to Hearth and 
Zaima (1984) and partially also Sicherman and Pettway (1992) as they detect a superior 
announcement effect for financially distressed firms versus healthy firms. Their CAAR 
over a two-day event period yields 2.12% for financially distressed firms, but only 
0.49% for the healthy sample. The overall CAAR is 0.82% and significant. 
Furthermore, excess returns are also influenced by the debt level of the selling company 
since more debt is seen as a proxy for higher lender monitoring which is regarded as a 
positive sign by the market. 
 
The results of Corhay and Tourani-Rad (1996) for 133 divestiture announcements in the 
Netherlands between 1989 and 1993 are mainly a by-product from their investigation on 
how adjustments of the abnormal returns for GARCH effects influence their magnitude 
and statistical significance. For the two-day event window [-1;0], Corhay and Tourani-
Rad (1996) detect a CAAR of 0.92% which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Correcting for GARCH effects, the CAAR decreases to 0.82%, which is significant at 
the 5% level. Regarding a three-day event window, the differences become more 
obvious. Whereas for the generic market model, the CAAR is 0.87%, significant at the 
5% level, the CAAR for the GARCH market model becomes insignificant with 0.73%. 
 
In a further study of the French market, Sentis (1996) also confirms the positive 
announcement effects for selloffs for this market. Regarding the factors influencing 
shareholder value creation, Sentis (1996) detects a significantly positive effect for the 
announcement of the transaction price as well as for the degree of debt and a 
significantly negative influence of a good pre-divestiture performance of the selling 
firm. Eventual liquidity issues do not have a significant influence.  
 
The 2000s 
Wang (2000) investigates the impact of foreign divestitures of UK firms. Despite a 
positive overall effect, he finds a significantly positive influence for the case when the 
buyer is from the same country as the divested asset and a significantly negative 
influence if the buyer is from an English speaking country. As in previous studies, the 
relative size of the transaction has a positive influence. A good financial performance 
respectively financial distress of the seller has a positive (negative) impact on the 
announcement returns. An increase in corporate focus, the level of development of the 
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country of the divested asset and currency effects, as well as bank debt, have no 
significant influence.  
 
Studying the largest sample of selloffs so far, Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) find 
an average excess return for UK divestitures of 0.39% (significant) over a three-day 
event window. Whereas their findings support the hypothesis that the size of the selloff 
is positively related to the announcement returns, the remaining findings are either new 
or contrary to prior findings. Contradicting Lasfer et al. (1996), they find a superior 
performance for financially strong sellers. Furthermore, enhancing corporate focus as 
well as selling as part of a strategic programme does not have any influence in their 
sample. However, it seems to be favourable to sell in an economic recession rather than 
during a boom. It also seems that divestors could make use of an information 
asymmetry by selling assets to foreign buyers. 
 
Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) analyse the shareholder wealth effects of UK selloffs 
dependent on their motivation. While firms do not experience significant announcement 
effects if the motivation behind the selloff is to raise cash, to restructure assets without 
increasing corporate focus, or when no motivation is announced, the effect is positive 
for focus-increasing selloffs. Regarding the use of the proceeds, there are significant 
positive effects if the proceeds are paid out to the shareholders or leverage is reduced. 
Reinvestments of the proceeds through M&A transactions were viewed negatively by 
the capital market in the 1980s and neutral in the 1990s. For the total sample, the 
announcement CAAR yields 1.2%. 
 
Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) hypothesise that the profitability of the sale, measured by 
the transaction price over the ‘value-in-use’ of the divested asset, has a positive 
influence on the abnormal returns in selloff transactions. In fact, their results show a 
highly significant relation for that variable. They state that this variable is one of the 
most significant in divestiture research and explains a major proportion of the excess 
returns. Moreover, the effect still remains significant when controlling for other 
variables, such as the motivation, the financial situation, the use of proceeds or the 
presence of agency costs. Also in this study, an increase in focus is positively related to 
the announcement returns, as well as the use of proceeds to pay down debt. The 
divested asset’s return on assets (ROA) is negatively related to the announcement 
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returns, indicating a positive reaction to the sale of underperforming units. Also, the 
absolute size of the seller has a negative influence. 
 
Stouraitis (2003) investigates the role of advisors in corporate acquisitions in the UK. 
He distinguishes between transactions in which the acquirer is not advised, transactions 
in which the acquirer is advised and transactions in which the advisor invests his own 
money in the acquisition he advises. Therefore, for the first two forms, he uses 
advised/not advised interfirm asset sales, for the latter, MBOs. Stouraitis (2003) finds 
that sellers receive significantly lower announcement returns when the acquirer is 
advised by an advisor that invests its own money (as is often the case in MBOs), than in 
interfirm asset sales when the acquirer is advised. Regarding the two subsamples 
separately, sellers gain more from MBOs where the acquirers are not advised, whereas 
they gain more from interfirm asset sales where the acquirer is advised. Overall, the 
abnormal announcement returns are higher for interfirm asset sales than for MBOs, 
although the difference is not significant. He argues that the findings are a result of 
insider knowledge by the buying management and higher incentives for the advisors in 
MBOs. In interfirm asset sales, on the other hand, the acquirers do not have this deep 
knowledge and, furthermore, the advisors are rather interested in completing the deal at 
any price since their compensation is often largely based on the completion. 
 
Also focusing on the UK, Gadad and Thomas (2005) explore the sources of abnormal 
returns by looking at the relative size of the deal, management turnover preceding the 
asset sale, an increase in corporate focus and a reduction of corporate debt through the 
sale. In their rather superficial study, they only find a significant positive effect if the 
seller could reduce its debt through the acquisition. All other variables are insignificant. 
Overall, the study delivers only weak evidence on the sources of value creation. 
 
Meschi (2005) investigates if the shareholder wealth effects from joint venture (JV) 
asset sales are different from those of ordinary asset sales. Using a sample of 151 
European asset sales, Meschi (2005) stands back from his hypothesis as the 
announcement effects are significant and positive on average. The results for 
influencing effects of the reasons for the selloff are rather weak. The motive debt 
reduction is significantly positive only over a wider event window [-10;10]; the same is 
true for a refocusing motive. The excess returns for involuntary sales are negative, 
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although insignificant, and the excess returns of sales of failed JVs are ambiguous with 
significantly positive announcement returns in the [-1;1] event window and significantly 
negative announcement returns in the [-10;10] event window. 
 
Mittnacht (2005) investigates the shareholder wealth effects for selloffs and unit 
buyouts of continental European firms, thereby focusing on Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden. The detected positive performance in his sample 
is not significantly different between selloffs and unit buyouts. For selloffs, the 
multivariate regression over the two-day announcement period [0;1] shows significant 
influences of the relative size (positive), the profitability of the parent (negative), and 
the degree of debt (positive) only. Over a six-day event window [-5;1] losses of the 
divested unit (positive), as well as an increase in corporate focus (positive), also show a 
significant influence. Possible synergies on the buyer side have no significant influence 
on the announcement returns. Regarding unit buyouts, the results are similar but show 
no influence of an increase in focus and losses of the divested unit. Regarding variables 
not captured in his multivariate analysis, Mittnacht (2005) finds no influence of the 
nationality of the divested unit or the buyer, the announcement of the transaction price 
and the time in an economic cycle. 
 
Also, Cao et al. (2008) study excess returns of UK firms and distinguish between the 
sale of domestic and foreign subsidiaries. For their sample, they observe a CAAR of 
1.23% over a two-day event window, whereby domestic selloffs lead to higher returns 
than foreign ones (1.44% versus 0.91%) – both statistically significant. Looking closer 
at the subsample of foreign divestitures, only the US divestitures report significant 
positive returns. Interestingly, they cannot find any information leakages, as the entire 
excess return is concentrated at the announcement day; other event windows are almost 
unexceptionally insignificant. Cao et al. (2008) explain the higher returns for domestic 
divestitures with investors’ difficulties in evaluating the impact of overseas divestitures. 
The main factors influencing divestiture performance differ between the subsamples. 
Whereas in the case of domestic divestitures relatively small firms with high growth 
perspectives gain the highest announcement returns, the relative size of the asset sold is 
of capital importance in international divestitures. The impact of economic and legal 
conditions for the latter case is insignificant. 
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Coakley et al. (2008) study divestitures of foreign assets of UK firms and detect 
significant positive announcement CAARs of 0.81%. They find positive results for 
divestitures increasing industrial focus, but significantly larger CAARs for divestitures 
increasing the “[…] geographical focus on countries with Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance […] (Coakley et al, 2008, p. 182). Moreover, they find that poor stock 
performance in the year prior to the divestiture is related to higher announcement 
CAARs, for both firms increasing as well as decreasing leverage. Good pre-divestiture 
performance, in contrast, is associated with insignificant CAARs. 
 
Lee and Lin (2008) investigate the impact of the use of proceeds and financial distress 
on long-run shareholder wealth. They find that contrary to the short-run results, selling 
firms experience significant negative excess returns in the long-run. Whereas at the 
immediate announcement, the significantly positive returns are higher for sellers that 
reduce debt than for sellers that reinvest the proceeds, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the long-run. Lee and Lin (2008) argue that in the case of sellers that 
reinvest their proceeds, the agency costs exceed the potential benefits from the 
investment and that in the case of sellers that reduce debt, the financial distress also 
remains after the sale. Moreover, they show that the magnitude of the proceeds has a 
positive influence on sellers that reduce debt, are in financial distress or have high 
growth opportunities. However, as in all long-run studies, it has to be questioned 
whether the measure allows the authors to separate the pure selloff from other corporate 
or external events. Lee and Lin (2008) nevertheless argue that especially during 
corporate restructurings, there would be high information asymmetries which would not 
allow the market to anticipate the consequences of the event properly and immediately. 
 
Also focusing on a sample of UK selloffs, Hillier et al. (2009) detect an abnormal return 
of 0.75% over a two-day event window. Moreover, they show that the announcement 
returns are positively related to subsequent changes in operating performance. Although 
not the primary focus of their research, Hillier et al. (2009) also investigate the 
announcement returns for subsamples according to the reason for the asset sale and the 
use of proceeds. For the first subsample, distinguishing between the reasons ‘poor 
performance’, ‘re-focusing’, and ‘high leverage’, the announcement returns are 
relatively similar (Hillier et al., 2009). Regarding the use of proceeds, it seems that 
using the proceeds to reduce debt outperforms the subsample of selloffs where the 
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proceeds are reinvested. However, Hillier et al. (2009) do not provide tests for the 
significance of the difference in returns nor multivariate analyses.  
 
Ataullah et al. (2010) investigate the influence of large shareholders, the board of 
directors, especially executive stock ownership, and the use of proceeds on 
announcement returns. However, their cross-sectional regression of cumulative 
abnormal returns does not deliver many insights. Ataullah et al. (2010) only find a 
significant positive influence of CEO stock ownership for the subsample where 
proceeds are retained in the firm. Other corporate governance mechanisms have no 
significant influence in their sample. Indeed, the likelihood that the proceeds are not 
retained in the firm increases with more effective corporate governance mechanisms, 
except CEO stock options, where there is a significant negative relationship. 
 
Table 5 shows the announcement effects reported for the European selloff and spinoff 
studies. 
 
Study Form Country Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Event 
Window 
CAAR 
Divestor 
Cadiou (1988) Selloff FR 1980-87 92 Week [-1;0] 2.27%* 
Afshar et al. (1992) Selloff UK 1985-86 178 [-10;10] 0.86% 
Lasfer et al. (1996) Selloff UK 1985-86 142 [-1;0] 0.82%*** 
Corhay & Tourani-Rad 
(1996) 
Selloff NL 1989-93 133 [-1;0] 0.92%*** 
Sentis (1996) Selloff FR 1988-92 71 [-1] 
[-1;0] 
0.72%*** 
1.05%a 
Wang (2000) Selloff UK 1986-95 16523 [-1;0] 0.81%*** 
Alexandrou & 
Sudarsanam (2001) 
Selloff UK 1987-93 1941 [-2;0] 0.39%*** 
Kaiser & Stouraitis 
(2001) 
Selloff UK 1984-94 590 [-1;0] 1.20%*** 
Clubb & Stouraitis 
(2002) 
Selloff UK 1984-94 187 [-1;0] 1.10%a 
Stouraitis (2003) Selloff UK 1984-94 509 
9124 
[-1;0] 
[-1;0] 
1.30%*** 
0.70% 
Kirchmaier (2003) Spinoffs EU 1989-99 48 [-1;1] 5.40%*** 
                                                 
23 Foreign divestitures. 
24 MBOs. 
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Study Form Country Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Event 
Window 
CAAR 
Divestor 
Veld & Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) 
Spinoff EU 1987-00 156 [-1;1] 2.62%*** 
Gadad & Thomas 
(2005) 
Selloff UK 1985-91 74 [-1;0] 0.66%* 
Meschi (2005) Selloff EU 1994-02 15125 [-1;1] 0.65%* 
Mittnacht (2005) Selloff EU 1990-02 286 [0;1] 1.42%*** 
Cao et al. (2008) Selloff UK 1992-03 668 [0;1] 1.23%*** 
Coakley et al. (2008)c Selloff UK 1986-95 165 [-1;0] 0.81%***  
Lee & Lin (2008) Selloff UK 1993-97 655 [-1;0] 1.11%a 
     Year [0;5] -37.86%*** 
Hillier et al. (2009) Selloff UK 1993-00 413 [-1;0] 0.75%*** 
Ataullah et al. (2010) Selloff UK 1992-05 195 [-1;1] 2.00%*** 
Vollmar (2014) Spinoffs EU 2000-12 83 [-1;1] 4.58%*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
a Unknown level of significance 
b Based on monthly data 
c Represents the same sample as Wang (2000) 
Table 5: Shareholder Value Effects of European Divestitures 
 
 
2.4.4 D-A-CH Studies 
 
There are only few studies analyzing corporate spinoffs in the D-A-CH region, which 
are characterised by very small sample sizes mostly prohibiting any generalisations. 
Therefore, the author focuses on the existing studies for selloffs. The samples of these 
studies are all limited to Germany and were all published after the year 2000. 
 
In one of the first German studies, Löffler (2001) investigates a sample of 141 selloffs, 
spinoffs and equity carve-outs whereby the sample of the latter two forms is fairly small 
(n=2, 19). Contrary to the majority of studies, Löffler (2001) observes a negative, but 
insignificant CAAR of -0.26% during a four-day event window. Looking at the factors 
influencing the performance, Löffler (2001) claims that focus-increasing divestitures 
and divestitures of underperforming assets receive higher abnormal returns. However, 
the evidence therefore is very weak. A good financial condition is positively related to 
the announcement returns.  
                                                 
25 JVs. 
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Eichinger (2001) finds evidence that German divestitures are also shareholder value-
creating. The CAAR during the two-day event window for his sample yields 1.09% 
(significant). Whereas the motive for the divestiture seems to have no influence on share 
price reactions, he finds that divestitures create significantly more shareholder value 
when the divested asset and/or the buyer are a domestic company. Moreover, the 
announcement of the transaction price is also positively related to the excess returns. 
 
Müller-Stewens et al. (2001) analyse 680 selloffs of the 250 largest firms in the D-A-
CH region and detect a CAAR of 0.7%. However, the number of cases with positive 
and negative shareholder wealth effects balances each other. As in the US, they find that 
the increase in corporate focus in particular is related to the magnitude of announcement 
gains. Interestingly, there seem to be remarkable differences in divestiture performance 
between countries. For example, in comparison to other European countries, Müller-
Stewens et al. (2001) observe that German corporations create below-average 
shareholder value with successful divestitures and, at the same time, destroy above-
average shareholder wealth with unsuccessful divestitures.  
 
Stienemann (2003) investigates German selloffs, spinoffs and equity carve-outs 
between 1989 and 2002. Since the sample of spinoffs consists of only three cases, the 
results can be neglected and meaningful comparisons to selloffs and carve-outs cannot 
be made. Despite a significantly positive announcement effect, which contrasts the 
findings of Löffler (2001), Stienemann (2003) only finds a significant influence of the 
size of the divested unit (measured via proportion of ‘divested employees’) (positive), 
losses of the divested unit (positive), for domestic instead of foreign divested units 
(negative) and cash as a means of payment (positive). However, the effects are all 
detected using different event windows within the [-20;20] period. These results of his 
multivariate regressions are mostly in line with the univariate findings. According to his 
univariate analysis, the announcement of the transaction price and an increase in 
corporate focus seem to have no influence. Though between voluntary and forced 
selloffs there seems to be a difference in the sense that voluntary selloffs outperform 
forced ones, the difference is not significant due to the small sample size for forced 
selloffs. A bad financial constitution of the seller, either measured via debt level or 
return on equity, seems to have a positive influence, as well as if the buyer is a financial 
rather than a strategic investor. Although not captured in the later analysis, it should be 
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mentioned that Stienemann (2003) finds extremely positive results for the instrument of 
equity carve-outs compared to the other two forms. 
 
Bartsch (2005) studies the shareholder wealth effects of strategic divestitures and their 
success factors. As assumed, he finds significant differences between the CAARs of 
strategic versus non-strategic divestitures. The overall CAAR over a two-day period is 
2.08%. However, Bartsch (2005) finds that focus-increasing divestitures lead to 
negative excess returns; the same is true in the case of a CEO change in the three years 
prior to the divestiture and a bad financial constitution of the parent. Moreover, the 
announcement of the transaction price and the type of buyer (financial investor versus 
strategic investor) seem to have no influence. 
 
Ostrowski (2007) mainly tries to research if there are differences between proactive and 
reactive divestitures. Though reactive divestitures show a higher announcement return 
than proactive divestitures, the difference between the returns is not significant. 
However, as for the whole sample, both samples show that the positive announcement 
effects are corrected in the time following the announcement. In her univariate analysis, 
Ostrowski (2007) finds no influence of the period and the industry in which the 
transaction took place, an increase in focus through the divestiture, the stated motive for 
the divestiture, a change of the CEO, the relative size of the transaction, the profitability 
of the divested asset, the existence of large shareholders and the type of acquirer of the 
divested asset. A positive effect is detected for the announcement of the transaction 
price whereas the quick ratio is negatively related to the announcement returns. An 
influence of the chosen form for the divestiture cannot be rejected, although the sample 
size for the latter variable is fairly small. Using a multivariate regression, the 
profitability of the divested asset (negative) as well as a de-diversification through the 
divestiture (positive) also have significant influence on the announcement returns. 
Especially the evidence regarding the relative size of the transaction is contrary to the 
insights gained from the majority of prior US and UK studies. 
 
Prugovecki (2011) investigates the success factors of selloffs that originated from 
earlier acquisitions (demergers) by focusing on the operationalization process. Besides 
the CAAR as a measure of success, which is only of minor importance in his analysis, 
Prugovecki (2011) uses a set of several other non-financial measures and studies the 
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correlation between these success measures and attributes of the operationalisation 
process. Prugovecki (2011) observes an excess return of 2.61%, whereby again, the 
proportion of positive and negative demergers balances each other. However, 
Prugovecki (2011) does not give detailed information for his methodology used. 
Regarding the CAAR as a measure for success, a slower operationalisation process 
seems to be more favourable in large demerger transactions. 
 
The results regarding the announcement effects of the studies that focus on the German 
speaking region are presented in Table 6. 
 
Study Form Country Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Event 
Window 
CAAR 
Divestor 
Löffler (2001) Selloff GER 1985-96 141 [-3;1] -0.26% 
Eichinger (2001) Selloff GER 1992-97 123 [-1;0] 1.09%** 
Müller-Stewens et 
al. (2001) 
Selloff D-A-CH 1993-98 680 not clear 0.7%a 
Stienemann (2003) Spinoff 
Selloff 
GER 1989-02 3 
147 
[-1;0] -4.02% 
0.30%*** 
Bartsch (2005) Selloff GER 1997-03 140 [-1;0] 2.08% 
Ostrowski (2007)  Selloff GER 2002-04 233 [-1;0] 2.96%*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
a Unknown level of significance 
b Based on monthly data 
Table 6: Shareholder Value Effects of D-A-CH Divestitures 
 
 
2.4.5 Summary of Divestiture Performance Studies 
 
Since the first US studies in the 1980s indicated that divestitures might be net 
shareholder value creating activities, research on corporate divestitures has steadily 
developed until today. Over time, the focus of the research has increasingly addressed 
the origins of this shareholder value creation potential. Now, after three decades of 
divestiture research, several studies have confirmed the initial findings regarding 
shareholder value creation. Whereas the CAARs range between 1.32% and 5.56% for 
spinoffs, the CAARs for selloffs seem to be lower, ranging between 0.20% and 3.55%.  
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Selloff Studies 
Regarding the origins of the abnormal announcement returns in selloff transactions, it 
seems that particularly the relative size of the divested asset, an increase in the industrial 
corporate focus, the seller’s financial performance and eventual financial distress, the 
disclosure of the transaction price immediately at the announcement, the intended use of 
proceeds and certain agency variables influence shareholder value creation.  
 
Independent of the economic region, the relative size of the target in relation to the 
seller mostly shows a positive influence on abnormal returns. For an increase in the 
corporate industrial focus, the US studies report a mainly positive influence. However, 
in recent studies, the effect seems less pronounced. Regarding Europe, an increase in 
focus mostly has a positive effect on abnormal returns as well, although some studies 
also report insignificant effects as in the US studies. For the D-A-CH region in 
particular, the picture looks similar, but it is the only region where even a negative 
effect of an increase in focus was reported (cf. Bartsch, 2005).  
 
The influence of the financial performance of the seller is mixed. The results for the US 
are somewhat inconclusive since the findings of a positive influence of financial 
strength and the findings of no or even a negative influence (cf. Brauer and Stüssi, 
2010) balance each other. For European selloffs, the results are mixed as well, but the 
studies that report a negative influence of financial strength slightly dominate. If the 
seller is in an acute distress situation, the abnormal returns seem to be higher than if this 
is not the case, independent of the economic region. Regarding the D-A-CH region, the 
impact of financial distress was only investigated by Stienemann (2003) who did not 
find any influence.  
 
The announcement of the transaction price immediately at the announcement, indicating 
transparency about the terms of the deal, tends to positively influence abnormal returns. 
Most researchers found either a significant positive or insignificant positive influence. 
The intended use of proceeds and certain agency variables appear to significantly 
influence the announcement returns to sellers as well.  
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Looking at European selloffs, because of the plurality of sovereign states, respectively 
different economic/regulatory systems on the European continent, the influence of the 
geographic focus particularly gained importance in divestiture research. Research 
results regarding the geographic focus are, however, ambiguous. Generally, shareholder 
value gains of European selloffs seem to be lower than those of US selloffs. Moreover, 
the few existing German-based studies often suffer from small samples and, hence, have 
a constrained validity which may explain the inconsistent findings.  
 
Table 7 provides an overview of the central variables investigated in the different selloff 
studies and summarises the findings.  
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US 
Boudreaux (1975)              (-)     
Montgomery et al. 
(1984) 
+ + (+)  (+)         (-)     
Alexander et al. (1984) +                  
Rosenfeld (1984) +   (-)               
Hearth & Zaima (1984) +  + +               
Jain (1985) +                  
Hearth & Zaima (1986) +                  
Klein (1986) +  +     +           
Hite et al. (1987) +                  
Tehranian et al. (1987)                   
Hirschey & Zaima 
(1989) 
+                  
Hite & Vetsuypens 
(1989) 
+                  
Hirschey et al. (1990) +                  
Denning & Shastri 
(1990) 
(-)                  
Cakici et al. (1991) +         +         
Sicherman & Pettway 
(1992) 
+   +    +           
Pashley & Philippatos 
(1993) 
(+)                 () 
Brown et al. (1994) (+)   +               
Servaes & Zenner (1994) +  +                
Slovin et al. (1995) +                  
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John & Ofek (1995) + +               +  
Lang et al. (1995) +  +                
Loh et al. (1995) +                 () 
Blumberg & Owers 
(1996) 
+                  
Datta & Iskandar-Datta 
(1996) 
+ +                 
Guedes & Parayre (1997) +      +            
Borde et al. (1998) +  +  +              
Hanson & Song (2000) +  +                
Kang & Diltz (2000) (+)                  
Mulherin & Boone 
(2000) 
+  +                
Byerly et al. (2003)  (+) (+)                 
Datta et al. (2003) +                  
Slovin et al. (2005) +           ()       
Bates (2005) +                  
Hanson & Song (2006) +                  
Kiymaz (2006) +   (+) +              
Bergh et al. (2008)  +                 
Hege et al. (2009) +                  
Bennett (2010) +                  
Owen et al. (2010) +                  
Brauer & Stüssi (2010)    -               
Brauer & Wiersema 
(2012) 
(+)                  
Clayton & Reisel (2013) +  +  + +             
EU 
Cadiou (1988) +                  
Afshar et al. (1992) (+)  + - +   +           
Kaiser & Stouraitis 
(1995) 
  +      -          
Lasfer et al. (1996) +  +  + +             
Corhay & Tourani-Rad 
(1996) 
+                  
Sentis (1996) +   -  +  +           
Wang (2000) +  + + -              
Alexandrou & 
Sudarsanam (2001) 
+  + +               
Kaiser & Stouraitis 
(2001) 
+ + +                
Clubb & Stouraitis 
(2002) 
 + +  +  -          +  
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Stouraitis (2003) (+)                  
Gadad & Thomas (2005) +    +              
Meschi (2005) + (+)           () (-)     
Mittnacht (2005) + + + -  + -            
Cao et al. (2008) +        (-)          
Coakley et al. (2008) + +  -     +          
Lee & Lin (2008) (+)                  
Hillier et al. (2009) + (+)  (-)  (+)       ()      
Ataullah et al. (2010) +                  
D-A-CH 
Löffler (2001) (-) +                 
Eichinger (2001) +       + - -         
Müller-Stewens et al. 
(2001) 
(+) (+)                 
Stienemann (2003) +  +    -  +          
Bartsch (2005) + -  +               
Ostrowski (2007) + +    + - +           
Prugovecki (2011) (+)                  
Key 
  Significant influence 
 No, ambiguous, or insignificant influence 
+ Significantly positive influence 
- Significantly negative influence 
(parentheses) Significance unclear 
Agency variables 
Long-term compensation plans, ownership structure, MBOs & managerial self-dealing, bank debt, agency 
costs of free cash flow… 
Others 
Industry, form of divestiture (i.e. horizontal, vertical etc.), capital market/macroeconomic development 
(boom, recession etc.) asset liquidity, takeover defence, life cycle stage, wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders, tax reforms, exchange rate changes, industrial classification of country… 
Table 7: Investigated Influencing Factors in Selloff Studies26 
 
Spinoff Studies 
Looking at the origin of shareholder value creation in spinoff transactions, the number 
of factors investigated is still at a considerably low level in comparison to selloff 
studies. The central variables investigated are again an increase in the corporate 
industrial focus, the relative size and a possible wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders. An increase in focus and the relative size tend to have a positive effect on 
                                                 
26 Illustration based on similar tables presented by Meschi (2005), Mittnacht (2005) and Fischer et al. (2013). 
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the abnormal returns in spinoff transactions as well. The evidence for the wealth transfer 
hypothesis is rather sparse. Table 8 summarises the central results from spinoff studies. 
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US 
Miles & Rosenfeld (1983) +   +    
Hite & Owers (1983) + ?  +    
Schipper & Smith (1983) +       
Rosenfeld (1984) +       
Cusatis et al. (1993) (+)       
Vijh (1994) +       
Allen et al. (1995) +   +    
Slovin et al. (1995) +       
Seward & Walsh (1996) +       
Daley et al. (1997) +  +     
Desai & Jain (1999) +  +     
Krishnaswami & Subramaniam (1999) +       
Burch & Nanda (2003) +       
Maxwell & Rao (2003) +       
Ahn & Denis (2004) (+)       
Marquette & Williams (2007) +       
EU 
Kirchmaier (2003) +   -  -  
Veld & Veld-Merkoulova (2004) +       
Veld & Veld-Merkoulova (2009) +  + +  +  
Vollmar (2014) +  +     
Key 
  Significant influence 
 No, ambiguous, or insignificant influence 
+ Significantly positive influence 
- Significantly negative influence 
(parentheses) Significance unclear 
Others 
Industry, form of divestiture (i.e. horizontal, vertical etc.), capital market/macroeconomic development 
(boom, recession etc.) asset liquidity, takeover defence, life cycle stage, wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders, tax reforms, exchange rate changes, industrial classification of country… 
Table 8: Investigated Influencing Factors in Spinoff Studies27 
 
To summarise, divestitures can be regarded as value-creating corporate activities. 
Although the different studies partially provide contrasting evidence while investigating 
the factors influencing excess returns, it seems that an increase in corporate focus and 
the relative size of the divested asset are positively related to the announcement gains. 
                                                 
27 Illustration based on similar tables presented by Meschi (2005), Mittnacht (2005) and Fischer et al. (2013). 
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The evidence for many other factors (such as bondholder expropriation, the financial 
condition of the divestor, the use of proceeds or the geographical focus) is ambiguous or 
not meaningful due to an insufficient sample, e.g. for the form of payment or the timing 
issue. Moreover, most regression analyses reveal that the analysed factors only explain a 
small proportion of the variation in shareholder value gains. Generally, it seems that 
spinoffs are superior to selloffs in terms of creating shareholder value and that European 
and especially German divestitures underperform their US counterparts, although the 
research in terms of number of studies and investigated factors in those countries lags 
substantially behind the US. This emphasizes the need for an in-depth investigation of 
the D-A-CH region. Also, the factors influencing excess returns differ between the 
countries. Finally, the research shows that M&A evidence cannot simply be transferred 
on divestitures, i.e. divestitures do not just represent the reverse of M&A.  
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3 Research Hypotheses and Theoretical Framework 
 
The following chapter addresses the research questions and corresponding hypotheses 
to be tested in this thesis. The hypotheses are derived from previous empirical research, 
which is extensively represented in chapter two, and are applied to the underlying 
sample. Besides the first hypothesis regarding the overall effect of corporate divestitures 
on shareholder wealth, they solely refer to selloffs as the final sample for spinoffs is too 
small to draw any statistically valid inferences. The hypotheses are classified in seller 
related hypotheses and deal related hypotheses. However, a clear distinction is not 
always possible. Where in doubt, the author uses his personal judgement. 
 
 
3.1 Overall Effect 
 
The central research question of this thesis is whether corporate divestitures in the D-A-
CH region, more precisely corporate selloffs and spinoffs, on average create shareholder 
value. As shown in the previous chapter, the majority of studies come to the conclusion 
that selloffs as well as spinoffs show significantly positive effects at and around the 
announcement date. The magnitude of the value created seems to be slightly higher for 
spinoffs than for selloffs. The observed positive effect is in line with the assumption that 
in an efficient market managers act in the interest of their shareholders and seek to 
maximise shareholder value. Although the studies for the D-A-CH region are rather 
sparse, cover only small timeframes, contain relatively few cases, and moreover, are 
ambiguous in their results regarding shareholder value creation (cf. Löffler, 2001; 
Eichinger, 2001; Stienemann, 2003; Bartsch, 2005; Ostrowski, 2007; Vollmar, 2014), 
the author hypothesises that previous empirical findings, mainly from the US and the 
UK, can be transferred to the D-A-CH region. Hence, the author expects the selloffs and 
spinoffs in this sample to create shareholder value on average.  
 
Hypothesis 1  
Corporate selloffs and spinoffs of publicly traded companies located in the D-A-CH 
region on average create significant value for their shareholders. 
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As will be described in the methodology chapter, the shareholder value creation will be 
measured using abnormal stock returns surrounding the divestiture announcement using 
event study methodology in order to allow for comparisons with previous research. 
 
 
3.2 Deal Characteristics 
 
3.2.1 Selloff Motive 
 
3.2.1.1 Increase in Corporate Focus 
 
Increase in the Corporate Industrial Focus 
One of the most often stated reasons for divestitures and also one of the most researched 
factors that may influence divestiture performance is an increase in the corporate 
industrial focus of the divesting company as a result of the transaction. The majority of 
researchers find a significantly positive relationship between divestitures of assets 
unrelated to the core business of the divesting company and the abnormal returns at the 
announcement (cf. i.a. Afshar et al., 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 
1995; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 1996; Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Löffler, 
2001; Bergh et al., 2008; Coakley et al., 2008). However, there are also some authors 
that do not support the finding of a positive effect, for example Wang (2000), 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001), Eichinger (2001), Brauer and Stüssi (2010) and 
Clayton and Reisel (2013). Bartsch (2005) even finds a negative relationship.  
 
The central argument for a positive wealth effect of an increase in corporate focus is 
based on the resource-based view, which goes back to Penrose (1959), but did not 
receive a lot of attention until the work of Wernerfelt (1984). Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt (1988), in one of the first empirical research projects, submit empirical 
support that firms with specific resources gain the highest returns when they transfer 
their excess resources to the markets close to the core business. On the other hand, the 
more widely a firm diversifies, the more average returns decline. Hence, unrelated 
diversification in particular seems to be harmful in regard to returns. Related 
diversification, however, can be even more beneficial than a completely focused 
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strategy as firms can employ their excess resources across related businesses to realise 
additional returns (Wan et al., 2011; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988).  
 
Besides the resource-based view, the principal-agent theory can also serve as a 
theoretical framework for corporate divestitures increasing the seller’s industrial focus. 
Going beyond the classical shareholder-manager (principal-agent) relationship, Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1998, p. 97) argue that a firm should instead “[…] be understood as 
being comprised of (at least) two tiers of agency relationships […].” A two-tier agency 
relationship means that there is also a relationship between headquarters and different 
divisional managers. The main issue regarding diversification lies in the efficiency of 
internal capital markets. Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) summarise that recent research 
suggests that internal capital markets do not work very efficiently which is supported by 
the trend of dismantling conglomerates. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992, p. 107) come to 
the conclusion that “[…] diversifying acquisitions are [much] more likely to be divested 
than related acquisitions […].” Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) believe that the main 
reason for this lies in the fact that capital allocation across divisions is a result of 
politics, since the managers in the headquarters are only agents. Hence, capital may be 
allocated in a ‘dysfunctional socialism’ way regardless of a division’s ability to use the 
resources efficiently rather than in a ‘Robin Hood’ way by allocating money from cash 
cows to poor divisions with good growth perspectives (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998). 
 
Following this argumentation, focus-increasing divestitures can serve as an instrument 
to reduce a possible overdiversification or unrelated diversification and allocate the 
freed-up resources to higher valued uses in the core or related businesses. Negative 
synergies between the different divisions, as well as capital misallocations through the 
internal capital market, are reduced and efficiency is improved. Thus, the author also 
expects a positive effect of an increase in corporate focus on shareholder value creation. 
 
Hypothesis 2  
An increase in the corporate industrial focus on average has a significantly positive 
impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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In order to operationalise an increase in corporate focus, the author uses two different 
measures. The first measure is the announced motive by the management – a subjective 
view from a managerial standpoint. As the announced motive may be flawed and 
unreliable, the author also uses an objective measure. Therefore, a divestiture is 
regarded as focus-increasing if the divested asset’s two-digit SIC code is different from 
the divestor’s core or primary two-digit SIC code. Looking at the two-digit SIC code 
will ensure that only the divestiture of unrelated assets is considered as focus-
increasing. This procedure is in line with previous research (cf. John and Ofek, 1995; 
Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Bergh et al., 2008; Brauer and Wiersema, 
2012; Vollmar, 2014).  
 
The expected positive impact of an increase in the industrial focus of the seller should 
be even more distinct the higher the seller is diversified. In order to account for the 
degree of diversification, Comment and Jarrell (1995) suggest different measures for 
diversification, amongst others the commonly used Herfindahl index and the number of 
four-digit SIC codes assigned by Compustat. Since the segmental data needed for the 
calculation of the Herfindahl index is not available or is at least incomplete for the 
majority of cases, the use of this (probably best) proxy for diversification is not 
possible. Hence, the author has to rely on the also suggested use of the number of four-
digit codes. However, the author instead refers to the number of two-digit SIC codes to 
capture only unrelated diversification. Therefore, an interaction term for the effect of an 
increase in focus on abnormal returns dependent on the degree of diversification of the 
seller was created. The number of two-digit SIC codes is taken from the Thomson 
Financial database. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
The degree of diversification of the seller on average has a significantly positive effect 
on shareholder wealth creation of selloffs that increase the seller’s industrial focus. 
 
Related to the possible effect of an increase in focus, the author also investigates the 
effect of strategic shifts, respectively major corporate restructurings. This can be seen as 
a more radical increase in corporate focus or even a complete change in corporate focus. 
The theoretical framework behind an assumed positive effect on shareholder wealth of 
such transactions is again the resource-based view and the assumption that the resources 
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of the divesting firm are transferred to higher valued uses. Regarding this variable, the 
author has to rely on the announced purpose of the parent company, press releases or 
news articles. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
A major restructuring, respectively a complete strategic shift in the corporate focus, on 
average has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Increase in the Geographic Corporate Focus 
In the same way as the industrial focus, changes in the geographic focus may influence 
shareholder wealth created through corporate divestitures. Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004) argue that focus-increasing divestitures can be both, shareholder value-
destroying and enhancing. Reasons for a possible reduction in the firm’s value through 
divestitures increasing the geographic focus are that (1) divestitures may result in 
decreasing economies of scale regarding production, (2) divestitures may be a sign of a 
prior mistake, and (3) a firm may weaken its position toward internationally oriented 
competitors (Veld and Veld-Merkoulova, 2004). On the other hand, the argumentation 
regarding the principal-agent theory in terms of cross-subsidising to inefficient 
divisions, as well as regarding the resource-based view in terms of overdiversification, 
is also valid for an increase in geographical focus. Additionally, Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova (2004) mention that an increase in the geographical focus results in reduced 
complexity and lowers monitoring and coordinating costs. 
 
This contrasting argumentation is reflected in the empirical evidence. Whereas Coakley 
et al. (2008) for Europe, and Stienemann (2003) for Germany, find a significantly 
positive effect of the disposal of foreign assets, Eichinger (2001) for German selloffs, 
and Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004) for European spinoffs, report a significantly 
negative influence of the disposal of foreign units. Borde et al. (1998) for US selloffs, as 
well as Vollmar (2014) for European spinoffs, do not report a significant influence. 
Thus, the author does not expect an influence of an increase in the geographic focus on 
abnormal returns. 
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Hypothesis 5  
An increase in the corporate geographic focus on average has no significant impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
In order to capture an increase in geographic focus, the author uses two different 
measures. Firstly, a divestiture is considered as geographic focus-increasing if the 
divested asset is a foreign asset; secondly, in order to capture a ‘geographic 
overdiversification’, the author considers a divestiture as focus-increasing if the 
divested asset is based in a country outside of Europe. 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Financial Distress 
 
An additional often stated motive for divestitures is financial distress, either of the seller 
itself or of the asset sold. As the argumentation for a possible impact of financial 
distress is related to the impact of the financial performance of the seller, which will be 
described later in more detail, the author only briefly describes the two contrasting 
views on this issue. 
 
The central question is whether a possible distressed financial situation is already 
known before the selloff announcement. If this is the case, the selloff may lower the 
probability of a possible bankruptcy and the costs related to this (Lasfer et al., 1996). 
Thus, financial distress should have a positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. If 
the distressed situation is not anticipated prior to the transaction, the selloff 
announcement may initially reveal a precarious situation, which should result in lower 
abnormal returns at the announcement (Afshar et al., 1992). Furthermore, a weakened 
negotiating position speaks for lower abnormal returns as well (Hearth and Zaima, 
1984).  
 
In order to capture the impact of financial distress on shareholder value creation, the 
author uses two different measures. As in the case of an increase in industrial focus, the 
author first uses a subjective measure referring to the stated motive of the divestiture by 
the seller. Second, the author applies an objective measure creating a binary variable 
based on the z-score as an indicator for financial distress. The z-score was developed by 
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Altman (1968) and tries to predict if a manufacturing company will become bankrupt 
within the next two years. In order to include non-manufacturing companies as well, the 
author uses the modified z’’-score model, which minimises potential industry effects 
that would be included using the original model which contains the asset turnover 
(Altman, 2000). The z’’-score is defined as:  
 
(1)  𝑧′′ = 6.56 ∙ 𝑋1 + 3.26 ∙ 𝑋2 + 6.72 ∙ 𝑋3 + 1.05 ∙ 𝑋4 
 
and indicates financial distress for a z’’-score below 1.1 (Altman, 2002). The 
parameters are defined as: 
 
X1=Working Capital / Total Assets 
X2=Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
X3=Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) / Total Assets 
X4=Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities 
 
Additionally, the cases where the z’’-score indicates financial distress are manually 
amended by cases where the financial distress of the seller is publicly known, for 
example if the seller is in bankruptcy proceedings, because in such cases, the calculation 
of the z-score was partly not possible due to missing financial data. 
 
Following the argumentation of a weakened negotiating position in the case of financial 
distress and, thus, the pressure to eventually accept lower prices, the author expects a 
negative impact of financial distress on the announcement returns. 
 
Hypothesis 6  
The announcement that a selloff is motivated by financial distress on average has a 
significantly negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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3.2.1.3 Regulatory Issues 
 
Some selloffs are not undertaken voluntarily, for example in the case of divestitures 
forced by antitrust authorities, due to regulatory issues or changes in legislation. Those 
involuntary divestitures forced by antitrust authorities result in reduced market power 
and a loss of synergies of the seller. Changes in legislation erode the profitability of the 
divested asset or can even result in a complete frustration of purpose of the divested 
assets. Hence, a profitable selloff of such assets is unlikely, therefore the announced 
reason of ‘regulatory issues’ is expected to have a negative impact on shareholder value 
creation. In line with the argumentation provided, Boudreaux (1975) and Montgomery 
et al. (1894) for the US and Meschi (2005) for European selloffs find negative average 
abnormal returns for involuntary divestitures, however, the findings are insignificant, 
which may be caused by small samples in all three cases. Regarding the D-A-CH region 
Stienemann (2003) tests for this characteristic but does not find any influence on 
abnormal returns. In order to capture selloffs undertaken for that reason, the author 
relies on the announced purpose of the parent company, press releases or news articles. 
 
Hypothesis 7  
The rationale that selloffs are forced by antitrust authorities, regulatory issues or 
changes in legislation on average has a significantly negative impact on shareholder 
wealth creation. 
 
 
3.2.1.4 Further Motives 
 
This thesis focuses only on the motives mentioned previously. However, sellers also 
report a range of other motives such as ‘sale and leaseback’ transactions or ‘build and 
sell’ business models. For these motives, the author only reports their impact on 
abnormal returns for the sake of completeness, but does not investigate them in more 
depth. 
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3.2.2 Use of Proceeds  
 
According to previous research, the use of proceeds from selloff transactions seems to 
have a significant influence on shareholder wealth creation (cf. i.a. Brown et al., 1994; 
Lang et al., 1995; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 1996; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Bates, 
2005; Kiymaz, 2006; Lee and Lin, 2008; Ataullah et al., 2010). The management of the 
divesting company generally has three different possibilities: (1) the company retains 
the proceeds and reinvests them in existing or new businesses or projects, (2) it uses the 
proceeds to reduce debt, or (3) it allocates the proceeds to its shareholders through 
dividend payments or stock repurchases. Especially in respect to the forms of 
retaining/reinvesting the proceeds or paying down debt, there are two different 
argumentations in terms of shareholder value creation. 
 
If one follows the resource-based view, reinvesting the proceeds in positive net present 
value projects, i.e. moving the resources to higher valued uses, should increase 
shareholder value. Moreover, using the proceeds from asset sales could also be the best 
way for refinancing, if the company is in financial trouble and refinancing through the 
capital market or stock issues may be very costly. On the other hand, reinvesting the 
proceeds can result in substantial agency costs for the shareholders: managers have 
incentives to invest the proceeds in low return or even negative net present value 
projects since there may be incentives to grow the firm for reasons related to managerial 
power, compensation or even prestige (Jensen, 1986). This argument becomes even 
more important because this reinvested free cash flow is not subject to lender 
monitoring as in the case of debt (Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001). Hence, average 
shareholder creation regarding reinvesting the proceeds of selloffs depends on which of 
the two arguments outweighs the other.  
 
Using the proceeds to reduce debt mitigates the agency costs of free cash flow as well as 
agency costs of debt (Lee and Lin, 2008). The latter include the cost of financial distress 
like high interest rates or even the costs of bankruptcy, a possible asset substitution 
problem as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), or the underinvestment problem 
that results from a debt overhang as described by Myers (1977). However, a reduction 
of debt to a very low level also lowers the degree of external monitoring through 
debtholders, which again could increase agency costs. Moreover, Brown et al. (1994) 
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argue that if financial distress is already very serious, paying out the proceeds to 
creditors could also be seen as wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders and 
result in a negative stock price reaction. Hence, the wealth effects of divestitures where 
the proceeds are used to reduce debt should depend on the financial situation of the 
firm. Whereas for healthy firms, using the proceeds to reduce debt may cause new 
agency costs, financially distressed firms may benefit from an increased flexibility or 
even through avoiding a possible bankruptcy, unless the situation is already too serious 
and the distribution of the proceeds to debtholders is perceived negatively by the 
shareholders due to the wealth transfer argument stated above.  
 
The highest abnormal returns are expected for firms paying out the proceeds to their 
shareholders. This option not only avoids the possibility of a free cash flow problem, 
but also serves as a sign for a financially healthy firm where neither funds are needed to 
finance new projects, nor debt reduction is necessary. In the case of a financially 
distressed firm, paying out the proceeds to the shareholders may, furthermore, avoid a 
wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. 
 
Although the empirical findings are ambiguous regarding this variable, it seems that 
firms using the proceeds to reduce debt outperform those that retain/reinvest the 
proceeds. Indeed, for financially distressed firms, Brown et al. (1994) report a 
significantly negative effect if the proceeds are used to repay debt. Lang et al. (1995), 
however, find a significantly positive effect for distressed firms using the proceeds to 
reduce debt, which is also significantly better than the positive, but insignificant, effect 
for healthy firms. Companies reinvesting the proceeds experience insignificantly 
positive (for distressed firms) or even negative (for healthy firms) abnormal returns. 
Also, in a multivariate model, an intention to reduce debt influences the abnormal return 
positively. This finding is in line with Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001), Bates (2005) and 
Kiymaz (2006). Comparing firms retaining the proceeds and firms using them to reduce 
debt, John and Ofek (1995) and Hanson and Song (2006) do not find a significant 
difference. Regarding the option of paying out the proceeds to the shareholders, 
respectively using the proceeds to repurchase stock, Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1996) 
and Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) both report a significantly positive effect on abnormal 
announcement returns. Based on this argumentation, the author expects the highest 
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returns for divestitures where the proceeds are distributed to the shareholders and the 
smallest returns for cases where the proceeds are reinvested.  
 
The information regarding the use of proceeds is obtained from the announcement of 
the divesting company, press releases, or from news articles. In order to test for the 
proposed relationships, the author uses a categorical variable with the characteristics 
‘reinvest/retain’, ‘reduce debt’, and ‘payout’. Furthermore, binary variables are built for 
every variable to create the following interaction terms: (1) reduce debt based on the 
debt level (debt/equity ratio), (2) reduce debt based on the degree of financial distress 
(z’’-score), and (3) reinvest/retain based on the growth opportunities (market-to-book 
value).  
 
Hypothesis 8  
The announced use of proceeds on average has a significant impact on shareholder 
wealth creation in the sense that abnormal returns are expected to be highest if the 
proceeds are distributed to the shareholders and smallest if the proceeds are retained 
within the firm. 
 
Hypothesis 9  
The higher the debt level of the divesting company, the significantly higher are the 
average abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to reduce debt. 
 
Hypothesis 10  
The more serious the financial distress of the divesting company, the significantly 
higher are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to reduce debt. 
 
Hypothesis 11  
The higher the growth opportunities of the divesting company, the significantly higher 
are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are reinvested or retained by the 
seller. 
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3.2.3 Transparency 
 
The most commonly utilised proxy for the transparency of the deal is the disclosure of 
the transaction price. First of all, if the price is disclosed, the true value of the divested 
assets is revealed and potential information asymmetries between the management and 
investors can be removed (Sicherman and Pettway, 1992). Thus, a possible valuation 
discount can be mitigated. Moreover, it reveals information about the relative size of the 
deal as an indicator for the degree of restructuring, which will be considered as a 
separate point later. Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995) argue that the disclosure of the 
transaction price is a signal for good news, i.e. a good selling price, as managers are 
likely to announce favourable information but suppress unfavourable information. 
Despite this, Klein (1986) adds for consideration that the announcement of the 
transaction price could also serve as a proxy for the likelihood of deal completion since 
the more information is already disclosed at the initial announcement, the more 
advanced negotiations should be. However, her analysis denies that investors use the 
transaction price as an indicator of the likelihood of completion.  
 
According to the argumentation above, the disclosure of transactions details, such as the 
price, should have a positive impact on the abnormal returns at the announcement. This 
theoretical conjecture is supported by empirical results of Klein (1986), Sicherman and 
Pettway (1992), Afshar et al. (1992), Sentis (1996), Eichinger (2001) and Ostrowski 
(2007), whereas Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995), Stienemann (2003), Mittnacht (2005), 
Bartsch (2005) and Bennett (2010) do not find a significant influence on abnormal 
returns. 
 
The announcement of the transaction price is measured using the official press releases 
on the announcement dates as well as press news on the same date. If no explicit 
information regarding the price was found the author assumes the price was not 
disclosed. 
 
Hypothesis 12  
The disclosure of the transaction details as the price on average has a significantly 
positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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Beyond the disclosure of the transaction price, the author also utilises the announcement 
of the motive, the use of proceeds, a possible book gain or loss and the form of 
consideration as transparency variables. 
 
 
3.2.4 Participation in Buyer’s Value Creation Potential 
 
Continuing the corporate focus hypothesis John and Ofek (1995) add that the strategic 
fit between the asset sold and the buyer should influence abnormal returns. They argue 
that abnormal returns should be “[…] higher when the buyer has a superior 
organizational form, [a] comparative advantage in operating the asset, or when the asset 
was poorly managed by the seller” (John and Ofek, 1995, pp. 121–122) because a part 
of those value gains will be captured by the seller via premiums in the transaction price. 
Hence, the seller participates in the value creation potential of the asset sold by 
transferring the asset to a better owner. Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) argue in a similar 
manner. According to them, the profitability of the sale, which they define as the 
difference between the transaction price and the value-in-use of the asset for the seller, 
should have a dominant impact on abnormal returns. Despite the possibility of 
overpayment by the buyer due to large free cash flows combined with low growth 
opportunities (cf. John and Ofek, 1995), a difference between the price paid by the 
buyer and the value-in-use for the seller should mainly result from the reasons stated 
above and be the result of a good strategic fit and synergies between the asset sold and 
the buyer. Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) show that the profitability of the sale has a 
significantly positive influence on seller abnormal returns, even when controlling for 
the motivation of the selloff, the use of proceeds and agency costs. Also, John and Ofek 
(1995) find empirical evidence for their hypothesis and report significantly larger 
abnormal returns if the asset sold and the buyer are from related industries.  
 
The author follows the argumentation by John and Ofek (1995) and expects that a good 
strategic fit between the divested asset and the buyer has a positive influence on 
shareholder wealth creation. The strategic fit is measured as the focus increase by 
comparing the four-digit SIC codes of the asset sold and the buyer. 
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Hypothesis 13  
The industrial relatedness between the buyer and the asset sold on average has a 
significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
In addition, John and Ofek (1995) combine the increase in focus and strategic fit 
hypothesis and conclude that returns should be highest if the divested asset is unrelated 
to the seller but related to the buyer, respectively lowest vice versa. To test this 
hypothesis, an interaction term is created that accounts for those characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 14  
The combination of an increase in the industrial corporate focus and a strategic fit 
between the buyer and asset sold on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
 
3.2.5 Type of Buyer  
 
Related to the participation in the value creation of the buyer, John and Ofek (1995) 
argue that if the buyer is a leveraged buyout group, abnormal announcement returns 
should be higher since the performance of the divested division may be improved by 
better governance structures, better monitoring or changed incentives. Similar to the 
participation hypothesis, a part of those efficiency increases will be captured by the 
seller. This hypothesis is supported by their empirical findings. Ostrowski (2007) also 
expects higher abnormal returns in the case of financial buyers, but she uses the higher 
financial resources and, hence, the possibility to outbid strategic buyers, as explanation. 
Other research argues in the other direction and presumes higher abnormal returns for 
strategic rather than for financial buyers. Stienemann (2003) and Bartsch (2005) both 
state that only strategic buyers are in a position to realise synergies and thereby increase 
the value of the asset sold. Their empirical results, however, do not support this 
expectation. Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) look at a third form of buyers, i.e. the actual 
management of the sold divisions. Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) expect management 
buyouts to yield lower abnormal returns because of agency costs created by a possible 
absence of ‘arm’s-length bargaining’ and the threat of ‘managerial self-dealing’ at the 
expense of the parent shareholders (Hite and Vetsuypens, 1989, p. 954). However, Hite 
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and Vetsuypens (1989) find no support for their hypothesis and report no significant 
difference between management buyouts and selloffs to strategic investors. Also, 
Stouraitis (2003) investigates the influence of the management as buyer, although his 
main focus is on the influence of advisors on acquisition premiums paid to the seller. 
Excluding the possible effect of an advisor, Stouraitis (2003) finds no significant 
difference in abnormal returns between management buyouts and interfirm selloffs. 
 
Although the published research so far does not show an unambiguous influence of the 
type of buyer on abnormal returns, the author expects strategic divestitures to yield the 
highest abnormal returns, followed by private equity investors and management buyouts 
on the last position. With this in mind, the author follows the argumentation of 
Stienemann (2003) and Bartsch (2005) and, furthermore, assumes that if financial 
investors act as buyers, the assets were probably not interesting enough for strategic 
investors, and, hence, the bargaining power of the seller was rather weak. Moreover, 
financial investors specifically search for undervalued assets, which serves as an 
additional indicator for a relatively low selling price and correspondingly lower 
abnormal returns. Regarding management buyouts, the author follows the 
argumentation of Hite and Vetsuypens (1989) and expects them to show the lowest 
abnormal returns of the three groups of buyers. 
 
Hypothesis 15  
Selloffs to strategic investors on average create significantly more shareholder wealth 
than selloffs to private equity investors and managers via leveraged buyouts. 
 
 
3.2.6 Form of Payment 
 
Regarding the form of payment, i.e. either cash, shares or a hybrid form, Stienemann 
(2003) hypothesises that cash deals should create more value for the parent company 
than share or hybrid deals. Stienemann (2003) argues that buyers are more likely to pay 
with shares if the management considers the shares of its company to be overvalued, 
whereas in the case of an anticipated undervaluation cash would be the preferred form 
of payment. Hence, the shares are subject to a substantial risk of devaluation until their 
disposal through the seller. Moreover, Stienemann (2003) argues that in share deals the 
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selloff would not lead to an increased focus since the direct investment in the asset sold 
is just exchanged against the indirect investment in the portfolio of the buyer. In his 
multivariate analysis, Stienemann (2003) finds support for his hypothesis showing that 
cash as a form of payment has a significantly positive influence on abnormal returns. 
On the other hand, Slovin et al. (2005, p. 2387) suggest that share deals should lead to 
higher abnormal returns as cash deals because the seller would only accept equity as 
means of payment if he has favourable “[…] private information about the value of the 
divested asset and the buyer.” In this way, the seller can participate in the value creation 
potential of the buyer. Hege et al. (2009) argue in a similar way – if the seller has 
unfavourable private information about the asset sold, he probably chooses the option to 
take cash from the highest bidder. If the private information is, by contrast, positive, the 
seller would make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ (Hege et al., 2009, p. 705) counter-offer to the 
highest bidder that entails shares as a form of payment to participate in the value 
creation potential of the asset sold under the new owner. Whereas Slovin et al. (2005) 
find no empirical evidence for their hypothesis, Hege et al. (2009) report significantly 
higher abnormal returns for share deals compared to cash deals. Controlling for the form 
of payment, Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995) and Brauer and Wiersema (2012), similarly to 
Slovin et al. (2005), find no impact on abnormal returns. However, the author considers 
the ‘participation in the value creation potential of the buyer’ argument regarding stock 
as means of payment as rather weak as the sold assets usually represent only a minor 
proportion of the whole buyer. Also, the argument of favourable private information 
about the buyer, i.e. an anticipated undervaluation, does not seem to be realistic. If the 
buyer has the same private information, he would rather pay in cash than in shares. And 
a situation in which the seller has better private information about the buyer than the 
buyer itself is rather unlikely. Moreover, the author expects sellers not to sell assets in 
exchange for shares if they have favourable private information about them but rather in 
the case of a low bargaining power and thus, a take-it-or-leave-it situation created by the 
buyer. Hence, the author follows the suggestion of Stienemann (2003) and expects cash 
deals to yield higher abnormal returns than share deals.  
 
The information about the structure of the payment is obtained from the SDC Platinum 
database. Because the mode of payment is just available in 47.59% of the cases and in 
over 90% of those cases, the announced consideration is cash, whereas only one case 
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represents a pure stock deal, this hypothesis cannot be tested as intended. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is formulated differently as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 16  
Selloffs, where the form of payment is cash, on average create significantly more 
shareholder wealth than selloffs settled with other or hybrid forms of payment. 
 
 
3.2.7 Relative Size of the Deal 
 
The relative size of the corporate divestiture, i.e. the transaction value as a proportion of 
the market capitalisation of the seller, shows a significant positive influence in a variety 
of empirical studies (cf. i.a. Hearth and Zaima, 1984; Afshar et al., 1992; Kaiser and 
Stouraitis, 1995; Lasfer et al., 1996; Wang, 2000; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam, 2001; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Mittnacht, 2005). 
According to Afshar et al. (1992), a significant positive influence of the relative size 
would support the hypothesis that divestitures are value-creating corporate activities. 
The reason for a presumed positive influence is that with an increasing relative size, the 
positive effects of the divestiture purpose, e.g. an increase in corporate focus, should 
increase in magnitude (Mittnacht, 2005). Hence, this variable can serve as a proxy for 
the degree of restructuring undertaken by the divestor (Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001). 
 
Hypothesis 17  
The relative size of selloffs on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The relative size is calculated as the proportion of the selling price from the market 
capitalization of the seller ten days before the divestiture announcement. This procedure 
shall ensure it obtains an as accurate as possible estimate of the market capitalisation of 
the seller at the announcement, but avoid that the market capitalisation is influenced by 
the event itself. 
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3.3 Seller Characteristics 
 
3.3.1 Efficiency and Growth Opportunities 
 
The efficiency and growth opportunities of the divesting firm should be positively 
related to the abnormal returns. The more attractive the efficiency and growth 
opportunities, the better the proceeds from the divestiture can be redeployed. This 
argument is again based on the resource-based view in the sense that the resources are 
moved to higher valued uses.  
 
An often-used proxy for the efficiency or growth perspectives of a company is the 
market-to-book value (Sharma et al., 2013). The market-to-book value itself serves as a 
proxy for Tobin’s q since the calculation of the replacement costs of assets that 
constitute the denominator in the q-ratio is somewhat sophisticated. They are usually 
not reported and furthermore, evaluating the market value of debt may be difficult 
(Perfect and Wiles, 1994). A high correlation between Tobin’s q and the market-to-book 
value allows for its usage as a proxy. Perfect and Wiles (1994) conclude that the 
market-to-book value, defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of total assets, “[…] may provide acceptable initial estimates 
if the other estimators are not available” (Perfect and Wiles, 1994, p. 339). Hence, a 
market-to-book ratio defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity is applied here. This is supported by Adam and Goyal (2008), who report a 
relationship between the market-to-book ratio as applied here and the growth 
opportunities, but they also conclude that the original q ratio has the highest explanatory 
power. Since Adam and Goyal (2008) are concerned that the market-to-book ratio also 
proxies for corporate performance and leverage, the author will include control 
variables in the regression model (covered under parent financial performance). 
 
Sharma et al. (2013), furthermore, describe that besides serving as a proxy for efficiency 
and growth perspectives, the market-to-book value also serves as a proxy for risk in 
financial research. Yet, in their empirical analysis, they find that corporate efficiency 
and growth perspectives explain the majority of variation of the market-to-book value, 
whereas the explanatory power of the factor risk is only small. 
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Hypothesis 18  
The growth perspectives of the parent company on average have a significantly positive 
influence on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
 
3.3.2 Seller Financial Performance 
 
Looking at the published empirical evidence, the financial performance of the divesting 
firm seems to influence shareholder value creation. However, there is no broad 
consensus on how the financial performance influences abnormal returns. As shown in 
Table 7 (p. 54) the results are rather mixed and range from a significant positive impact 
to no impact as well as a significant negative impact. Even if researchers used the same 
proxies for financial performance, the results are not unambiguous. The reason for these 
results may again lie in two contrasting argumentations regarding the impact of parent 
financial performance. As Hearth and Zaima (1984) argue, good financial performance 
of the divesting firm should influence abnormal returns positively. In the case of 
selloffs, the seller will have a stronger negotiating position since there is no immediate 
pressure to sell the assets and, hence, more favourable prices can be negotiated. This 
argumentation is also stated by others, such as Sicherman and Pettway (1992), Kaiser 
and Stouraitis (2001), Stienemann (2003) or Wang (2000). The latter describes the 
divestiture out of a good financial situation as “[…] restructuring for strategic reasons 
[…]” (Wang, 2000, p. 5). This is more a proactive than a reactive action by the 
management that should be honoured by the capital market. However, Sicherman and 
Pettway (1992) argue that it may be the other way around and shareholders may react 
positively to divestitures of financially distressed firms. The probability of default 
decreases through the divestiture as they may raise desperately needed cash which 
would have been very costly to raise through the capital market. Afshar et al. (1992) 
argue in a similar way, but add that divestitures out of a weak financial situation could 
be interpreted as a ‘harbinger of doom’ or ‘fire sales’ (Afshar et al., 1992, p. 120), 
which again would cause a negative reaction by the capital market. Nevertheless, the 
author follows the first argumentation and expects higher abnormal returns for firms in 
a strong financial condition due to their favourable negotiation position. 
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Often used proxies for financial performance are S&P rankings (cf. Hearth and Zaima, 
1984; Rosenfeld, 1984) or the z-score (cf. Afshar et al., 1992; Wang 2000; Alexandrou 
and Sudarsanam, 2001). The z-score is – also in this thesis – sometimes used as a 
special variable for financial health or distress. Since the S&P rankings in particular are 
more oriented towards the past, the author refrains from applying those rankings. 
Instead, five different measures are applied to capture the financial situation of a 
divestor. First of all, the stock performance during the estimation period is considered to 
capture the performance prospects of the divesting firm. This is measured using the 
buy-and-hold return over the estimation period. Second, the variable return on assets in 
the year of the announcement is applied to capture the profitability of the divestor. The 
return on assets is the preferred ratio here as it is not as sensitive to the capital structure 
of the divesting firm as other ratios (cf. Vollmar, 2014). Third, the quick ratio in the 
year of the announcement serves as a proxy for the liquidity of the parent. Fourth, the 
debt/equity ratio accounts for the leverage of the divestor. Fifth, as also used by Afshar 
et al. (1992), Wang (2000) and Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) the z-score (more 
precisely the z’’-score as explained above) is applied as a measure of financial distress.  
 
Hypothesis 19  
The stock performance of the seller in the period before the announcement on average 
has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 20  
The profitability of the seller on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 21  
The degree of liquidity of the seller on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 22  
The degree of leverage of the seller on average has a significantly negative impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
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Hypothesis 23  
Financial distress, respectively the probability of bankruptcy of the seller, on average 
has a significantly negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
 
3.4 Further Characteristics 
 
Beyond the aforementioned variables related to the hypotheses stated, several variables 
arose as by-products from the research such as the economic environment, the 
nationality of the seller, buyer or asset sold, if the transaction contained the divestiture 
of an asset directly or indirectly (via a subsidiary) held by the seller, if the selloff led to 
an increase in the systematic risk and also the industry of the seller. These variables are 
not specifically motivated but are reported for informational reasons. 
 
 
3.5 Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1  
Corporate selloffs and spinoffs of publicly traded companies located in the D-A-CH 
region on average create significant value for their shareholders. 
 
Hypothesis 2  
An increase in the corporate industrial focus on average has a significantly positive 
impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
The degree of diversification of the seller on average has a significantly positive effect 
on shareholder wealth creation of selloffs that increase the seller’s industrial focus. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
A major restructuring, respectively a complete strategic shift in the corporate focus, on 
average has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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Hypothesis 5  
An increase in the corporate geographic focus on average has no significant impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 6  
The announcement that a selloff is motivated by financial distress on average has a 
significantly negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 7  
The rationale that selloffs are forced by antitrust authorities, regulatory issues or 
changes in legislation on average has a significantly negative impact on shareholder 
wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 8  
The announced use of proceeds on average has a significant impact on shareholder 
wealth creation in the sense that abnormal returns are expected to be highest if the 
proceeds are distributed to the shareholders and smallest if the proceeds are retained 
within the firm. 
 
Hypothesis 9  
The higher the debt level of the divesting company, the significantly higher are the 
average abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to reduce debt. 
 
Hypothesis 10  
The more serious the financial distress of the divesting company, the significantly 
higher are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to reduce debt. 
 
Hypothesis 11  
The higher the growth opportunities of the divesting company, the significantly higher 
are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are reinvested or retained by the 
seller. 
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Hypothesis 12  
The disclosure of the transaction details as the price on average has a significantly 
positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 13  
The industrial relatedness between the buyer and the asset sold on average has a 
significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 14  
The combination of an increase in the industrial corporate focus and a strategic fit 
between the buyer and asset sold on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 15  
Selloffs to strategic investors on average create significantly more shareholder wealth 
than selloffs to private equity investors and managers via leveraged buyouts. 
 
Hypothesis 16  
Selloffs, where the form of payment is cash, on average create significantly more 
shareholder wealth than selloffs settled with other or hybrid forms of payment. 
 
Hypothesis 17  
The relative size of selloffs on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 18  
The growth perspectives of the parent company on average have a significantly positive 
influence on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 19  
The stock performance of the seller in the period before the announcement on average 
has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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Hypothesis 20  
The profitability of the seller on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 21  
The degree of liquidity of the seller on average has a significantly positive impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 22  
The degree of leverage of the seller on average has a significantly negative impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Hypothesis 23  
Financial distress, respectively the probability of bankruptcy of the seller, on average 
has a significantly negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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4 Research Design and Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the research methodology and design. The structure of the 
chapter is oriented towards the research onion described by Saunders et al. (2016). 
Whereas section 4.1 briefly describes philosophical issues, section 4.2 addresses the 
approach to theory development and section 4.3 concentrates on the research strategy. 
The main part (4.4) of the methodology section explains the event study methodology in 
detail, including its assumptions and the subsequent statistical tests as well as the 
multivariate analyses. Section 4.5 describes the sample selection and section 4.6 the 
data collection process. Finally, section 4.7 provides a description of the variables 
applied in the thesis. 
 
 
4.1 Research Philosophy 
 
This thesis follows a pragmatist research philosophy, although the research 
methodology contains several positivist elements. The event study methodology and the 
multivariate statistical analyses, which will be described later, as the central element of 
this research, relate to the stance of natural scientists and the belief that only objective 
observable phenomena provide reliable facts and can lead to generalisations (Saunders 
et al., 2016). The researcher tries to detect causal relationships between the abnormal 
announcement returns of divesting companies and different factors that may have an 
influence and uses these findings to explain and predict divestiture performance 
(Sekaran and Bougie, 2013; Saunders et al., 2016). Moreover, as in the underlying 
research, positivist researchers work deductively and use existing theories to develop 
their research hypotheses (Saunders et al., 2016; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2016). Due 
to the quantitative nature of their data, which often leads to statistical analyses, they try 
to remain neutral as far as possible to ensure the results are uninfluenced by human bias 
or interpretation (Saunders et al., 2016). In this regard, Saunders et al. (2016) add that 
the substance of the data collected can, if at all, be altered to a moderate extent, which is 
also the case in the underlying research. Furthermore, positivist research generally 
follows a highly structured methodology in order to allow for replication and to assure 
scientific rigour (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013).  
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Whilst all these arguments indicate that the underlying research seems to follow a 
positivist research philosophy, the author nonetheless adopts a pragmatist’s position. 
The reason for this (besides questioning the benefit of adopting a specific research 
philosophy at least in this field of research) is that the choice of the research design and 
methodology is not based on any ontological, epistemological and axiological 
assumption, but rather on the research problem to be addressed (Saunders et al., 2016). 
Hence, whereas normally, the adopted research philosophy leads to a specific research 
design, in this thesis, the chosen research design based on the research questions leads 
to the adoption of the pragmatist ‘philosophy’. The choice of pragmatism is in line with 
the previous research presented in the literature review as event study methodology is 
the only method that allows isolating a corporate event from other corporate decisions 
and, thus, measuring the impact of such an event economically. 
 
This central argument for a pragmatist research philosophy is supported by the point 
that – as described by Saunders et al. (2016) – the author is aware that no single 
research methodology is able to entirely answer the research problem. Thus, he has to 
select the method or the methods that he thinks suit best. Moreover, the author is in 
agreement with Sekaran and Bougie (2013) who describe pragmatists as seeing the 
current truth based on the research results as changing over time – and therefore 
provisional – and also with Saunders et al. (2016, p. 143) who describe pragmatists as 
being “[…] more interested in practical outcomes than abstract distinctions […].”  
 
 
4.2 Approach to Theory Development 
 
The approach to theory development addresses the question of whether existing theories 
are tested based on collected data (deduction), new theory is generated based on 
collected data (induction) or a combination of both approaches (abduction) (Saunders et 
al., 2016). Based on this distinction, a clear allocation of the research to one of the three 
approaches is not possible. However, the main approach to theory development will be 
of a deductive nature, i.e. the validity of existing theories from previous research that 
are presented in the literature review is tested for a different geographic region or based 
on a more representative sample. But the research also contains certain inductive and 
also abductive elements. Some data regarding corporate divestitures has been collected 
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and analysed without an underlying theory or purpose and some data originated as by-
products. Salience in the research results regarding such data leads to the development 
of a new theory, and, hence, inductive elements in the research. Moreover, the outcomes 
of the tests of existing theories may lead to a modification of these theories. This adds 
some abductive components to the research. 
 
 
4.3 Methodological Choice and Research Strategy 
 
The pragmatist approach also becomes apparent regarding the methodological choice 
and the research strategy as they rely on the choice of the tools for the research analysis 
and not vice versa. Since the main elements for the research analysis, i.e. the event 
study methodology as the first step and the bi- or multivariate analyses as the second 
step require quantitative or quantified qualitative data, the methodological choice falls 
onto quantitative methods. More specifically, the author follows a multi-method 
quantitative study as he uses more than one data collection technique and source for 
data collection (Saunders et al., 2016), i.e. collecting data regarding the sample of 
divestiture cases from different financial databases, press releases and newspaper 
articles.  
 
The reason for using multiple methods lies in the fact that the different independent 
sources complement each other in the case of missing data and offer the possibility for 
triangulation, which confirms the validity and credibility of the research data and, 
hence, improves the quality of the research results (Saunders et al., 2016). 
 
Indeed, the researcher also collects qualitative data through professional discussions 
which, however, are conducted at a previous stage of the research to offer some 
informal triangulation in order to confirm the hypotheses derived from the research 
described in the literature review. Professional discussions are undertaken with the CEO 
of a private equity company, an M&A expert from an investment bank and with a 
valuation expert from a leading consultancy.  
 
Research Design and Methodology 
84 
 
 
Figure 5: Methodological Choice28 
 
If the research had to be classified into the different research strategies, it would fit best 
to the strategy of archival or documentary research. This is because the research 
analysis completely relies on secondary data which is drawn from financial databases. 
Due to the nature of this data, for example share prices or annual reports, there is only a 
very low threat regarding the reliability and validity of this data. More care needs to be 
taken regarding the quantified qualitative data such as the announced purposes for 
divestitures, however, for this data, multiple independent sources are used to ensure 
reliability and offer triangulation. 
 
The time horizon of the research will be cross-sectional. The research studies a 
particular phenomenon, i.e. corporate divestitures, at a specific point in time, i.e. the 
announcement of the divestiture transactions. 
 
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
 
4.4.1 Event Study Methodology 
 
4.4.1.1 Efficient Capital Markets as Precondition 
 
The event study methodology as the central research methodology of this thesis is based 
on the assumption of efficient capital markets as a prerequisite. The concept of capital 
market efficiency was initially extensively described by Fama (1970). According to 
                                                 
28 Source: Saunders et al., 2016, p. 167. 
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Fama (1970), a capital market is efficient if “[…] security prices at any time ‘fully 
reflect’ all available information” (Fama, 1970, p. 383). Since capital market efficiency 
is mainly about the adjustment of share prices to new information, it is also called 
information efficiency. This means that in a market equilibrium, which reflects the 
expectations of all investors based on the available information, all information is 
incorporated in the security prices. As soon as there is new information and, hence, 
expectations change, the prices immediately adjust to that information. Those 
adjustments are random and identically distributed as the new information is not 
predictable (Fama, 1970). As soon as the market is in equilibrium again, there are no 
successive price changes anymore. Fama (1970) remarks that sufficient conditions for 
capital market efficiency would be that (1) “[…] there are no transaction costs in trading 
securities […]”, (2) “[…] all available information is costlessly available to all market 
participants […]”, and (3) “[…] all agree on the implications of the current information 
for the current price and distributions of future prices of each security” (Fama, 1970, p. 
387). However, since these conditions do not represent the reality, they are fortunately 
not necessary conditions and capital markets may still be efficient even if these 
conditions are violated (Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991). 
 
Dependent on which subsets of information are reflected in share prices, Fama (1970) 
distinguishes between three forms of information efficiency which are called (1) weak 
form, (2) semi-strong form and (3) strong form.  
 
The weak form assumes that the history of share prices, i.e. past returns, is fully 
reflected in the price. Hence, future prices cannot be predicted using past returns as, for 
example, in the case of technical analyses and no return exceeding the market return can 
be generated.  
 
The semi-strong form assumes that share prices additionally reflect “[…] other 
obviously publicly available information (e.g. announcements of stock splits, annual 
reports, new security issues, etc.) […]” immediately (Fama, 1970, p. 388). This implies 
that investors are not able to obtain excess capital gains over the market return based on 
this information as in the case of fundamental analyses.  
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Finally, the strong form of capital market efficiency assumes that insider information, 
i.e. information of investors or groups with “[…] monopolistic access to any 
information relevant […]” (Fama, 1970, p. 388) is always immediately reflected in 
security prices as well. Hence, investors are not even able to make use of insider 
information. According to Fama (1970), empirical tests strongly support the weak- and 
semi-strong forms of capital market efficiency; the evidence against the strong form is 
also sparse.  
 
In a review of the market efficiency literature since the work from 1970, Fama (1991) 
changes the categories to (1) tests for return predictability, (2) event studies and (3) 
tests for private information, which is still relevant today. Whereas the first category 
now also includes some other variables, such as dividend yields or interest rates in order 
to forecast returns, the latter two categories are just renamed. Hence, event studies, as 
applied in this thesis, test the semi-strong form of capital market efficiency since they 
analyse “[…] the adjustment of prices to public announcements […]” (Fama, 1991, p. 
1577). In the special case of this thesis, those events are the public announcements of 
corporate divestitures. As the market is assumed to be efficient, at least in the semi-
strong form, the impact of the information on the value of the company should be 
reflected immediately in the stock prices. Moreover, by analysing eventual unexpected 
returns preceding public announcements, for example, due to insider trading, event 
studies are also able to test the strong form of capital market efficiency to a certain 
extent. Since Fama (1970; 1991) concludes that empirical tests support at least the semi-
strong form of information efficiency, i.e. prices adjust immediately to the public 
announcement of an event, the main prerequisite for event study methodology stands up 
well. Regarding the strong form, Fama (1991) states that because of the weak evidence, 
strong inferences about market efficiency cannot be made. Nevertheless, he adds for 
consideration that insiders often underperform the market, which led to the evolution of 
passive investment strategies. This may be an indication that the strong form of capital 
market efficiency also cannot be rejected.  
 
For Europe, Eichinger (2001) supports the hypothesis of semi-strong information 
efficiency, using the announcement of selloffs in Germany. Also, evaluating prior 
research on the semi-strong form, he summarises that the semi-strong form cannot be 
rejected for the German capital market. Mittnacht (2005) comes to a similar conclusion 
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and Röder (1999) also cannot reject the semi-strong form of information efficiency for 
the DAX29. Regarding the strong form of capital market efficiency, Ostrowski (2007) 
concludes that there is a widely accepted consensus that the strong form of information 
efficiency has to be rejected. Though, through a change in German law regarding the 
trading of securities coming into effect on the 1st August 1994 (‘Zweites 
Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz’) insider trading has been prohibited according to §14 
WpHG (‘Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel’)30 and, hence, efficiency should increase. 
Similar regulations also exist in Switzerland (Art. 33e BEHG (‘Bundesgesetz über die 
Börsen und den Effektenhandel’)) and Austria (§48b BörseG (‘Börsegesetz’)). Also, the 
increasing public access to information and the increasing speed with which information 
is distributed further increases information efficiency. 
 
Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that because of the joint hypothesis problem, which 
states that market efficiency can only be tested together with an asset-pricing model, 
market efficiency alone is not testable (Fama, 1991). Specifically, this means that one 
“[…] can only test whether information is properly reflected in prices in the context of a 
pricing model that defines the meaning of ‘properly’” (Fama, 1991, p. 1576). Indeed, 
using daily data in event studies can mitigate or even eliminate the joint hypothesis 
problem (Fama, 1991). Furthermore, Fama (1991, p. 1602) reports that over the years of 
event study research, “[…] some event studies suggest that stock prices do not respond 
quickly to specific information.” These few exceptions, however, would be ‘inevitable’ 
regarding the large number of event studies and with these few exceptions he concludes 
that the evidence is supportive (Fama, 1991).  
 
Based on the empirical evidence and the similarity of capital markets in the D-A-CH 
region in terms of capital market legislation, which is to a large extent determined by 
EU directives (also Switzerland generally adapts these directives), the author assumes 
that the semi-strong form of capital market efficiency is valid for this region.  
 
 
  
                                                 
29 As will be shown later, the assumption of efficient capital markets in the semi-strong form is furthermore supported by the 
research results of this thesis. 
30 German Securities Trading Act. 
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4.4.1.2 The Concept of Event Studies 
 
The assumption of an efficient capital market, at least in the semi-strong form, allows 
assessment of the influence of the announcement of a corporate event like a divestiture 
on shareholder value. Since it is assumed that all publicly available information is 
reflected in the prices, no abnormal return over the market return is possible. The 
announcement of the divestitures, however, presents new information, which is not yet 
reflected in the prices. Dependent on the content of the new information, the 
expectations of the investor’s change and the prices quickly adjust to the new 
expectations. Consequently, until the market is in equilibrium again, the abnormal 
return over the market return differs from zero. This abnormal return, which is the 
difference between the expected return based on the available information before the 
announcement and the actual return through the adjustment of the prices to the new 
information, can be defined as the shareholder value that is created through the 
divestiture.  
 
 
4.4.1.3 Normal and Abnormal Returns 
 
The abnormal return as the economic value of the event is defined as the actual ex post 
return of a security that exceeds the normal return during the event window. The normal 
return is the return that would have been expected if the event would not have taken 
place (Campbell et al., 1997). Hence, the abnormal return is defined as:  
 
(2)  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡), 
 
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return of security i for the time period t, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual 
return of security i for the time period t and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) is the normal return that would 
have been expected based on the information available before the announcement of the 
event 𝑋𝑡. 
 
The different approaches in order to estimate the expected normal return can be 
categorised into statistical models and economic models, whereby the economic models 
still rely on statistical assumptions. Campbell et al. (1997, p. 154) note that commonly 
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one assumes “[…] that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal and independently 
and identically distributed through time.”  
 
Probably the three most popular statistical models are the mean-adjusted-return model, 
the market-adjusted-return model and the market model. 
 
Mean-Adjusted Returns 
The mean-adjusted-return model is probably the least complex model. It assumes that 
the ex ante expected return for a security i is constant and equal to its predicted ex post 
return. This constant (mean) return 𝜇𝑖 can differ between different stocks (Brown and 
Warner, 1980). Hence, the normal return is defined as: 
 
(3)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 with 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 , 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of security i in the period t, 𝜇𝑖 is the mean return of security i, 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the unexpected, abnormal or disturbance term, and 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  is the variance of the 
abnormal return. Campbell et al. (1997) point out that although the mean-adjusted-
return model is probably the simplest model, it often leads to results similar to more 
complex models since the variance of the abnormal returns is in many cases not reduced 
by more complex models. 
 
Market-Adjusted Returns 
In contrast to the mean-adjusted-return model, the market-adjusted-return model 
assumes that the “[…] ex ante expected returns are equal across [different] securities, 
but [do not have to be] constant for a given security” (Brown and Warner, 1980, p. 
208). The normal return is defined as: 
 
(4)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 with 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 , 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of security i in the period t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return of the market 
portfolio in the period t, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return and 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  is the variance of the 
abnormal return. Theoretically, the market portfolio consists of every type of assets that 
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exist in the world, relatively weighted. As such a portfolio does not exist in reality, 
event study methodology usually draws on broad stock indices like the S&P 500 in the 
US or the FTSE 100 in the UK. The advantage of the market-adjusted-return over the 
mean-adjusted-return model is that it removes market-wide movements and thus leads 
to better results in terms of isolating the pure effects of the respective event. 
 
Market Model 
The market model is a derivative of the market-adjusted-return model. It “[…] relates 
the return of any given security to the return of the market portfolio […]” (Campbell et 
al., 1997, p. 155) and is defined as: 
 
(5)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 with 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 , 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of security i in the period t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return of the market 
portfolio in the period t and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return. 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 and the variance of the 
abnormal return 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  are the parameters of the market model. In contrast to the market-
adjusted-returns, the market model does not just remove the market-wide movements, 
but the proportion of the return of a given security that is in fact related to market-wide 
movements. Hence, the market-adjusted-return model represents a market model with 
𝛼𝑖 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖 = 1. Campbell et al. (1997) argue that the market-adjusted-return model 
is advantageous when there is limited data availability for the estimation of the market 
model parameters as, for example, in the case of initial public offerings. Otherwise, the 
market model, which presents the most commonly used one-factor model in divestiture 
research, should be applied and other restricted models, like the market-adjusted-
returns, should only be used as a ‘last resort’ (Campbell et al., 1997). 
 
In addition to these models, there are a number of other statistical models that have been 
developed over the years, one-factor models such as the market model and also 
multifactor models. Other factors that are included in the models are, for example, 
industry indices, the market capitalisation, the book-to-market ratio or benchmark 
portfolios that consist of peers of similar size. Campbell et al. (1997, p. 156) summarise 
that the gains of applying multifactor models are limited as “[…] the marginal 
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explanatory power of additional factors beyond the market factor is small, and hence 
there is little reduction in the variance of the abnormal return” 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 . 
 
The two most conventional economic models are the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) going back to Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) and the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) developed by Ross (1976). Regarding the APT, Campbell et al. (1997) 
see little practical advantage but an increase in complexity. Regarding the application of 
the CAPM, Campbell et al. (1997, p. 156) have reservations since “[…] deviations from 
the CAPM have been discovered [which] casts doubt on the validity of the restrictions 
imposed by the CAPM on the market model.” These restrictions could “[…] be relaxed 
at little cost by using the market model […]” (Campbell et al., 1997, p. 156). Hence, 
Campbell et al. (1997) see no reason for preferring the economic models. These 
findings are in line with the practice in divestiture research using event studies where 
the market model is commonly used. 
 
For Germany, Eichinger (2001) summarises that the CAPM as well as the APT have no 
explanatory power for the security returns. In contrast, a certain explanatory power of 
the market model cannot be rejected. Indeed, the market return, represented by a broad 
stock index, does not seem to be the only variable that explains security returns. 
However, the market return is the only variable where a significant influence has been 
measured yet.31 Hence, since the research focuses on the D-A-CH region, the author 
follows Eichinger (2001) and chooses the market model in order to estimate the 
expected normal return. 
 
 
4.4.1.4 Parameter Estimation 
 
In order to estimate the expected normal returns during the event window, the 
parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 of the market model have to be estimated. As described above, the 
market model is defined as: 
 
(6)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                 
31 Although not explicitly mentioned, the dominant application of the market model in more recent work supports Eichinger (2001) 
and, hence, the application of the market model in this thesis. Also, in this thesis, the market model has good explanatory power in 
most cases. 
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The parameters are estimated using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression over an 
estimation window with length 𝐿1 = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 + 1 and 𝑇0 as the earliest day of the 
estimation window and 𝑇1 as the latest day of the estimation window, referring to 
trading days only (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6: Estimation and Event Period 
 
The estimation window has to be long enough to reduce estimation errors to a minimum 
but short enough to cover recent parameter changes. Moreover, the estimation window 
must not overlap with the event window to prevent influences from the event on the 
estimated parameters of the market model. An estimation window of 200 trading days 
immediately preceding the event window, which was also applied in comparable 
studies, should meet those requirements. Hence, the author applies an estimation 
window ranging from 𝑇1 = −11 to 𝑇0 = −210 relative to the announcement date. The 
independent variable in the regression model is represented by the market return. In 
contrast to many prior studies, the market return is not represented by a broad market 
index. Instead, the market return is given by an industry index related to the divesting 
firm. This should increase the explanatory power of the market model. The industry 
indices are represented by the STOXX® Europe 600 supersector indices, which use the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) for the categorisation of the companies. Thus, 
the same standard (ICB Codes) is used to classify the companies in the sample of the 
underlying thesis.  
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4.4.1.5 Calculation and Aggregation of Abnormal Returns 
 
Since, generally, one assumes logarithmised returns to be approximately normally 
distributed, logarithmised or continuous daily returns are applied in this thesis. Hence, 
the return of an individual security or the market return is defined as: 
 
(7)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ln (
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
), 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return from day 𝑡 − 1 to day 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the closing price of the individual 
security or the market at day 𝑡 and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the closing price of the individual security or 
the market at the preceding day 𝑡 − 1. Despite some other benefits, for example 
regarding the homoscedasticity assumption of the residuals, logarithmised returns can 
be aggregated more easily than discrete returns by simply adding up consecutive 
returns.  
 
Applying the market model, the abnormal return (AR) of an individual security 𝑖 at a 
single day 𝑡 is defined as: 
 
(8)  𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡), 
 
whereby 𝑋𝑡 (as the conditioning information for the expected return) is the market 
return and the other parameters are defined as before. 
In order to draw conclusions from the observations, the single abnormal returns have to 
be aggregated in two dimensions: (1) through time and (2) across the cases investigated 
(Campbell et al., 1997).  
 
Aggregation Through Time 
In order to capture the full effect of the announcement of a divestiture, the trading day 
before the announcement, as well as the trading day following the announcement, are 
also included in the calculation of the abnormal returns. This is in line with most of the 
prior research where event windows of two ([-1;0], [0;1]) or three ([-1;1]) days 
surrounding the announcement date (AD) have been applied. The reason for covering 
the day before the announcement is to also include potential abnormal returns on the 
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day before the announcement through information leakages. The day after the 
announcement is covered for two reasons: first, since it is not clear whether the 
announcement took place during the day or after the closing of the stock market and, 
second, to capture a potential overreaction on the announcement day. Hence, the 
abnormal returns are aggregated to cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) covering the 
whole event window. Therefore, 𝐿2 denotes the event window length, which is defined 
as 𝐿2 = 𝑇3 − 𝑇2 + 1 with 𝑇2 as the first day of the event window and 𝑇3 as the last day 
of the event window, again referring to trading days only (Figure 6). Since the daily 
returns are calculated using the natural logarithm, the individual daily abnormal returns 
during the event window 𝐿2 ranging from 𝑇2 = −1 (first day of the event window) to 
𝑇3 = 1 (last day of the event window) relative to the announcement date can be added 
up to the cumulative abnormal return. 
 
(9)  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑇2,𝑇3) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇3
𝑡=𝑇2
. 
 
Beyond the event windows also covering the day before and after the announcement 
([0], [-1;0], [0;1], [-1;1]), several other event windows surrounding the event 
announcement ([-2;2], [-3;3], [-5;5], [-10;10]) are analysed in order to improve the 
reliability and robustness of the results as well as to gain insights into how quickly the 
prices adjust to the new information, thus testing the capital market efficiency. 
 
Aggregation Across Cases 
In order to draw inferences for the whole sample of divestitures analysed in this thesis, 
the abnormal returns have to be averaged over the sample. Therefore, the individual 
abnormal returns are averaged assuming an equally weighted portfolio of divesting 
firms at the respective day of interest. Thus, the formula for the average abnormal return 
(AAR) is: 
 
(10)  𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
, 
 
whereby 𝑁 represents the sample size, i.e. the number of event studies, and the other 
terms are defined as before. However, also regarding the sample average, one is indeed 
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interested in the cumulative abnormal return over the whole event window. Thus, the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is defined as: 
 
(11)  𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇2,𝑇3) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖.
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
4.4.2 Univariate Tests 
 
4.4.2.1 Parametric Test for Abnormal Returns 
 
In order to test for the significance of the abnormal returns, the null hypothesis 𝐻0 
rejects the presence of abnormal returns within the respective event window; the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 suggests the existence of positive abnormal returns. This 
hypothesis can be tested for the individual abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns as well as for the sample average abnormal returns and cumulative average 
abnormal returns. For the purpose of this thesis, the latter hypothesis is of primary 
interest, i.e. that the cross-sectional cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) over 
the entire sample are significantly positive. Hence, the hypotheses read as follows: 
 
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇2,𝑇3) = 0 
𝐻1: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇2,𝑇3) > 0 
 
In order to apply parametric tests on the (average) abnormal returns, in small samples, 
the abnormal returns have to be independently and identically distributed (iid) as 
normal. In order to test against the null hypothesis of normality of the abnormal returns, 
a Jarque/Bera test has been applied with: 
 
(12)  𝐽𝐵 =
𝑛
6
(𝑆2 +
(𝐾 − 3)2
4
), 
 
where 𝑛 represents the number of observations, 𝑆 is defined as the skewness and 𝐾 as 
the kurtosis of the abnormal returns. The test statistic is asymptotically chi-square 
distributed with two degrees of freedom (Jarque and Bera, 1980). However, a possible 
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violation of the normality assumption does not pose a problem here, since according to 
the Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of average abnormal returns over the entire 
sample should converge to normality with an increasing sample size (Brown and 
Warner, 1985). Brown and Warner (1985) confirm this statement for a sample size of 50 
securities, whereas for a sample size of 5, they observe a distinct deviation from 
normality. Hence, Brown and Warner (1985) conclude that parametric tests for the 
significance of the average abnormal returns are well specified. 
 
In general, the test statistic of the parametric test for abnormal returns is defined as: 
 
 𝑡𝑑𝑓 =
?̅?
𝑠?̅?
, 
 
where 𝑑𝑓 denotes the degrees of freedom, ?̅? stands for the sample mean, i.e. the 
(cumulative) (average) abnormal returns and 𝑠?̅? represents the sample standard 
deviation, i.e. the standard deviation of the (cumulative) (average) abnormal returns. 
The hypotheses and the test statistics for the individual abnormal returns are 
summarised in Table 9: 
 
𝐻0 𝑡𝑑𝑓 𝑠?̅?
2 
𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 0 𝑡𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 =
1
𝐿1 − 2
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
2
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
 
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 0 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 = 𝐿2𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
2  
The test statistic follows the t-distribution with 𝐿1 − 2 degrees of freedom 
Table 9: Single Case Test for Abnormal Returns 
 
Here, 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 denotes the standard deviation of the abnormal returns in the estimation 
period that is derived from the OLS market model regression. The hypotheses and test 
statistics for the cross-sectional (average) abnormal returns are defined as follows in 
Table 10: 
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𝐻0 𝑡𝑑𝑓 𝑠?̅?
2 
𝐻0: 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 0 𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
√𝑁 𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
2 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
√𝑁 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
2 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The test statistic follows the t-distribution with 𝑁 − 1 degrees of freedom 
Table 10: Cross-Sectional Test for Abnormal Returns 
 
Adjustments of the Cross-Sectional Test 
Since the described cross-sectional test for the average and cumulative average 
abnormal return is prone to event-induced variance increases (heteroscedasticity), some 
adjustments of the test statistic are necessary. Therefore, Boehmer et al. (1991) 
introduced the ‘standardised cross-sectional test’, which will be applied here. This test 
standardises the abnormal returns, whereby the standard error is adjusted by the forecast 
error. Under the standardised cross-sectional test, the test statistic for 𝐻0: 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 0 will 
be denoted by 𝑧𝐵𝑀𝑃, where BMP stands for the authors Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen, and is defined as: 
 
(13)  𝑧𝐵𝑀𝑃𝑡 =
𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
√𝑁, 
 
with: 
 
(14)  𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡.
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
The standardised abnormal return of company 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is defined as in Patell 
(1976), by: 
 
(15)  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
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with forecast error corrected standard error: 
 
(16)  𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 (1 +
1
𝐿1
+
(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑚)
2
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑚
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
)²
). 
 
The standard deviation 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 is defined as in Boehmer et al. (1991) with: 
 
(17)  𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
2 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑ (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
2
.
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
For 𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0, the test statistic reads as follows: 
 
(18)  𝑧𝐵𝑀𝑃 =
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
√𝑁 
 
with: 
 
(19)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖.
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
The standardised cumulative abnormal return of company 𝑖 (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖) is given by: 
 
(20)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
 
 
and forecast error corrected standard deviation 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, which corrects the abnormal 
returns of the individual companies for serial correlation, defined as in Mikkelson and 
Partch (1988)32, with: 
 
(21)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 = 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
2 (𝐿2 +
𝐿2
2
𝑀𝑖
+
(∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑚))
𝑇3
𝑡=𝑇2
2
∑ (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑚)
2𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
). 
                                                 
32 The formula provided by Mikkelson and Partch (1988) slightly differs from the one above as the formula in their paper contains 
an error in the nominator of the last term in parentheses (cf. Mikkelson and Partch, 1988, p. 122).  
Research Design and Methodology 
99 
 
The standard deviation 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 is defined as: 
 
(22)  𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅
2 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅)²
𝑁
𝑖=1
. 
 
 
4.4.2.2 Nonparametric Test for Abnormal Returns 
 
In order to check for the robustness of the results of the parametric significance tests 
and specifically for smaller subsamples, the author additionally uses a nonparametric 
significance test. Usually, a generalised sign test as described by Cowan (1992), which 
can be interpreted as a test for the median CAR, is applied. The generalised sign test 
examines whether the proportion of positive/negative abnormal returns in the event 
window differs from the expected proportion of positive/negative abnormal returns 
based on the proportion in the estimation period. Hence, the expected proportion ?̂? 
based on the estimation window is defined as: 
 
(23)  ?̂? =
1
𝑁
∑(
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇1
𝑡=𝑇0
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
with 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 1 if the sign of the AR is positive and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 0 otherwise. The generalised 
sign test statistic is  
 
(24)  𝑧𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 =
𝜔 − 𝑁?̂?
√𝑁?̂?(1 − ?̂?)
 
 
with 𝜔 representing the number of stocks in the event window with a positive CAR. 
However, this procedure treats ?̂? as a population parameter and, hence, tests against an 
assumed population parameter rather than a correctly required estimator derived from a 
second sample (estimation period). Nevertheless, the generalised sign test leads to 
reliable results as the estimation period is relatively large compared to the event 
window. Still, the author instead applies a Fisher’s exact test for independence of the 
samples, i.e. a significant difference in the number of positive abnormal returns in the 
estimation period and the event window. The reason for this is that, especially for 
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smaller subsamples, an approximation of the standard normal distribution cannot be 
assumed. For a similar reason regarding the approximation of the chi-squared 
distribution, an alternative chi-squared test also cannot be conducted in all cases. 
Fisher’s exact test, however, does not rely on the assumption of any distribution and, 
hence, does not impose requirements regarding the sample size.  
 
The p-value for a right-tailed Fisher’s exact test is calculated as:  
 
(25)  𝑝 =
(
𝑎 + 𝑏
𝑎
) (
𝑐 + 𝑑
𝑐
)
(
𝑛
𝑎 + 𝑐
)
 
 
with a 2𝑥2 contingency table as follows in Table 11: 
 
 No. positive CARs No. negative CARs Row Total 
Event Window a b a+b 
Estimation Period c d c+d 
Column Total a+c b+d a+b+c+d 
Table 11: 2x2 Contingency Table – Fisher’s Exact Test 
 
This test can similarly be applied to the individual cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
 
4.4.3 Multivariate Tests 
 
After generating the dependent variable for the research, i.e. the cross-sectional 
abnormal returns that answer the question of whether corporate divestitures on average 
create shareholder value, the second step addresses the question of which factors 
influence this shareholder value creation. For this purpose, the author uses a sequential 
analysis.  
 
As a first step, the author aims to explain the variation in the abnormal returns by one 
explanatory variable. Therefore, a simple regression model is applied. In the case of a 
qualitative explanatory variable, for example the divestiture motive, the author defines a 
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dummy variable which takes on the value one or zero; one if the variable takes on a 
specific characteristic and zero otherwise. The bivariate results shall serve as a first 
indicator for potential significant influences of the respective divestiture characteristics 
on the abnormal returns. 
 
In a second step, the author aims to explain the variation in the abnormal returns by 
more than one explanatory variable; therefore, a cross-sectional multiple regression is 
applied, where qualitative variables are again included as dummy variables in the 
model. The advantage of a multiple regression over just applying bivariate models is 
that it allows for explicit control of other factors that simultaneously influence the 
dependent variable. This is needed as the exogeneity assumption of the simple linear 
regression, which states that all other factors that influence the dependent variable are 
uncorrelated with the independent variable, is often unrealistic (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Hence, since multivariate regression models can incorporate multiple independent 
variables that may be correlated, one can draw conclusions about causal relationships 
where simple regression results would be misleading (Wooldridge, 2009). Moreover, 
including more explanatory variables in the regression model has the advantage that 
more of the variation in the dependent variable, i.e. the abnormal returns, can probably 
be explained. As in the case of the univariate tests, the standardised cumulative average 
abnormal returns are applied as the dependent variable to account for event-induced 
variance increases. 
 
Technically, the simple as well as the multiple cross-sectional regression test whether, 
dependent on the formulation of the hypothesis, the beta coefficient for the respective 
variable is either significantly positive or negative (one-tailed test), or just significantly 
different from zero (two-tailed test). The null hypothesis claims that the respective 
coefficient is zero. For reasons of exposition, the author only describes the hypotheses 
verbally; the corresponding technical hypotheses can be found in the Appendix (Table 
115, p. 230).  
 
The parameters of the simple as well as the multiple linear regression are estimated 
using the OLS technique. In order to obtain unbiased estimators and to apply statistical 
tests, several assumptions have to be fulfilled. The OLS estimators are the best linear 
unbiased estimators if the following assumptions 1) to 5) hold: 
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1) Linearity 
The linearity assumption requires the regression model to be linear in its parameters. 
However, it should be noted that the linearity assumption is not violated if the 
dependent and independent variables are arbitrary functions of the underlying variables, 
for example squares or natural logarithms (Wooldridge, 2009). The population model is 
defined as: 
 
(26)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝜀 
 
in the bivariate case and: 
 
(27)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝜀 
 
in the multivariate case with 𝛽0, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑘 as the unknown parameters of interest and 𝜀 
as the unobservable random error term. In order to test for possible functional 
misspecifications, a regression model that also includes the quadratics and cubes of the 
independent variables is used to check if those additional independent variables are 
significant (Wooldridge, 2009). For the ease of exposition, the following formula shows 
the univariate case: 
 
(28)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥1
2 + 𝛽3𝑥1
3 + 𝜀 
 
In addition, Ramsey’s (1969) regression specification error test (RESET) is applied, 
which adds polynomials in the OLS fitted values (Wooldridge, 2009). Again, the case 
of a significance of the additional independent variables implies some functional 
misspecification of the model (as before, the formula refers to the univariate case for the 
ease of exposition). 
 
(29)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2(?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑥1)
2
+ 𝛽3(?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑥1)
3
+ 𝜀 
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2) Random Sampling 
The random sampling assumption claims that following the population model in 1) 
there is a random sample of 𝑛 observations {(𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘, 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖): 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛}, 
which implies that the observations are independent and identically distributed (iid). 
Hence, the regression model for a particular randomly drawn divestiture case is:  
 
(30)  𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
3) No Perfect Multicollinearity 
The assumption of no perfect multicollinearity, which only arises in multivariate 
models, states that none of the explanatory variables is a constant and that beyond the 
explanatory variables no exact linear relationships exist (Wooldridge, 2009). Here, it is 
important to note that this does not mean that correlation beyond the explanatory 
variables is generally prohibited, but a perfect correlation. In this case, an OLS 
estimation is not possible. According to Wooldridge (2009), this assumption can fail not 
only if the model is not carefully specified, e.g. through including a constant variable or 
a variable that is a multiple of another, but also if the sample size is too small. However, 
imperfect multicollinearity, i.e. a strong linear relationship between independent 
variables, can also cause problems for the parameter estimation. Although the 
assumption of no perfect multicollinearity is not violated in such cases, it can still 
impair the estimation results. Whereas perfect multicollinearity does not cause any 
problems here, the author checks for a possible imperfect multicollinearity by looking at 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs). The VIF for a specific coefficient is defined as:  
 
(31)  𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑗 =
1
1 − 𝑅𝑗
2 
 
with 𝑅𝑗
2 defined as the 𝑅² obtained from regressing 𝑥𝑖 on all other explanatory 
variables. Although defining a cutoff value above which imperfect multicollinearity is 
problematic is arbitrary (Wooldridge, 2009), the author would consider the model to 
suffer from multicollinearity with VIFs above ten which would be equivalent to an 𝑅𝑗
2 
of 90%.  
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4) Exogeneity 
The assumption states that, on average, the value of the error term is zero given any 
values of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009): 
 
(32)  𝐸(𝜀|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘) = 0 
 
This implies that the residual and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑥i; 𝜀) = 0 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … , 𝑘. There are two main possible issues that can cause 
a violation of the exogeneity assumption, which are (1) the ‘omitted variable bias’ and 
(2) the ‘simultaneous equation bias’. The omitted variable bias arises if the model is 
misspecified by omitting an explanatory variable that is correlated with the included 
explanatory variables. This issue seems to be of minor importance in a multiple 
regression due to the possibility to include many explanatory variables in the model. 
Nevertheless, data limitations can still cause a problem regarding this assumption. Also, 
in this thesis, some data was unavailable for the author. Through a careful selection 
process, which was supported by professional discussions with experts in the divestiture 
field, the author tried to collect an as exhaustive as possible set of potential explanatory 
variables to reduce the risk of a violation of this assumption to a minimum. However, a 
possible violation cannot be entirely ruled out. A simultaneous equation bias, i.e. a 
causal relationship with the dependent variable explaining the independent variable, 
should not cause any issues in this sample due to the nature of those variables. Hence, 
the assumption of exogenous explanatory variables should be quite unproblematic. 
 
5) Homoscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity means that conditional on the independent 
variables, the variance of the residuals is equal. This means that the variance of the 
residual 𝜀, conditional on the independent variables, is constant for any combinations of 
outcomes of the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2009): 
 
(33)  𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝜀|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘) = 𝜎
2 
 
In order to test for heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test can be used to detect 
heteroscedasticity by regressing the squared OLS residuals on the independent 
variables. The F statistic of this regression allows testing of whether the null hypothesis 
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of homoscedasticity can be rejected (Wooldridge, 2009). In the case of a violation of the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions, the White test for heteroscedasticity can be applied as an 
alternative (Wooldridge, 2009). Here, the squared OLS residuals are regressed on the 
independent variables, the squares of the independent variables and all the cross 
products. The LM test statistic for heteroscedasticity is defined as 𝑛 ∙ 𝑅?̂?²
2  and tests that 
all coefficients except the intercept are zero. The LM statistic is asymptotically 𝜒² 
distributed.  
 
Because the homoscedasticity assumption is violated in most regressions, 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors have been calculated. As the sample is large 
enough, the application of the heteroscedasticity robust standard errors should not cause 
any problems even if the homoscedasticity assumption is not violated (Wooldridge, 
2009). 
 
6) Normality of the Residuals 
In order to conduct hypothesis tests about the parameters of the regression model, the 
assumption of normality of the residuals amends the Gauss-Markov assumptions 1) to 
5) to the classical linear model assumptions (Wooldridge, 2009). The residuals have to 
be independent of the explanatory variables and normally distributed with a mean of 
zero and variance 𝜎2 (Wooldridge, 2009). A possible violation of the normality 
assumption is, however, rather unproblematic in this thesis. If the assumption of a 
random sampling process holds, i.e. the observations are iid, the Central Limit Theorem 
indicates that the residuals should converge to normality. 
 
 
4.5 Sample Selection 
 
The sample of corporate divestitures cases, i.e. selloffs and spinoffs, was drawn from 
the SDC Platinum M&A database, which was accessed via Thomson ONE Banker. The 
SDC Platinum database contains over 900,000 worldwide M&A transactions since the 
1970s and is backed by Thomson Reuters. The database was also used for comparable 
studies by other researchers. 
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The initial selloff sample was drawn up based on the following sequential selection 
criteria (number of cases in parentheses):  
 
1. Corporate divestitures (302,568) (accessed 22nd November 2015) 
2. Date announced: between 1st January 2000 and 31st December 2014 (189,399) 
3. Target ultimate parent public status: public (96,330) 
4. Target ultimate parent nation: Austria, Germany, Switzerland (5,796) 
5. Target ultimate parent primary SIC codes (excluded): Financial D (4,354) 
The following SIC codes are excluded: 6011, 6019, 6091, 6099, 6311, 6321, 
6324, 6331, 6361, 6371, 6399, 6411, 619B, 6211, 6221, 6231, 6282, 6289, 
6722, 6726, 6732, 6733, 6792, 6794, 6798, 6799, 6162, 6163, 619A, 6512, 
6513, 6514, 6515, 6517, 6519, 6531, 6541, 6552, 6553, 6061, 6062, 6111, 
6141, 6153, 6159, 6035, 6036, 6000, 6021, 6022, 6029, 6081, 6082, 6712 
6. Target ultimate parent mid industry code (excluded): Financials (4,353) 
The following mid industries are excluded: Alternative Financial Investment, 
Asset Management, Banks, Brokerage, Credit Institutions, Diversified 
Financials, Government Sponsored Entity, Insurance, Other Financials 
7. Deal value (Euros): from 10 million (769) 
8. Percent of shares owned after transaction: 100% (570) 
9. Percent of shares acquired in transaction: from 50% (570)  
 
The selection criteria in steps 1 to 4 represent the basic sample by defining the type of 
M&A transaction (corporate divestitures), the period (2000 until 2014) and the public 
status of the seller as well as its origin (Austria, Germany, or Switzerland). Steps 5 and 
6 exclude financial firms from the sample. With this, the author follows Fama and 
French (1992) who argue that a high leverage, which is normal for financial firms, has a 
different meaning than for non-financial companies, where a high leverage may indicate 
financial distress. In doing so, the author furthermore follows common research 
practice, which ensures comparability to peer studies. By imposing a minimum deal 
value, the author ensures that only relevant divestitures, i.e. divestitures which have the 
potential to impact shareholder value, are included. The last two criteria ensure that the 
respective asset was majority-owned by the seller before the transaction and is fully 
divested by the transaction. Hence, the initial sample of corporate selloffs contains 570 
cases. In a second step, the author reviewed all cases individually. In the course of this 
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second step, cases with confounding news within the window of five trading days 
before and after the announcement date have been manually excluded from the sample 
as those confounding announcements do not allow the isolation of the influence of the 
divestiture announcement from other corporate decisions. For example, Thyssen Krupp 
AG announced the sale of Thyssen Polymer GmbH on the same day as it announced the 
acquisition of Hanseatische Aufzugsbau GmbH. Confounding news was detected using 
the Bloomberg Corporate Action Calendar for the divesting companies. Moreover, 
cases with no unambiguous announcement date, cases that were mistakenly assigned to 
the D-A-CH region (e.g. Transocean Inc., Tyco International Ltd.33), cases where the 
ultimate parent could not be defined and cases where no market data was available (i.a. 
for Degussa AG, Centerpulse AG or Swissair Group AG) were deleted from the sample. 
In order to check for the accurate announcement date, the Bloomberg Corporate Action 
Calendar, as well as press releases and newspaper articles, were again utilised. This 
procedure reduced the sample to 334 cases, which were further reduced to the final 290 
cases in a third step. Here, all cases with insufficient data, for example due to thin 
trading (e.g. Afipa SA) or when the ultimate parent is newly publicly traded, and thus, 
not enough past data is available (i.a. for Premiere AG, Syngenta AG or Infineon 
Technologies AG), were dropped. Moreover, all cases announced before the 1st January 
2002 were deleted since the industry benchmark indices that serve as the explanatory 
variable for the estimation of the expected returns were mostly quoted first since 1st 
January 2001 and there need to be sufficient quotes for the estimation period.  
 
For the spinoff sample, the initial selection criteria were as follows: 
 
1. Spinoff (4,272) (accessed 22nd November 2015) 
2. Date announced: between 1st January 2000 and 31st December 2014 (2,812) 
3. Target ultimate parent nation: Austria, Germany, Switzerland (86) 
 
Here, initial selection criteria only encompass three criteria. The first again defines the 
type of M&A transaction, the second and third refer to the investigated period and the 
origin of the parent company. Because of the small sample size and, hence, the 
eschewal of multivariate analyses, the author decided not to exclude financial firms 
from the sample. By definition of a spinoff, the public status of the seller (public), as 
                                                 
33 The companies were non-D-A-CH companies at the time of the announcement. 
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well as criteria 8 and 9 of the selloff sample, are redundant as selection criteria. Due to 
the small sample size, the author additionally checked the Bloomberg database, which 
increased the initial sample by six cases. In the next step, the sample was manually 
reduced. First, all cases that do not fall under the spinoff definition of this research, 
mostly because the spinoff is not intended to be publicly traded (e.g. the spinoff of 
Neoplan Gottlob Auwärter GmbH by MAN AG or the spinoff of TESA AG by 
Beiersdorf AG), were deleted. Likewise, as in the selloff case, cases with confounding 
news in the five days before or after the announcement, cases with no unambiguous 
announcement data and cases with no or insufficient market data were excluded from 
the sample. This procedure resulted in a sample size of 22 cases only. Due to this small 
sample size, the author did not exclude the cases announced before the 1st January 2002 
and instead uses a country benchmark in place of the industry benchmark for those 
cases.  
 
 
4.6 Data Collection 
 
As mentioned in the sample selection section, the sample of divestiture cases was drawn 
from the SDC Platinum M&A database. For each case, the author also collected a wide 
range of information from the same database. The collected data is summarised in Table 
116 (Appendix, p. 233). 
 
All information that was used in the research analysis, such as the announcement dates, 
the deal purpose, the consideration, industry affiliation etc. was validated. 
Announcement dates, for example, were cross-checked by press releases of the firms, ad 
hoc messages, news articles and the Bloomberg Corporate Action Calendar. The same 
holds true for the deal value, the form of consideration or the deal purpose. The industry 
affiliation was cross-checked with the Thomson Financial database. For other deal 
related information, which was not included in the SDC database, such as the intended 
use of proceeds, the author had to rely solely on press releases, news articles or analyst 
comments. 
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The stock data to conduct the event studies, i.e. the daily share prices – respectively the 
total return of the seller – were taken from Datastream. In addition, daily information 
regarding the market value, the shares outstanding, the market-to-book value, the 
breadth index and the country benchmark were also collected from Datastream. The 
data regarding the industry benchmarks was taken from Bloomberg. In the case of 
missing information, the Bloomberg database was again checked for additional 
information, which was especially the case for sellers that ceased to exist. Information 
regarding the sellers’ SIC codes (primary and further SIC codes), ICB codes and the 
number of segments was gathered from the Thomson Financial database as source. 
Finally, a wide range of accounting data for each seller, such as the income statement, 
profitability ratios, the cash flow statement, cash flow ratios, the balance sheet and 
balance sheet ratios were gathered from the Worldscope database. 
 
 
4.7 Variable Description 
 
4.7.1 Deal Related Variables 
 
In the research analysis presented in chapter 5, the author uses abbreviations for the 
individual variables, which are explained hereinafter. The variables are categorised as 
deal related variables (4.7.1), seller related variables (4.7.2) and further variables 
(4.7.3). Table 117 (Appendix, p. 237) summarises all variables including a brief 
description. 
 
Motives 
For an increase in the corporate industrial focus, the author uses two different variables. 
IFOCUS_A indicates that the management announced an increase in corporate 
industrial focus as the motive of the transaction; IFOCUS_S indicates an increase in the 
corporate industrial focus based on a difference in the seller’s and target’s two-digit SIC 
code. Both variables are binary variables. The variable NO2 describes the number of 
two-digit SIC codes that are assigned to the seller as an indicator for the degree of 
diversification and ranges from one to seven different two-digit SIC codes. MAJ_RES 
indicates that the announced motive of the management is a major restructuring or even 
a complete strategic shift and is also a binary variable. Financial distress is again 
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represented by two binary variables: DISTRESS_A indicates that the seller announced 
financial distress as the motive for the transaction; DISTRESS_Z refers to the z’’-score 
and indicates that the seller’s z’’-score is below the critical value of 1.1. If the 
transaction was conducted involuntarily as it was forced by changes in the legislation or 
regulatory issues, the binary variable INVOLUNT accounts for this circumstance. The 
variable MOTIVE accounts for the announcement of the management in detail 
(manifestations described in Table 117, p. 237). 
 
Geographic Focus 
In order to measure the change in the geographic focus, two different variables were 
again applied. The variable FOREIGN states whether the asset sold is a foreign asset; 
the variable NON_EU indicates that the target is not a European asset. 
 
Use of Proceeds  
The categorical variable PROCEEDS indicates the intended use of proceeds announced 
by the management of the seller. It takes on the manifestation DEBT if the proceeds 
should be used to reduce debt, REINVEST if the proceeds are intended to remain in the 
company or be used to reinvest in other projects, PAYOUT if the management 
announces distribution of the proceeds to its shareholders and UNKNOWN if the use of 
proceeds remains unclear.  
 
Transparency 
The deal transparency is proxied by five different variables. PRICE_A is a categorical 
variable and indicates if the price is announced directly at the announcement 
(PRICE_A), if it is not announced (NOT_ANNOUNCED) or if the announcement is 
unclear (UNKNOWN). The other four variables – BOOKGAIN_A, PROCEEDS_A, 
CONSIDERATION_A, and MOTIVE_A – are binary variables and indicate if the 
impact of the selloff on the seller’s books, the intended use of proceeds, the form of 
payment and the motive of the transaction was announced by the management. 
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Strategic Fit 
The binary variable FIT accounts for the strategic fit of the seller and buyer based on the 
two companies’ four-digit SIC codes. FOCUS_FIT combines the variable FIT with the 
variable IFOCUS_S and thus has the four manifestations of FOCUS_FIT, 
NOFOCUS_FIT, FOCUS_NOFIT and NOFOCUS_NOFIT.  
 
Type of Buyer 
The type of buyer is given by the variable BUYER with its manifestation PE for private 
equity companies, STRATEGIC for strategic buyers like competitors, and MBO in the 
case of managerial buyouts. 
 
Payment 
Regarding the form of payment, the author uses the variables CASH and PAYM 
(payment). The binary variable CASH indicates that the form of consideration is cash; 
the variable PAYM is more detailed and distinguishes the ‘non-cash group’ between 
cases where the form of payment is unknown (UNKNOWN) and cases where the form 
of payment is really non-cash (OTHER). 
 
Relative Size 
The variable RELSIZE is a continuous variable and describes the relative size of the 
target in relation to the seller. Furthermore, the author uses a categorical variable SIZE, 
which distinguishes between SMALL deals (relative size between 0% and 10%), 
MEDIUM deals (relative size between 10% and 50%) and LARGE deals (relative size 
50% and more).  
 
 
4.7.2 Seller Related Variables 
 
Growth Perspectives and Financial Condition 
The growth perspectives of the seller are represented by the variable MTB which stands 
for the seller’s market-to-book ratio. Additionally, the variable MTBD divides the 
market-to-book ratio into quartiles. The performance prospects are described by the 
binary variable STOCK which indicates if the seller’s buy-and-hold return in the 
estimation period BAH_ESTP is positive. The continuous variable ROA represents the 
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seller’s profitability proxied by its return on assets. QUICK stands for the seller’s quick 
ratio, i.e. its liquidity; QUICKD for a dummy variable indicating a quick ratio above 
one. DE stands for the seller’s leverage proxied by its debt-equity ratio. The variable 
ZSCORE represents the seller’s z’’-score which indicates if the seller is likely to 
become bankrupt within the next two years. 
 
 
4.7.3 Further Variables 
 
The variable DIRECT indicates if the relationship between seller and target is of a direct 
nature, i.e. the target is, for example, a direct subsidiary or business unit, or if the 
relationship is indirect, i.e. the target is, for example, the subsidiary of a subsidiary. The 
categorical variables SELLERNAT, BUYERREG and TARGETREG indicate the 
origin of the seller, buyer or the asset sold (the manifestations are described in Table 
117 (Appendix, p. 237)). BETA indicates if the seller’s beta changed significantly 
following the divestiture (alpha level is 5%) with the manifestations NOCHANGE, 
UNKNOWN, INCREASE and DECREASE. The variable CYCLE describes the 
economic environment (BOOM, RECESSION) and the variable ASSET indicates the 
nature of the asset sold (for the characteristics see Table 117. p. 237). The variable DV 
stands for the deal value and the variable MV for the market value of the seller ten 
trading days prior to the divestiture announcement. Finally, the variables INDUSTRY 
and YEAR stand for the industry based on the ICB classification benchmark, 
respectively the year of the announcement of the transaction. 
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5 Research Results 
 
The research results are structured as follows: first, section 5.1 provides the descriptive 
statistics for the selloff and spinoff sample to get an overview of the underlying data. 
Second, section 5.2 presents the results of the event study analysis for the whole sample, 
as well as for different subsamples, according to the research hypotheses formulated in 
chapter three, including univariate tests for significantly positive abnormal returns. The 
significances reported indicate a significantly positive average abnormal return at the 
respective alpha level. If not otherwise mentioned, the significances refer to a right-
tailed standardised cross-sectional test if the size of the subsample is at least 30 cases, 
and to a right-tailed Fisher’s exact test if the sample size is less than 30 cases. The 
standardised abnormal returns are presented in Appendix G. Moreover, the author 
presents the results of bivariate tests for differences in the standardised abnormal returns 
of the different subsamples, using simple regression.  
 
For consistency reasons, the significances of the regression coefficients reported in the 
tables always refer to a two-tailed test. In the interpretation of the results, however, the 
author may refer to one-tailed tests dependent on the formulation of respective 
hypotheses. In such cases, this approach is explicitly mentioned. The regression results 
for the generic abnormal returns can also be found in the Appendix (Appendix H).  
 
Because the bivariate results only serve as a first indicator for a potential influence of 
the respective variables on the abnormal returns, the author delays a discussion of the 
results until section 5.3 where the bivariate findings are included in multivariate models 
to validate the bivariate findings. Hence, section 5.3 includes a discussion of the 
research results with respect to the hypotheses tested as well as to prior research. The 
corresponding results regarding the generic abnormal returns are presented in Appendix 
I. 
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5.1 Data Description 
 
5.1.1 Selloff Sample 
 
Deal Value and Number of Deals 
The final sample of selloffs is comprised of 290 cases which are fairly equally 
distributed over the first years of the sample period, followed by a decrease in the 
number of cases in the years 2009 until 2013. The total deal value increases initially 
until the peak in 2006, which also presents the peak in the number of cases, followed by 
a significant decline in subsequent years, which is in line with the decline in the number 
of deals. From 2009 onwards, a slight recovery of total deal values can be observed 
(Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7: Selloff Annual Total Deal Value and Deal Number 
 
The average deal value, as well as the total deal value, increases until 2006, followed by 
a significant drop, especially in 2008 during the course of the financial crisis. However, 
contrary to the total deal value, the average deal value already reaches its previous level 
again in 2009. The average proportion (equally weighted) of the deal value in relation to 
the market value of the seller remains constant over the entire sample period, with an 
exception in 2003 where the high average is caused by divestitures of companies in 
acute financial distress or even insolvency (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Selloff Annual Average Deal Value and Relative Size 
 
Looking at the total sample, the average deal value amounts to 458.25 million Euros 
with a median of 101.57 million Euros; the average market capitalisation ten trading 
days before the announcement of the divestitures is 20,230.93 million Euros with a 
median of 4,198.07 million Euros. The relative size of the transaction, i.e. the deal value 
as a proportion of the market value of the selling company, which serves as an 
indication for the degree of restructuring undertaken, yields a mean of 73.84%. The 
distribution shows a significant deviation from normal (leptokurtic as well as right-
skewed). The relative size is between 0% and 10% for 63.45% of the selloff cases in the 
sample and between 10% and 50% for 21.03%. For the rest, the deal value exceeds 50% 
of the seller’s market capitalisation. Hence, both the absolute as well as the relative size 
of the deal indicate some outliers with extraordinary deal values (Table 12). 
 
  
  
 
Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
DV 290 458.25 101.57 1145.16  28.4 296.67 
MV 290 20230.93 4198.07 31243.99 456.86 33305.66 
RELSIZE 290 73.84 3.74 333.62  0.63 21.49 
Deal Value and Market Value in EUR 1,000,000, Relative Size in % 
Table 12: Selloff Distribution of Deal Value, Market Capitalisation and Relative Size of the Deal 
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Industry Affiliation and Degree of Diversification 
The cases are distributed over 16 industries. Accounting for 220 of the 290 cases 
(78.86%) the Chemicals, Construction & Materials, Health Care, Industrial Goods & 
Services, Technology and Utilities industries represent the major part of the sample. 
This dominance becomes even more distinct looking at the total deal value where those 
industries account for 86.17% of the sample total deal value (Table 13). Moreover, 247 
divestitures are conducted by companies operating in the manufacturing sector whereas 
only 43 divestitures are announced by companies outside the manufacturing sector. 
 
Industry N Proportion Total Deal Value  Proportion 
Automobile & Parts 10 3.45 6,836.10 5.14 
Basic Resources 9 3.10 2,694.33 2.03 
Chemicals 43 14.83 16,027.10 12.06 
Construction & Materials 21 7.24 6,795.82 5.11 
Food & Beverages 11 3.79 1,032.15 0.78 
Health Care 42 14.48 22,692.89 17.08 
Industrial Goods & Services 61 21.03 18,352.69 13.81 
Media 4 1.38 1,575.18 1.19 
Oil & Gas 4 1.38 138.50 0.10 
Personal & Household Goods 5 1.72 786.75 0.59 
Retail 14 4.83 2,537.16 1.91 
Real Estate 1 0.34 130.00 0.10 
Technology 26 8.97 3,337.18 2.51 
Telecommunication 10 3.45 2,428.01 1.83 
Travel & Leisure 2 0.69 219.62 0.17 
Utilities 27 9.31 47,309.09 35.60 
Total 290 100.00 132,892.58 100.00 
Proportion in %, Total Deal Value in EUR 1,000,000 
Table 13: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Industry 
 
Based on the number of different two-digit SIC codes assigned to the seller, only 
12.46% of the sellers solely operate in one single industry, whereas 65.40% operate in 
two to four different industries. 22.15% of the sellers are more widely diversified and 
operate in five or more industries (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Degree of Diversification 
 
Geographic Affiliation 
In regard to the seller region, there is a clear focus on the German market with 203 
cases, followed by 84 cases of Swiss companies. Austria is represented with only three 
cases in the sample (Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Seller Nation 
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The targets, i.e. the assets or subsidiaries disposed, are mainly located in Europe (228) 
and North America (42). Similarly, the majority of buyers come from European 
countries (165) or North America (89). Only a minority of targets or buyers come from 
other regions such as, for example, Africa, Asia or South America (Table 14). 
 
 Target Buyer 
Region N Proportion (%) N Proportion (%) 
Africa 0 0.00 1 0.34 
Asia 6 2.07 16 5.52 
Central America 5 1.72 3 1.03 
Europe 228 78.62 165 56.90 
Middle East 0 0.00 4 1.38 
North America 42 14.48 89 30.69 
Oceania 6 2.07 6 2.07 
Russia 0 0.00 2 0.69 
South America 3 1.03 2 0.69 
Unknown 0 0.00 2 0.69 
Total 290 100.00 290 100.00 
Table 14: Distribution of Selloff Cases by the Divested Asset's and Buyer Region 
 
Rationale for Divestitures 
Looking at the announced transaction motive, a substantial proportion of the sellers 
claim that they want to increase their corporate focus by the selloff transaction. A major 
restructuring or even a complete shift in the corporate strategy is stated as motive in 
11.72% of the transactions. 4.83% of the sellers claim that the divestiture is the result of 
financial distress, 3.79% that it is the result of an underperformance of the asset 
disposed. In 18 of the 290 cases, the reason for the transaction is the need to raise cash; 
in 12 cases the sellers announce that the divestiture is a consequence of regulatory 
issues or changes in the legislation and hence, involuntary. 19 transactions are either 
sale and leaseback transactions or are the seller’s business model, i.e. build and sell 
strategies. In almost 20% of the cases, no motive for the divestiture is announced 
(Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Announced Motive 
 
Looking at the objective measure regarding an increase in the corporate industrial focus 
through the selloff transaction, i.e. if the divested asset has a different two-digit SIC 
code from the seller’s main two-digit SIC code, an increase in focus is observed in 144 
cases, representing 49.66% of the entire sample. Regarding the measure of an increase 
in the geographic focus, i.e. if a foreign asset is divested or if the divested asset is even 
located outside Europe, 134 (46.21%) – respectively 62 (21.38%) – cases are considered 
as geographic focus-increasing (Table 15). 
 
  
  
 
Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
IFOCUS_S 290 49.66 0 50.09 0 100 
FOREIGN 290 46.21 0 49.94 0 100 
NON_EU 290 21.38 0 41.07 0 0 
All variables in % 
Table 15: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Increase in Industrial and Geographic Focus 
 
For the variable financial distress, Altman’s z-score is applied as the objective measure. 
Using the z’’-score in order to include non-manufacturing companies and considering a 
z’’-score below 1.1 as an indicator for financial distress, 62 cases (21.83%) represent 
divestitures of sellers suffering from financial distress. 
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Growth Perspectives 
The average market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the growth perspectives yields 2.56 
(Table 16). The distribution of the market-to-book ratio is highly different from normal 
with a large right-tail. Three cases even exhibit a negative market-to-book value. 
 
  
  
 
Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
MTB 289 2.56 1.82 6.29 1.26 2.72 
Table 16: Distribution of Selloff Cases by the Seller’s Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Use of Proceeds 
The intended use of proceeds announced by the selling company is classified in the 
categories ‘payout’, ‘reduce debt’, and ‘retain/reinvest’. Only four sellers claimed that 
they would use the proceeds of the divestiture for distribution to their shareholders, 
either via special dividends or via stock repurchases. 35 sellers announced that they 
would reinvest the proceeds in new projects or retain them in the company for future 
investments. In 56 cases, the proceeds were to be used to reduce the seller’s debt level. 
However, in about two-thirds of the cases (67.24%), the intended use of proceeds 
remains unclear (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Intended Use of Proceeds 
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Transparency 
For the evaluation of a possible impact of the transparency of the transaction details, 
five different proxies are applied. Two proxies, the announcement of the motive of the 
transaction as well as the use of proceeds have already been addressed above. The main 
proxy, however, is the announcement of the transaction price. In 218 of the 290 cases 
(75.17%), the price of the transaction is announced directly on the announcement date. 
The effect of the sale on the seller’s books as a further proxy, i.e. if the sale leads to a 
book gain or loss, is only announced in 23 cases (7.93%). The form of consideration as 
the fifth variable is disclosed in 47.59% of the cases. 
 
Participation in the Value Creation Potential of the Buyer 
Following the argumentation in chapter three, sellers have the chance to participate in 
the value creation potential of the buyer if the buyer operates in the same industry as the 
disposed asset, based on the four-digit SIC code. In the sample, this is the case for 70 
selloffs (24.14%). Beyond that, a possible participation in the value creation potential 
should be even higher if the disposed asset is additionally unrelated to the seller, 
referring to the two-digit SIC code. Therefore, a new variable (FOCUS_FIT) was 
created which accounts for this relationship. In 29 cases, the disposed asset is unrelated 
to the seller but related to the buyer; in 105 cases the asset sold is related to the seller 
but unrelated to the buyer (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Participation in the Buyer’s Value Creation Potential 
 
  
29
41
115
105
FOCUS_FIT NOFOCUS_FIT FOCUS_NOFIT NOFOCUS_NOFIT
Research Results 
122 
 
Type of Buyer 
In most cases, the buyer can be classified as a strategic buyer, such as, for example, a 
competitor. Strategic buyers represent 73.70% of the sample. The second largest group 
of buyers is private equity companies representing 23.53% of the cases. Finally, in eight 
cases, the management acts as buyer (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Type of Buyer 
 
Form of Payment 
As noted regarding the transparency variables, the form of payment is not announced in 
over 50% of the sample. Of the remaining cases, the form of payment in the large 
majority (125) is cash only. In seven cases, the means of payment is a combination of 
cash and stock and only one case is settled by stock only. In five cases, other forms of 
payment are used (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Distribution of the Selloff Cases by Form of Payment 
 
Financial Performance 
The buy-and-hold stock return of the seller in the estimation period, as proxy for the 
performance prospects of the seller, averages 12.57% with 62.07% of the sellers 
exhibiting a positive return. The distribution is right-skewed and leptokurtic. The 
average return on assets over the sample representing the profitability is 7.41% and is 
also right-skewed. Here, 84.89% of the sellers show a positive sign. The average quick 
ratio amounts to 1.62 and thus indicates that the average seller is able to meet its short-
term liabilities with its liquid assets. The median, however, lies just under the critical 
value of 1, indicating that with 60.14%, a substantial number of sellers suffer from 
liquidity problems. As proxy for the leverage, the mean debt/equity ratio of the sellers is 
1.86 with a median of 0.73. As the variable, which is probably most dependent on the 
industry in which a seller operates, the variation of this ratio is high with a variation 
coefficient of 7.60. The average z’’-score as measure for financial distress is 4.09. The 
median, and even the 25%-percentile, also lie over the critical value of 1.1. Hence, the 
majority of sellers do not seem to suffer from acute financial distress (Table 17).  
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Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
BAH_ESTP 290 12.57 6.43 51.42 -11.08 27.01 
ROA 278 7.41 4.63 16.18 2.06 8.72 
QUICK 276 1.62 0.92 6.44 0.73 1.33 
DE 277 1.86 0.73 14.14 0.32 1.24 
ZSCORE 273 4.09 2.72 7.28 1.42 4.74 
BAH_ESTP and ROA in % 
Table 17: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Financial Performance 
 
Further Characteristics 
Most selloffs are announced in a friendly economic environment. Only 67 (or 23.10%) 
of the divestitures in the sample are announced during recession periods, referring to the 
development of the stock market, in particular the DAX34. Applying this measure, the 
period until the 12th March 2003 and from the 14th July 2007 until the 6th March 2009 
are considered to be recession periods (Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of Boom and Recession Periods Within the Investigated Time Horizon 
  
                                                 
34 The commonly applied definition of a recession period is two consecutive quarters with no or negative GDP growth. Since the 
applied market model to estimate the expected returns uses the market return as a benchmark, the author deviates from the technical 
definition and instead uses the development of the stock market as a leading indicator for the economic trend. In the context of this 
thesis, the DAX was found to be the best proxy for the stock market development because divestitures of German companies 
represent the majority of cases. According to the subjective definition of the author, recession periods are defined as the time from 
the respective (all-time) high until the lowest point before a subsequent recovery of the stock market. The drop in 2011 is not 
considered to be a recession as the author considers this period as too short to constitute a recession. This is in line with the 
commonly applied definition where only the periods from 2001 until 2003 and 2008 until 2009 are considered as recession periods. 
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In 34 cases, the systematic risk of the seller’s stock increases following the divestiture 
announcement, measured by a significant change in the seller’s beta (at the 5% alpha 
level). In 28 cases, the divestiture announcement is followed by a decrease in the 
systematic risk and in 226 cases, no significant change in the seller’s beta occurs 
(Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Risk Changes Following the Selloff 
 
Almost 50% of the assets sold are subsidiaries, i.e. independent companies that are 
controlled by the seller. In 31.72% of the cases, the asset disposed of is a fully 
integrated business unit. 8.62% of the cases represent the divestiture of properties, 
6.90% plants and 3.10% the disposal of rights (Figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 18: Distribution of Selloff Cases by Type of Asset Sold 
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Finally, 206 cases are characterised by a direct relationship between the seller and the 
asset sold; in 82 cases, the divestiture is conducted by a subsidiary of the ultimate 
parent.  
 
 
5.1.2 Spinoff Sample 
 
Due to the small size of the spinoff sample and, hence, the wide (involuntary) eschewal 
of multivariate analyses, the spinoff sample is not described as exhaustively as the 
selloff sample. The final sample consists of 22 deals in the period from 2000 until 2014, 
and only the years 2012 and 2014 account for more than two cases (Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 19: Annual Distribution of Spinoff Cases 
 
A deal value is known in 50% of the cases and ranges from 101.83 to 2,011.64 million 
Euros; the deal value in relation to the market capitalisation of the divestor ranges from 
2.90% to 2,351.74%. The cases cover eleven different industries with the Industrial 
Goods and Services sector providing more than a third of all cases (Table 18). 
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Industry N Proportion 
Banks 2 9.09 
Basic Resources 1 4.55 
Chemicals 3 13.64 
Construction & Materials 1 4.55 
Food & Beverages 1 4.55 
Industrial Goods & Services 8 36.36 
Personal & Household Goods 1 4.55 
Retail 1 4.55 
Real Estate 1 4.55 
Travel & Leisure 2 9.09 
Utilities 1 4.55 
Total 22 100.00 
Proportion in % 
Table 18: Distribution of the Spinoff Cases by Industry 
 
The average market value of the parent companies is 6,209.11 million Euros with a 
median of 715.50 million Euros (Table 19).  
 
  
  
 
Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
MV 22 6209.11 715.50 15425.46 310.72 3402.25 
Market Value in EUR 1,000,000 
Table 19: Distribution of Spinoff Cases by Market Value of the Parent 
 
The buy-and-hold stock returns of the parents as a proxy for performance prospects 
average 12.35% in the estimation period with only five parents exhibiting a negative 
estimation period return. The average is close to the average value for sellers who 
exhibit an average estimation period return of 12.57%. Similarly, the average return on 
assets over the sample representing the profitability is 6.56%, compared to 7.41% in the 
selloff sample, with 83.33% of the divestors showing a positive profitability. The 
average quick ratio amounts to 1.64 and thus indicates that the average divestor is able 
to meet its short-term liabilities with its liquid assets. Also, the median quick ratio is 
above the critical value of 1, however, 50% of the divestors have a quick ratio below 1. 
As proxy for the leverage, the mean debt/equity ratio of the parent companies is 1.88 
with a median of 0.63. The variation in the debt/equity ratio is also very high here with 
a variation coefficient of 2.96, but substantially smaller than in the selloff sample. The 
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average z’’-score as indicator for financial distress is 5.47. The median and even the 
25% percentile also lie over the critical value of 1.1. Only three divestors show a z’’-
score below 1.1 and, hence, seem to be in financial distress (Table 20). 
 
  
  
 
Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
BAH_ESTP 22 12.35 10.91 49.06 0.36 30.79 
ROA 18 6.56 2.96 12.02 0.69 7.33 
QUICK 16 1.64 1.06 1.26 0.85 1.99 
DE 18 1.88 0.63 5.56 0.33 0.80 
ZSCORE 15 5.47 3.42 4.75 1.54 8.83 
BAH_ESTP and ROA in % 
Table 20: Distribution of Spinoff Cases by Financial Performance of the Parent 
 
Finally, only four cases are conducted during recession periods; the majority of spinoffs 
are conducted in a favourable economic environment. 
 
 
5.2 Event Study and Bivariate Results  
 
5.2.1 Selloff Event Study and Bivariate Results 
 
5.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1 – Overall Effect 
 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate selloffs and spinoffs of publicly traded companies located in 
the D-A-CH region on average create significant value for their shareholders. 
 
The results support the hypothesis that selloffs on average create significant shareholder 
value and are in line with previous research. A highly significant positive average 
abnormal return of 1.25% can be observed for the whole sample at the announcement 
date, which is supported by the result of the standardised cross-sectional test that should 
be rather applied as described in the methodology section. Equally, the proportion of 
positive abnormal returns at the announcement date, which amounts to 58.97%, is 
highly significantly positive and also the absolute abnormal return in terms of Euros, 
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which amounts to 57.47 million Euros, is positive and significant at the 5% alpha level 
(Table 21).  
 
Trading Day AAR SAAR Median AR 
Proportion 
positive ARs Absolute AAR 
-10 0.19 0.10* 0.07 52.41 31.09* 
-9 -0.15 0.01 -0.07 47.59 24.49* 
-8 0.43** 0.10* -0.01 49.66 -8.52 
-7 -0.03 0.05 0.07 51.03 -1.42 
-6 -0.07 -0.03 -0.12 45.17 6.62 
-5 0.11 0.01 0.03 51.03 -29.92 
-4 -0.20 -0.06 -0.09 46.21 -31.41 
-3 0.45*** 0.16*** 0.09 53.10* 2.12 
-2 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 47.93 3.48 
-1 -0.01 0.02 0.02 51.38 3.36 
 0 1.25*** 0.62*** 0.34 58.97*** 57.47** 
 1 0.19 0.07 -0.04 49.31 -23.11 
 2 0.00 -0.11 -0.12 47.24 -9.59 
 3 0.02 0.02 -0.06 47.93 -21.82 
 4 0.27** 0.02 0.03 50.69 -19.53 
 5 -0.24 -0.06 -0.13 45.86 -6.48 
 6 -0.04 0.09* 0.06 51.03 6.82 
 7 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 47.93 -45.27 
 8 -0.07 0.03 -0.08 46.90 -6.22 
 9 -0.14 0.01 -0.05 47.93 18.34 
 10 0.06 0.03 0.03 51.72 -0.38 
AAR, median AR and proportion of positive AR in %; Absolute AAR in EUR 1,000,000 
N=290; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively based on a right-tailed cross-sectional 
test for AAR and absolute AAR, a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test for SAAR and a right-tailed Fisher’s exact test for 
the proportion of positive abnormal returns. 
Table 21: Daily Average Abnormal Selloff Returns in the Event Period 
 
Moreover, except for the average abnormal return on the trading day three days prior to 
the announcement, all single day average abnormal returns in the event period are 
insignificantly different from zero regarding a two-tailed test (not reported here), which 
supports the theory of efficient capital markets in the semi-strong form that is 
automatically jointly tested. Looking at the cumulative average abnormal returns over 
the entire event period and different event windows within the event period, the results 
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show that the abnormal announcement gains for the shareholders remain and are not lost 
in the days following the announcement (Table 22).  
 
Event Window CAAR SCAAR Absolute CAAR 
Proportion 
positive CARs 
[-1;0] 1.24*** 0.45*** 60.84* 54.83** 
[-1;1] 1.44*** 0.40*** 37.73 54.83** 
[0;1] 1.45*** 0.48*** 34.37 57.93*** 
[-2;2] 1.41*** 0.27*** 31.63 54.48** 
[-3;3] 1.88*** 0.29*** 11.93 57.24*** 
[-5;5] 1.82*** 0.20*** -75.42 54.48** 
[-10;10] 1.86*** 0.22*** -33.61 53.79** 
AAR and proportion of positive AR in %; Absolute AAR in EUR 1,000,000 
N=290; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively based on a right-tailed cross-sectional 
test for CAAR and absolute CAAR, a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test for SCAAR and a right-tailed Fisher’s exact test 
for the proportion of positive abnormal returns. 
Table 22: Selloff CAARs in the Event Period 
 
Hence, the significantly positive average announcement return does not seem to be the 
result of an initial overreaction but the result of real gains due to the divestiture (Figure 
20). Indeed, because of the increasing number of trading days, the significance of the 
cumulative average abnormal returns is decreasing with an increasing event window. 
 
 
Figure 20: Event Period Daily and Cumulative Standardised Average Abnormal Selloff Returns 
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The following table (Table 23) reports the (cumulative) average abnormal returns for 
each year of the investigation period in the event windows [0], [-1;0], [0;1] and [-1;1], 
which will also be applied for the multivariate analysis later. Except the year 2006, the 
reported significances are based on a non-parametric Fisher’s exact test rather than a 
parametric test, since due to the small sample size, normal distributions cannot be 
assumed. The average abnormal returns are always positive, except the years 2010 and 
2014, although statistical significance can only be reported in some cases. The negative 
average in 2014 can, however, be attributed to one large outlier. 
 
YEAR N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
2002 25 1.84* 0.36 1.50* 0.02 
2003 25 3.14 3.49 4.62 4.97 
2004 24 1.01 0.57 0.94** 0.50 
2005 26 1.39 1.60 0.93 1.14 
2006 35 0.22 0.32 0.96* 1.06* 
2007 28 1.12* 0.85 0.67 0.40 
2008 22 3.82* 4.59* 2.31 3.09 
2009 12 2.07 1.41 2.23 1.57 
2010 16 0.26 0.13 -0.34 -0.46 
2011 18 2.40 2.71 4.00 4.31* 
2012 16 2.30* 2.55*** 2.82 3.07* 
2013 18 1.79 2.54 1.39 2.14 
2014 25 -3.46 -3.25 -1.91 -1.70 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 23: Selloff CAARs by Year 
 
Likewise, distinguishing between industry-specific abnormal returns, the picture is 
similar (Table 24). Abnormal returns are mainly positive, although a statistical 
significance based on Fisher’s exact test can only be reported for some industries. 
However, in contrast to the abnormal returns by year, the differences between the 
different industries seem to be higher. The negative abnormal returns for sellers in the 
Utilities industry are very noticeable and can be explained by one outlier exhibiting an 
abnormal return between -92.41% in the [0] and -66.91% in the [-1;1] event window. 
This outlier, which also causes the negative average for the year 2014, refers to a selloff 
conducted by SAG Solarstrom AG, which was in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of 
the divestiture announcement. Since the statistical tests are based on standardised 
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abnormal returns rather than the generic abnormal returns, or even on a non-parametric 
test, this outlier should not cause any issues regarding the research results. Likewise, the 
averages for the Media, Personal & Household Goods as well as Retail industries are 
dominated by outliers that explain the higher magnitude compared to the other 
industries, although the magnitude of these outliers is not comparable to the SAG 
Solarstrom case.  
 
INDUSTRY N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Automobile & Parts 10 -0.01 0.31 -0.31 0.01 
Basic Resources 9 1.20 -0.49 0.21 -1.48 
Chemicals 43 0.21 -0.15 0.33 -0.03 
Constr. & Materials 21 1.80* 2.10 1.79 2.08 
Food & Beverage 11 0.09 0.99 0.95 0.96 
Health Care 42 1.83*** 1.92** 2.03*** 2.13*** 
Industrial Gds. & Serv. 61 1.32*** 0.75** 1.94** 1.37** 
Media 4 8.65 8.97 8.64 8.96 
Oil & Gas 4 2.55 2.84 4.09 4.37* 
Pers. & Househ. Goods 5 4.11 2.83 4.32 3.04 
Real Estate 1 8.84* 10.30* 18.31* 19.77* 
Retail 14 3.41 4.28 2.62 3.49 
Technology 26 3.79 4.33 3.28 3.82 
Telecommunication 10 0.77 1.60 1.14 1.97 
Travel & Leisure 2 0.41 2.13 -1.36 0.36 
Utilities 27 -3.39 -2.86 -2.48 -1.94 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 24: Selloff CAARs by Industry 
 
Distinguishing between the countries of origin of the seller, no obvious differences can 
be observed (Table 25). The average abnormal returns are positive in all three cases, 
however, due to the fact that Austria represents just three cases, no statistical 
significance could be detected here. 
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SELLERNAT N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Austria 3 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.79 
Germany 203 1.25*** 1.36*** 1.51*** 1.62*** 
Switzerland 84 1.28*** 0.99*** 1.31*** 1.03** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively based on the right-tailed standardised cross-
sectional test for Germany and Switzerland and Fisher’s exact test for Austria because of the small sample size. 
Table 25: Selloff CAARs by Seller Nation 
 
This first impression is supported by the results of a bivariate regression (Table 26), 
which shows an insignificant F-test for all reported event windows. Hence, there seem 
to be no differences in abnormal returns dependent on the country of origin of the seller. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
AUSTRIA -0.877 
(0.682) 
-0.421* 
(0.218) 
-0.349 
(0.578) 
-0.123 
(0.298) 
SWITZERLAND 0.202 
(0.265) 
0.020 
(0.213) 
-0.000 
(0.232) 
-0.099 
(0.208) 
Cons 0.568*** 0.447*** 0.487*** 0.434*** 
F-Statistic 1.28 2.19 0.18 0.17 
R² 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
GERMANY omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 26: Regression of SCAARs on the Seller Nation 
 
Regarding the origin of the target as well as the buyer (Table 27 and 28), significantly 
positive abnormal returns can only be reported for Europe and North America.  
 
TARGETREG N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Europe 228 1.47*** 1.54*** 1.60*** 1.66*** 
North America 42 0.52* 0.27* 1.47* 1.32** 
Asia 6 -0.27 -0.14 -0.37 -0.24 
Oceania 6 0.33 -0.21 -0.37 -0.90 
Central America 5 0.44 0.64 0.20 0.41 
South America 3 2.67 -0.61 -1.16 -4.44 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 27: Selloff CAARs by Target Region 
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The large negative abnormal returns in the case of an Asian acquirer are particularly 
remarkable (Table 28), however, a statistical test for a possible negative abnormal return 
does not show a significant result. Also here, the average is dominated by the SAG 
Solarstrom case with a negative abnormal return ranging between 92.41% in the [0] and 
66.91% in the [-1;1] event windows. 
 
ACQUIRERREG N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Europe 165 2.03*** 2.11*** 1.93*** 2.01*** 
North America 89 1.22** 0.99* 1.43** 1.20* 
Asia 16 -5.62 -4.80 -3.27 -2.46 
Oceania 6 1.02 0.95 0.76 0.69 
Middle East 4 0.28 -0.67 0.95 -0.00 
Central America 3 0.21 -0.11 -0.25 -0.56 
Russia 2 0.38 1.06 -0.24 0.43 
South America 2 0.51 1.47 0.40 1.36 
Unknown 2 -0.41 -3.03 9.13 6.50 
Africa 1 0.55 -1.10 0.46 -1.20 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 28: Selloff CAARs by Acquirer Region 
 
Tests for the differences in abnormal returns between different target regions, as well as 
the different acquirer regions, show significant F-statistics for all event windows, except 
for the announcement date only for the target region. Hence, the origin of target and 
buyer seem to play a significant, although small role in explaining shareholder value 
gains. The regression results are reported in the Appendix (Tables 118 and 119, pp. 
238–239). 
 
Looking at the motives stated by the sellers at the announcement, significantly positive 
abnormal returns are observed for the motives of an increase in focus, a major 
restructuring or if no motive is stated at all (Table 29). Also, if the motive is to raise 
cash in order to finance an acquisition or reduce debt, the abnormal returns are positive 
for all reported event windows, although the sign test does not show any significance. 
The results are somewhat mixed for the cases where financial distress or the 
underperformance of the asset sold are stated as the rationale for the divestiture. Again, 
a sign test does not reveal any significance for those two groups. 
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MOTIVE N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Increase focus 128 1.36*** 1.28*** 1.49*** 1.41*** 
Major restructuring 34 2.10*** 2.38*** 2.03*** 2.31*** 
Financial Distress 14 -1.25 -2.08 1.81 0.98 
Underperformance 11 -0.37 0.62 1.59 2.59 
Regulatory Issues 12 0.04 0.31 -0.38 -0.11 
Raise cash 18 2.10 1.57 2.38 1.86 
Business model 8 0.28 0.10 0.73 0.55 
Sale and lease back 11 -0.01 -0.26 0.64 0.39 
Unknown 54 1.84*** 2.01** 1.22* 1.38* 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 29: Selloff CAARs by Motive 
 
A statistical test for the differences in the abnormal returns between the different 
motives (Table 30) only reveals a significant F-statistic for the event windows [0] and [-
1;0].  
 
The motives ‘increase in focus’, ‘major restructuring’, ‘financial distress’ and 
‘regulatory issues’ (involuntary divestiture) are investigated separately in the following 
sections. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
BM 0.291 
(0.706) 
0.305 
(0.536) 
-0.120 
(0.686) 
-0.015 
(0.534) 
IFOCUS_A 0.880 
(0.698) 
0.666 
(0.516) 
0.213 
(0.488) 
0.210 
(0.411) 
MAJ_RES 1.491 
(0.810) 
1.212** 
(0.609) 
0.717 
(0.590) 
0.716 
(0.510) 
RAISE CASH 1.364 
(0.856) 
0.982 
(0.679) 
0.497 
(0.636) 
0.420 
(0.580) 
INVOLUNT 0.300 
(0.701) 
0.257 
(0.532) 
-0.477 
(0.513) 
-0.351 
(0.437) 
SALE & LB 0.096 
(0.750) 
0.106 
(0.554) 
-0.117 
(0.543) 
-0.065 
(0.444) 
UNDERPERF 0.551 
(0.916) 
0.929 
(0.691) 
0.398 
(0.802) 
0.763 
(0.618) 
UNKNOWN 1.202 
(0.749) 
0.906 
(0.566) 
0.193 
(0.543) 
0.205 
(0.473) 
Cons -0.299 -0.275 0.251 0.152 
F-Statistic 2.44** 1.95* 1.57 1.66 
R² 0.035 0.032 0.021 0.025 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 30: Regression of SCAARs on the Deal Motive 
 
 
5.2.1.2 Hypothesis 2 – Increase in Corporate Industrial Focus 
 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in the corporate industrial focus on average has a 
significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
In order to analyse the effect of an increase in the corporate industrial focus through the 
divestiture, two different measures are applied. The first refers to the announced motive, 
whereas the second refers to an objective measure defining a divestiture as focus-
increasing if the seller’s main two-digit SIC code is different from the code of the asset 
sold. Regarding the first measure, an increase in the corporate focus is indicated in 128 
of the 290 cases. The abnormal returns are significantly positive in all event windows 
for both groups: divestitures where an increase in the corporate industrial focus is the 
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announced motive and where this is not the stated motive. Moreover, there are no 
obvious differences in the magnitude of the abnormal returns between the two groups 
(Table 31). 
 
IFOCUS_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Increase 128 1.36*** 1.28*** 1.49*** 1.41*** 
No increase 162 1.17*** 1.22*** 1.41*** 1.46*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 31: Selloff CAARs by Increase in Focus (Announced) 
 
Similarly, referring to the objective measure regarding an increase in the corporate 
focus through the transaction, there is no obvious difference between industrial focus-
increasing divestitures and divestitures of assets related to the seller’s core business. 
Again, abnormal returns are significantly positive and no clear trend regarding 
differences in their magnitude can be observed (Table 32). 
 
IFOCUS_S N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Increase 144 1.01*** 1.06*** 1.45*** 1.50*** 
No increase 146 1.49*** 1.43** 1.44*** 1.37** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 32: Selloff CAARs by Increase in Focus (Based on SIC Code) 
 
The results of the test for a difference between focus-increasing and non-focus-
increasing divestitures are somewhat mixed. Regarding the subjective measure, the 
bivariate regression does not show a significant influence of an increase in the corporate 
focus on abnormal returns (Table 33).  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
IFOCUS_A -0.065 
(0.253) 
-0.104 
(0.200) 
-0.035 
(0.207) 
-0.076 
(0.181) 
Cons 0.646*** 0.495*** 0.499*** 0.438*** 
F-Statistic 0.07 0.27 0.03 0.17 
R² 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 33: Regression of SCAARs on an Increase in Focus (Announced) 
 
Now, applying the objective measure, a certain influence of an increase in focus on 
abnormal returns cannot be rejected. Whereas for the announcement date no significant 
influence can be observed, abnormal returns are higher for focus-increasing divestitures 
in the event windows [-1;0], [0;1] and [-1;1] at the 5%, 10% and 1% alpha level 
respectively in a right-tailed test35 (Table 34).  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
IFOCUS_S 0.182 
(0.254) 
0.348* 
(0.201) 
0.316 
(0.209) 
0.438** 
(0.183) 
Cons 0.527*** 0.276** 0.327** 0.187* 
F-Statistic 0.51 2.98* 2.29 5.71** 
R² 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.020 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 34: Regression of SCAARs on an Increase in Focus (Based on SIC Code) 
 
As the first measure related to the announcement of the management may be biased and 
not as precise as the objective measure, the author concentrates his attention on the 
results of the objective measure. The finding of a significant positive influence of an 
increase in the corporate focus supports the hypothesis formulated. Hence, it seems that 
focus-increasing divestitures can serve as an instrument to reduce harmful unrelated 
diversification and move a company’s resources to higher valued uses; thereby creating 
value for the shareholders. Moreover, capital misallocations caused by principal-agent 
issues can be reduced and efficiency improved. Figure 21 illustrates the differences in 
the standardised abnormal returns between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing 
divestitures based on the objective measure applying the two-digit SIC code. 
                                                 
35 Significances differ from the ones reported in the table because the table reports the significances for the two-tailed test. 
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Figure 21: Selloff SAARs and SCAARs by Increase in Focus (Based on SIC Code) 
 
 
5.2.1.3 Hypothesis 3 – Degree of Diversification 
 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of diversification of the seller on average has a significantly 
positive effect on shareholder wealth creation of selloffs that increase the seller’s 
industrial focus. 
 
Looking at the generic abnormal returns segmented by the number of SIC codes of the 
seller, no clear trend of an influence of the degree of diversification can be observed. 
Abnormal returns are positive, except the [-1;0] event window for sellers with seven 
different SIC codes, and in most of the cases also significantly positive (Table 35). 
Although the magnitude of the abnormal returns initially decreases with an increasing 
degree of diversification, the trend does not stand up for sellers with four or more 
different SIC codes.  
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NO2 N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
1 36 3.01** 3.15** 2.04** 2.19** 
2 80 1.03*** 1.17** 1.08** 1.22** 
3 72 0.55** 0.34* 0.41 0.20 
4 37 1.55* 1.44 2.52*** 2.41** 
5 43 0.88** 0.96** 1.43** 1.51*** 
6 18 1.57 2.29** 1.58 2.30 
7 3 3.09 -3.11 15.32 9.12 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 35: Selloff CAARs by Degree of Diversification 
 
A regression of the standardised abnormal returns supports this finding with all 
coefficients being not significantly different from zero (Table 36). Only at the 
announcement date [0] is the coefficient significantly negative at the 10% alpha level in 
a left-tailed test. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
NO2 -0.120 
(0.089) 
-0.065 
(0.072) 
-0.019 
(0.076) 
0.000 
(0.068) 
Cons 0.994*** 0.651** 0.545* 0.402 
F-Statistic 1.83 0.82 0.07 0.00 
R² 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 36: Regression of SCAARs on the Degree of Diversification 
 
Also distinguishing between focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing divestitures, no 
plain effect of the degree of diversification can be observed. For the [0] event window, 
for example, the abnormal returns have the highest magnitude for sellers operating in 
only one two-digit industry; regarding the other number of two-digit SIC codes, no clear 
trend is observable (Table 37).  
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NO2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Focus increase 3.23 -1.59 1.02** 2.18 1.14 1.03 3.09 
Cases 12 23 42 19 33 11 3 
No focus increase 2.89 2.08*** -0.11 0.88 0.02 2.42 - 
Cases 24 57 30 18 10 7 0 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 37: Selloff Announcement Day Average Abnormal Returns by Increase in Focus (Based on SIC 
Code) and Degree of Diversification 
 
The regression confirms this observation. Neither the degree of diversification nor the 
interaction term have a significant influence on the abnormal return, except the 
interaction term in the [-1;1] event window, with a negative effect at the 10% alpha 
level in a left-tailed test (Table 38). Apart from this exception, only the coefficient for 
an increase in the corporate focus is significantly positive in the [-1;0], [0;1] and [-1;1] 
event windows at the 10%, 10% and 5% alpha level respectively in a right-tailed test. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
IFOCUS_S 0.539 
(0.787) 
0.802 
(0.612) 
0.911 
(0.648) 
1.088* 
(0.576) 
NO2 -0.114 
(0.118) 
-0.046 
(0.097) 
0.040 
(0.090) 
0.061 
(0.081) 
IFOCUS_S*NO2 -0.071 
(0.191) 
-0.116 
(0.153) 
-0.176 
(0.165) 
-0.197 
(0.147) 
Cons 0.832** 0.400 0.218 0.024 
F-Statistic 0.94 1.52 0.91 2.04 
R² 0.012 0.021 0.015 0.029 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 38: Regression of SCAARs on an Increase in Focus, the Degree of Diversification and an 
Interaction Term of Both Variables 
 
However, it has to be mentioned that the combined inclusion of the increase in 
corporate focus and the interaction term leads to increasing standard errors for both 
variables due to a certain extent of multicollinearity. 
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5.2.1.4 Hypothesis 4 – Major Restructuring 
 
Hypothesis 4: A major restructuring, respectively a complete strategic shift in the 
corporate focus, on average has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth 
creation. 
 
The hypothesis that a major restructuring, or even a complete strategic shift in the 
corporate focus, is related to higher abnormal returns, is derived from the corporate 
focus hypothesis. However, this can be seen as an even more radical increase or change 
in the corporate focus. In regard to an increase in the corporate focus, a positive 
influence on the abnormal returns was expected; this should be the case here as well. 
Regarding this variable, the author only relies on the announced motive of the 
transaction. Hence, results have to be considered with caution as the announcements of 
sellers may be biased. Looking at the abnormal returns for corporate divestitures, where 
a major restructuring or a strategic shift is the announced motive, which is the case in 34 
of the 290 selloff cases, significantly positive abnormal returns can be observed. The 
same, however, is true for the group where this is not the announced motive. Yet, the 
abnormal returns are consistently higher for the sample of companies announcing a 
major restructuring, which supports the hypothesis formulated (Table 39). 
 
MAJ_RES N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Yes 34 2.10*** 2.38*** 2.03*** 2.31*** 
No 256 1.14*** 1.09*** 1.37*** 1.32*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 39: Selloff CAARs by Major Restructuring 
 
A test for the difference between divestitures as a consequence of a major restructuring 
and divestitures conducted for other motives reveals a significantly positive effect of a 
major restructuring at the 10% alpha level in all event windows. A two-tailed test, as 
reported in Table 40, is insignificant. Hence, it seems that a major restructuring also 
influences abnormal returns positively, which supports the hypothesis formulated.  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MAJ_RES 0.651 
(0.463) 
0.553 
(0.364) 
0.549 
(0.374) 
0.525 
(0.335) 
Cons 0.541*** 0.384*** 0.419*** 0.343*** 
F-Statistic 1.98 2.32 2.15 2.45 
R² 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.012 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 40: Regression of SCAARs on a Major Restructuring 
 
 
5.2.1.5 Hypothesis 5 – Increase in Corporate Geographic Focus 
 
Hypothesis 5: An increase in the corporate geographic focus on average has no 
significant impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
In order to analyse the effect of an increase in the geographic focus, two variables have 
been developed. First, a divestiture is considered as geographic focus-increasing if the 
divested asset is a foreign asset. Second, in order to capture a ‘geographic 
overdiversification’, a divestiture is considered as geographic focus-increasing if the 
divested asset is a non-European asset. Regarding the divestiture of foreign assets, i.e. 
the first measure, the abnormal returns are significantly positive in all event windows 
except the [-1;1] window (Table 41). However, in relation to the divestiture of domestic 
assets, where the abnormal returns are highly significantly positive in all event 
windows, the abnormal returns tend to be lower for foreign divestitures.  
 
FOREIGN N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Foreign 134 0.69*** 0.49** 0.69* 0.49 
Domestic 156 1.73*** 1.89*** 2.09*** 2.25*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 41: Selloff CAARs by Origin of Divested Asset: Foreign vs Domestic 
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Figure 22 shows the differences in the standardised abnormal returns between the two 
groups.  
 
 
Figure 22: Selloff SAARs and SCAARs by Origin of Divested Asset: Domestic vs Foreign  
 
This first impression regarding geographic focus-increasing divestitures is supported by 
the second measure. Here, the abnormal return for divestitures of assets based outside of 
Europe is positive but mostly insignificant. A significantly positive abnormal return is 
reported only for the [0] event window at the 10% alpha level. By contrast, abnormal 
returns for divestitures of assets based within Europe are highly significantly positive in 
all reported event windows (Table 42). 
 
NON_EU N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Non-European 62 0.46* 0.17 0.89 0.60 
European 228 1.47*** 1.54*** 1.60*** 1.66*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 42: Selloff CAARs by Origin of Divested Asset: European vs Non-European 
 
The impression regarding the influence of an increase in the geographic focus is 
supported by the statistical analyses. The regression results show a highly significantly 
negative influence on the abnormal returns if the divested asset is a foreign asset (Table 
43).  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
FOREIGN -0.658*** 
(0.240) 
-0.551*** 
(0.191) 
-0.583*** 
(0.201) 
-0.545*** 
(0.177) 
Cons 0.921*** 0.703*** 0.753*** 0.657*** 
F-Statistic 7.53*** 8.31*** 8.46*** 9.54*** 
R² 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.030 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 43: Regression of SCAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Foreign vs Domestic 
 
Similarly, the abnormal returns are significantly lower for the divestiture of non-
European assets at the 5% – respectively 10% – alpha level (Table 44). Hence, it seems 
that the disadvantages of a reduction in the geographic diversification mentioned by 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2004), i.e. decreasing economies of scale, a weakened 
position towards international oriented competitors, or even the signal that the prior 
diversification may have been a mistake, outweigh the advantages that are basically 
again related to the reduction of agency costs and the resource-based view.  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
NON_EU -0.447** 
(0.224) 
-0.393** 
(0.184) 
-0.394* 
(0.219) 
-0.382* 
(0.194) 
Cons 0.713*** 0.533*** 0.568*** 0.486*** 
F-Statistic 4.00** 4.57** 3.24* 3.87* 
R² 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.010 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 44: Regression of SCAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Non-European vs European 
 
 
5.2.1.6 Hypothesis 6 – Financial Distress 
 
Hypothesis 6: The announcement that a selloff is motivated by financial distress on 
average has a significantly negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Similar to the increase in the corporate industrial focus, for the variable financial 
distress, two different measures are applied. Again, the first refers to the announcement 
by the management and is thus of a subjective nature and may be biased; the second is 
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of an objective nature and refers to Altman’s z’’-score. Regarding the second measure, a 
seller is regarded to suffer from financial distress if the z’’-score is less than 1.1. In 
addition, cases where the financial distress is publicly known, as, for example, if the 
seller is in bankruptcy proceedings, were manually added to the distress group. 
 
Applying the announced motive of financial distress as a measure, it appears that the 
abnormal returns would be lower for sellers conducting a selloff because of financial 
distress, looking at the abnormal returns in the [0] and [-1;0] windows, where the 
average abnormal returns are even (insignificantly) negative (Table 45). However, 
looking at the other event windows, no obvious tendency can be observed. Excluding 
the SAG Solarstrom case from the sample, the average abnormal returns for the distress 
sample become positive (5.76%, 4.19%, 7.78%, 6.20%), although still insignificant 
applying a sign test. 
 
DISTRESS_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Distress 14 -1.25 -2.08 1.81 0.98 
No distress 276 1.38*** 1.41*** 1.43*** 1.46*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 45: Selloff CAARs by Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (Announced) 
 
Looking at the z’’-score as indicator for financial distress, the abnormal returns seem to 
be lower for distressed than for healthy firms (Table 46). Whereas the abnormal returns 
are highly significantly positive for all event windows for healthy firms, abnormal 
returns are only weakly significant for distressed firms in the [-1;1] event window.  
 
DISTRESS_Z N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Distress 62 0.53 0.46 1.27 1.23* 
No distress 222 1.39*** 1.35*** 1.59*** 1.52*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 46: Selloff CAARs by Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (z’’-Score) 
 
  
Research Results 
147 
 
A statistical test for the differences in abnormal returns between healthy and distressed 
firms supports the first impression gained by looking at the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns. Abnormal returns for distressed firms are significantly lower in the [0] and [-
1;0] event windows referring to a left-tailed test, although the differences are not highly 
significant (Tables 47 and 48). For the event windows [0;1] and [-1;1] no statistically 
significant differences could be observed. This result holds for both measures of 
financial distress, the subjective and the objective measure. The finding of a negative 
influence of financial distress on abnormal returns supports the ‘fire sale theory’ that 
due to a weakened negotiation position and the time pressure because of the distressed 
situation, sellers are forced to eventually accept lower prices.  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
DISTRESS_A -0.963 
(0.678) 
-0.761 
(0.501) 
-0.244 
(0.472) 
-0.265 
(0.399) 
Cons 0.664*** 0.485*** 0.495*** 0.417*** 
F-Statistic 2.02 2.31 0.27 0.44 
R² 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 47: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (Announced) 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
DISTRESS_Z -0.495* 
(0.278) 
-0.297 
(0.221) 
-0.224 
(0.232) 
-0.141 
(0.189) 
Cons 0.696*** 0.482*** 0.486*** 0.389*** 
F-Statistic 3.18* 1.80 0.93 0.56 
R² 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.002 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 48: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (z’’-Score) 
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5.2.1.7 Hypothesis 7 – Involuntary Divestitures 
 
Hypothesis 7: The rationale that selloffs are forced by antitrust authorities, regulatory 
issues or changes in legislation on average has a significantly negative impact on 
shareholder wealth creation. 
 
For divestitures that were conducted involuntarily, for example divestitures forced by 
antitrust authorities, due to regulatory issues or changes in legislation, a negative 
influence on abnormal returns was expected. Looking at the average abnormal returns in 
the different event windows, the expectation seems to be justified. No significant 
abnormal returns are observed; for the [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows, returns are even 
(insignificantly) negative. Voluntary divestitures, on the other hand, are significantly 
positive in all event windows (Table 49). 
 
INVOLUNT N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Involuntary 12 0.04 0.31 -0.38 -0.11 
Voluntary 278 1.30*** 1.28*** 1.52*** 1.50*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 49: Selloff CAARs by Voluntariness of the Deal 
 
The bivariate regression results underpin the assumption of lower abnormal returns for 
involuntary divestitures. In all event windows, the abnormal returns are significantly 
lower than their voluntary counterparts (Table 50). Hence, it seems that indeed, the 
profitability of involuntary selloffs is lower than of voluntary selloffs. A negative 
shareholder value creation in absolute terms can, however, not be proved. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
INVOLUNT -0.644*** 
(0.231) 
-0.487** 
(0.216) 
-0.740*** 
(0.239) 
-0.629*** 
(0.212) 
Cons 0.644*** 0.469*** 0.514*** 0.431*** 
F-Statistic 7.79*** 5.09** 9.60*** 8.79*** 
R² 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.006 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 50: Regression of SCAARs on the Voluntariness of the Deal  
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5.2.1.8 Hypotheses 8–11 – Use of Proceeds 
 
Hypothesis 8: The announced use of proceeds on average has a significant impact on 
shareholder wealth creation in the sense that abnormal returns are expected to be 
highest if the proceeds are distributed to the shareholders and smallest if the proceeds 
are retained within the firm. 
 
As expected, extraordinary abnormal returns in particular can be observed for sellers 
intending to pay out the proceeds of the sale to their shareholders (Table 51). The 
average abnormal return is in double figures for all event windows. However, with only 
four cases, no parametric significance test can be applied here. Still, for the event 
windows [0;1] and [-1;1], a sign test shows that returns are significantly positive. For 
the event window [0;1], the individual abnormal returns in the four cases amount to 
7.77%, 8.70%, 13.19% and 18.31%. Comparing the other forms, no clear tendency can 
be observed. Whereas at the [0] and [-1;1] event windows, the ‘retain/reinvest’ sample 
obtains higher abnormal returns than the ‘reduce debt’ sample, the magnitude pretty 
much matches for the [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows. Moreover, it appears that 
irrespective of the intended use of proceeds, abnormal returns are higher if the use of 
proceeds is announced at all compared to the sample where the sellers keep the use of 
proceeds secret. This, however, will be investigated later regarding the transparency 
variable. 
 
PROCEEDS N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Payout 4 10.18 10.80 11.99** 12.62** 
Reduce debt 56 0.60* 0.48** 2.01** 1.89*** 
Retain/reinvest 35 3.10** 3.08** 1.87** 1.85* 
Unknown 195 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 51: Selloff CAARs by Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
The F-test of the regression shows that the announced use of proceeds significantly 
influences the abnormal returns (Table 52). However, it seems that the only significant 
differences between the groups are versus the ‘pay-out’ group, and that regarding the 
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two forms ‘reduce debt’ and ‘retain/reinvest’ the possible advantages and disadvantages 
described in section three balance each other.  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
PAYOUT 3.886** 
(1.852) 
3.070** 
(1.402) 
4.413*** 
(1.682) 
3.863** 
(1.504) 
DEBT -0.165 
(0.275) 
-0.000 
(0.227) 
-0.011 
(0.236) 
0.084 
(0.198) 
REINVEST 0.594 
(0.506) 
0.290 
(0.383) 
0.224 
(0.367) 
0.074 
(0.301) 
Cons 0.524*** 0.371*** 0.398*** 0.326*** 
F-Statistic 2.14* 1.78 2.41* 2.24* 
R² 0.053 0.046 0.085 0.082 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
UNKNOWN omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 52: Regression of SCAARs on Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
As argued before, the effect for firms using the proceeds to reduce debt should depend 
on their financial situation. Whereas reducing debt in a good financial situation should 
create new agency costs and therefore be perceived negatively, reducing debt in a 
distressed situation could lower the distress and be perceived positively. 
 
Hypothesis 9: The higher the debt level of the divesting company, the significantly 
higher are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to reduce debt. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The more serious the financial distress of the divesting company, the 
significantly higher are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to reduce 
debt. 
 
Similarly, the shareholder value effect for firms reinvesting the proceeds should depend 
on their growth perspectives in the sense that for firms with good growth perspectives, 
reinvesting the proceeds should create shareholder value and for firms with poor growth 
perspectives, reinvesting the proceeds should be related to lower or even negative 
shareholder value effects. 
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Hypothesis 11: The higher the growth opportunities of the divesting company, the 
significantly higher are the average abnormal returns if the proceeds are reinvested or 
retained by the seller. 
 
In order to account for those relationships, an interaction term for the form 
‘retain/reinvest’ based on the market-to-book value of the seller and for the form 
‘reduce debt’ based on the seller’s debt/equity ratio and the seller’s z’’-score was 
created. However, the author excluded the interaction DEBT*DE from his analysis to 
overcome a multicollinearity issue between the debt/equity ratio and the market-to-book 
value. With respect to the interaction term DEBT*ZSCORE, a clear trend cannot be 
observed if the abnormal returns of sellers using the proceeds to reduce debt are higher 
for distressed or healthy firms (Table 53). 
 
DEBT N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Distress 23 -0.69 -1.32 2.86 2.23 
No distress 32 1.55** 1.78*** 1.49* 1.72*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 53: Selloff CAARs if Proceeds are Used to Repay Debt by Seller Financial Condition 
 
Regarding the interaction term REINVEST*MTB, the highest magnitude of the 
abnormal returns, and also the only significantly positive returns, are reported for the 
sellers with the highest market-to-book value. However, a clear trend of the abnormal 
returns regarding the first three quartiles cannot be observed (Table 54). 
 
REINVEST N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
1st Quartile MTB 12 3.34 4.53 0.22 1.41 
2nd Quartile MTB 6 -2.02 -2.79 -2.49 -3.25 
3rd Quartile MTB 10 2.39 1.84 2.74 2.19 
4th Quartile MTB 7 8.11*** 7.37** 7.20 6.46 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 54: Selloff CAARs if Proceeds are Retained or Reinvested by Seller Growth Perspectives 
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The results of a regression support the impression gathered from comparing the 
abnormal returns of firms using the proceeds to reduce debt based on their financial 
situation and firms using the proceeds to reinvest based on their growth perspectives. 
Contrary to the expectation of the author, the financial situation neither has an influence 
on the abnormal returns of sellers using the proceeds to reduce debt, nor do the growth 
perspectives influence the abnormal returns of firms reinvesting the sale proceeds 
(Table 55). 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
PAYOUT 2.778 
(2.089) 
2.197 
(1.445) 
1.654** 
(0.777) 
1.540** 
(0.707) 
DEBT -0.398 
(0.400) 
-0.200 
(0.290) 
-0.022 
(0.420) 
0.048 
(0.304) 
ZSCORE 0.003 
(0.042) 
-0.000 
(0.031) 
0.029* 
(0.018) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
DEBT*ZSCORE 0.224 
(0.209) 
0.213 
(0.134) 
0.078 
(0.160) 
0.108 
(0.112) 
REINVEST 0.725 
(0.583) 
0.419 
(0.438) 
0.093 
(0.392) 
-0.003 
(0.320) 
MTB 0.041 
(0.089) 
0.032 
(0.068) 
-0.053 
(0.054) 
-0.041 
(0.051) 
REINVEST*MTB -0.037 
(0.093) 
-0.032 
(0.071) 
0.055 
(0.055) 
0.039 
(0.052) 
Cons 0.400* 
(0.213) 
0.277 
(0.173) 
0.387** 
(0.162) 
0.310** 
(0.154) 
F-Statistic 0.79 0.87 1.60 1.88* 
R² 0.038 0.034 0.040 0.040 
Observations 273 273 273 273 
UNKNOWN omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 55: Regression of SCAARs on the Intended Use of Proceeds and Interaction Terms 
 
However, the model also here suffers from multicollinearity between the market-to-
book ratio and the interaction term REINVEST*MTB which causes increasing standard 
errors. 
 
 
  
Research Results 
153 
 
5.2.1.9 Hypothesis 12 – Transparency 
 
Hypothesis 12: The disclosure of the transaction details as the price on average has a 
significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Contrary to the expectation, the transparency variables show no obvious impact on the 
abnormal returns. The magnitude is noticeably similar for the subsamples where a price 
is disclosed directly at the announcement, where no price is announced and where there 
is no obvious information about an announcement (Table 56).  
 
PRICE_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 218 1.18*** 1.04*** 1.38*** 1.25*** 
Not announced 40 1.35*** 1.42*** 1.38 1.45 
Unknown 32 1.65 2.41 1.96 2.72** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 56: Selloff CAARs by Announcement of Transaction Price 
 
The same holds true for the announcement of a book effect of the divestiture (Table 57) 
and for the announcement of the motive (Table 58). Also here, there is no clear trend in 
the magnitude and the sign of the abnormal returns; however, due to the small sample 
size regarding the announcement of a book effect, no significance based on a parametric 
test can be reported for the announcement subsample. 
 
BOOKGAIN_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 23 1.99 2.04 1.46 1.51 
Not announced 267 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.44*** 1.43*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 57: Selloff CAARs by Announcement of Book Effect 
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MOTIVE_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 236 1.12*** 1.07*** 1.50*** 1.45*** 
Not announced 54 1.85*** 2.01** 1.22* 1.38* 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 58: Selloff CAARs by Announcement of the Motive 
 
The only positive effect of a certain transparency at the announcement can be assumed 
regarding the announcement of the use of proceeds (Table 59) and the announcement of 
the mode of payment (Table 60). Here, the magnitude of the abnormal returns where the 
use of proceeds is announced is higher, the same as for the cases where the mode of 
payment is announced. However, also for the non-announcement group, abnormal 
returns are significantly positive. 
 
PROCEEDS_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 95 1.92*** 1.87*** 2.38*** 2.33*** 
Not announced 195 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 59: Selloff CAARs by Announcement of Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
CONSID_A N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 138 2.22*** 2.05*** 2.45*** 2.28*** 
Not announced 152 0.37*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.67*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 60: Selloff CAARs by Announcement of Form of Consideration 
 
Referring to statistical tests regarding the transparency variables, the only significant 
difference that can be detected is regarding the announcement of the price, where 
announcing the price leads to significantly higher abnormal returns in the [0;1] event 
window (Table 61). All other event windows and all tests regarding the other 
transparency variables do not reveal a significant difference between transparent and 
‘intransparent’ selloff transactions. This result suggests that – contrary to the 
assumption formulated in the hypothesis – transparency does not necessarily serve as a 
signal for good news and that unfavourable information is rather suppressed. The 
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regression results regarding the other transparency variables can be found in the 
Appendix (Tables 120–123, pp. 239–240). 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
UNKNOWN -0.384 
(0.309) 
-0.211 
(0.293) 
0.143 
(0.277) 
0.163 
(0.268) 
PRICE_A 0.261 
(0.230) 
-0.006 
(0.228) 
0.460** 
(0.218) 
0.219 
(0.213) 
Cons 0.464*** 0.476** 0.122 0.222 
F-Statistic 2.28 0.35 2.42* 0.53 
R² 0.009 0.001 0.010 0.002 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NOT_ANNOUNCED omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 61: Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Transaction Price 
 
 
5.2.1.10 Hypotheses 13–14 – Participation in the Buyer’s Value Creation 
Potential 
 
Hypothesis 13: The industrial relatedness between the buyer and the asset sold on 
average has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
An industrial relatedness between the buyer and the asset sold is expected to have a 
positive influence on abnormal returns because, in these situations, buyers may have the 
possibility to run the disposed asset more efficiently than the seller and may thus be able 
to pay a price that exceeds the value in use for the seller. In this way, sellers have the 
chance to participate in the buyer’s value creation potential and obtain higher abnormal 
returns as if the asset sold and the buyer are unrelated. Looking at the actual figures, the 
fit between the asset sold and the buyer does not seem to influence abnormal returns. 
Abnormal returns are significantly positive for both groups and no clear trend can be 
observed regarding the magnitude (Table 62).  
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FIT N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Fit 70 1.23** 1.50*** 1.04** 1.31** 
No fit 220 1.26*** 1.16*** 1.58*** 1.48*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 62: Selloff CAARs by Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer 
 
This is supported by the results of the statistical test for differences between the two 
groups which are insignificant in all tested event windows (Table 63). 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
FIT 0.171 
(0.369) 
0.301 
(0.277) 
0.055 
(0.288) 
0.194 
(0.250) 
Cons 0.576*** 0.376*** 0.470*** 0.358*** 
F-Statistic 0.21 1.18 0.04 0.60 
R² 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.003 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 63: Regression of SCAARs on the Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer 
 
Referring to the findings of John and Ofek (1995) for the US and Clubb and Stouraitis 
(2002) for European selloffs and the theoretical argumentation behind the hypothesis, 
the result is somewhat unexpected. Hence, in order to analyse this relationship more in 
depth, the author follows the approach of John and Ofek (1995) and connects this 
hypothesis to the corporate focus hypothesis. Therefore, the sample is divided into four 
groups. Following both hypotheses, the highest abnormal returns are expected for 
sellers selling unrelated assets (according to the two-digit SIC code) to buyers related to 
the respective assets sold (according to the four-digit SIC code). The lowest abnormal 
returns are thus expected for sellers selling related assets to buyers whose main 
operations are unrelated to those of the asset sold. 
 
Hypothesis 14: The combination of an increase in the industrial corporate focus and a 
strategic fit between the buyer and asset sold on average has a significantly positive 
impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
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Looking at the generic abnormal returns for the four groups, the expected relationship 
cannot be observed. Although the abnormal returns for the sellers that sell an unrelated 
asset to a buyer operating in the same industry as the disposed asset are positive in all 
event windows, a statistical significance based on a sign test cannot be reported. 
Unexpectedly, the abnormal returns for sellers selling a related asset to a buyer 
operating in an industry unrelated to the disposed asset are of a similar magnitude and 
significantly positive in all event windows, although not always highly significant. For 
the sellers that did not increase their industrial focus through the transaction, but had the 
chance to participate in the buyer’s value creation potential, abnormal returns are almost 
always insignificantly positive. Sellers that increased their corporate industrial focus, 
but sold the asset to a buyer unrelated to the asset sold, obtained highly significantly 
positive abnormal returns (Table 64). 
 
FOCUSFIT N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Focus & fit 29 1.59 1.63 1.53 1.57 
No focus & fit 41 0.98 1.41* 0.69 1.12 
Focus & no fit 115 0.86*** 0.91*** 1.43*** 1.48*** 
No focus & no fit 105 1.69*** 1.43* 1.73*** 1.47* 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 64: Selloff CAARs by Combination of Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer and Increase in 
Focus 
 
Taking into account the result of the F-test of the bivariate regression, the assumption 
expressed based on the average abnormal returns seems to come true. The F-test does 
not show a significant result for any of the four regressions (Table 65).  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
FOCUS_NOFIT -0.041 
(0.251) 
0.268 
(0.208) 
0.106 
(0.217) 
0.330* 
(0.191) 
FOCUS_FIT 0.715 
(0.658) 
0.862* 
(0.506) 
0.710 
(0.537) 
0.874* 
(0.473) 
NOFOCUS_FIT -0.251 
(0.407) 
0.143 
(0.302) 
-0.313 
(0.293) 
0.008 
(0.247) 
Cons 0.598*** 0.236 0.415*** 0.185 
F-Statistic 0.58 1.28 1.27 1.98 
R² 0.013 0.021 0.020 0.029 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NOFOCUS_NOFIT omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 65: Regression of SCAARs on Combination of Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer and 
Increase in Focus 
 
 
5.2.1.11 Hypothesis 15 – Type of Buyer 
 
Hypothesis 15: Selloffs to strategic investors on average create significantly more 
shareholder wealth than selloffs to private equity investors and managers via leveraged 
buyouts. 
 
Contrary to the expectation, abnormal returns tend to be higher if the management acts 
as buyer in divestiture transactions. Abnormal returns for this subsample are relatively 
high and even significant when applying non-parametric tests. This contrasts with the 
argumentation that because of the possibility of an absence of arm’s-length bargaining 
as well as the danger of managerial self-dealing, abnormal returns were expected to be 
lower than for other groups of buyers. Regarding strategic or private equity buyers, both 
groups show significantly positive abnormal returns and no obvious difference can be 
observed (Table 66). 
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BUYER N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Strategic 213 1.19*** 1.16*** 1.08*** 1.05*** 
Private Equity 68 0.81** 0.85* 1.35*** 1.39** 
Management 8 6.91** 7.42** 10.02 10.53** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 66: Selloff CAARs by Type of Buyer 
 
The regression results are in line with the initial observation. Abnormal returns are 
significantly higher in the case of management buyouts compared to selloffs to strategic 
or private equity investors (Table 67). Furthermore, in the [0] and [-1;0] event windows, 
selloffs to strategic investors lead to significantly higher abnormal returns than selloffs 
to private equity investors at the 5% and 10% alpha level respectively applying a right-
tailed test (not reported). Hence, the hypothesis seems to be true for strategic versus 
private equity buyers at least in regard to two event windows; the higher abnormal 
returns for the managerial buyers, however, cannot be explained with the argumentation 
provided earlier.  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MBO 1.067* 
(0.541) 
0.806* 
(0.473) 
0.600 
(0.427) 
0.534 
(0.379) 
PE -0.422* 
(0.218) 
-0.310 
(0.188) 
-0.128 
(0.197) 
-0.114 
(0.177) 
Cons 0.689*** 0.503*** 0.486*** 0.410*** 
F-Statistic 4.95*** 3.45** 1.45 1.44 
R² 0.015 0.013 0.004 0.004 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
STRATEGIC omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 67: Regression of SCAARs on the Type of Buyer 
 
 
5.2.1.12 Hypothesis 16 – Form of Payment 
 
Hypothesis 16: Selloffs, where the form of payment is cash, on average create 
significantly more shareholder wealth than selloffs settled with other or hybrid forms of 
payment. 
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The abnormal returns are significantly positive for cash transactions as well as for non-
cash transactions or transactions where the terms of settlement are not announced (Table 
68). Yet, the abnormal returns tend to be higher for transactions where the consideration 
announced is cash. At all four event windows, the difference is at least 1.32 percentage 
points.  
 
CASH N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Cash 125 2.19*** 2.00*** 2.44*** 2.25*** 
No cash 165 0.54*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.82*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 68: Selloff CAARs by Form of Consideration 
 
However, the results do not withstand a statistical test for the difference between the 
two groups or even the test for higher abnormal returns of selloff transactions where the 
mode of payment is cash (Table 69). 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
CASH 0.156 
(0.253) 
0.036 
(0.204) 
0.113 
(0.212) 
0.032 
(0.189) 
Cons 0.550*** 0.433*** 0.435*** 0.391*** 
F-Statistic 0.38 0.03 0.28 0.03 
R² 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 69: Regression of SCAARs on the Form of Consideration 
 
Since cases where the consideration is unknown are included in the non-cash group as 
well, a further test distinguishing between cases where the mode of payment is cash, 
non-cash or unknown was applied. The results suggest that the real difference in 
abnormal returns is in fact between cases where the mode of payment is announced 
respectively unknown and not between cash and non-cash transactions. The abnormal 
returns for the non-cash transactions are of a similar magnitude as the cash transactions, 
although a statistically positive average abnormal return can only be reported for the 
[0;1] event window applying a non-parametric sign test (Table 70). However, a test for 
the difference between the three groups also does not reveal a significant difference 
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(Table 124, Appendix, p. 241), which contradicts the author’s expectation based on the 
argumentation provided in section 3.2.6. 
 
PAYM N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Cash 125 2.19*** 2.00*** 2.44*** 2.25*** 
Other 13 2.51 2.58 2.59** 2.52 
Unknown 152 0.37*** 0.51*** 0.67*** 0.54*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 70: Selloff CAARs by Form of Consideration (Detailed) 
 
 
5.2.1.13 Hypothesis 17 – Relative Size 
 
Hypothesis 17: The relative size of selloffs on average has a significantly positive 
impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The relative size, which is measured as the transaction value as proportion of the market 
capitalisation of the seller ten days before the announcement in order to rule out any 
influences of the announcement on the market value, serves as a proxy for the degree of 
restructuring undertaken. In line with most of the previous research, an increasing 
relative size is expected to influence abnormal returns positively if corporate 
divestitures are on average value creating corporate activities. Forming three categories 
for deals with a relative size up to 10%, 50% and from 50% onwards, it looks as if the 
findings from previous research would be confirmed. For small deals, abnormal returns 
are rather small and also not highly significantly positive, if at all. With an increasing 
relative size of the deal, indeed, abnormal returns become highly significantly positive 
and the magnitude of the abnormal returns also increases (Table 71). 
 
SIZE N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Small 184 0.28** 0.21* 0.19 0.12 
Medium 61 1.64*** 1.63*** 2.69*** 2.69*** 
Large 45 4.72*** 4.94*** 4.89*** 5.10*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 71: Selloff CAARs by Relative Size of the Deal 
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Figure 23 illustrates the differences in the standardised abnormal returns between small, 
medium and large divestitures. 
 
 
Figure 23: Selloff SAARs and SCAARs by Relative Size of the Deal 
 
The regression results prove the relationship and report a significant influence for all 
reported event windows. Moreover, the relative size has by far the highest explanatory 
power with a 𝑅² ranging from 8.9% to 9.3% (Table 72). 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.715** 
(0.285) 
0.556** 
(0.229) 
0.811*** 
(0.240) 
0.700*** 
(0.211) 
LARGE 1.814*** 
(0.578) 
1.410*** 
(0.446) 
1.390*** 
(0.437) 
1.236*** 
(0.379) 
Cons 0.185* 0.113 0.097 0.065 
F-Statistic 7.65*** 7.47*** 9.96*** 9.96*** 
R² 0.093 0.089 0.092 0.092 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
SMALL omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 72: Regression of SCAARs on the Relative Size of the Deal 
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5.2.1.14 Hypothesis 18 – Seller Growth Perspectives 
 
Hypothesis 18: The growth perspectives of the parent company on average have a 
significantly positive influence on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
In order to display the abnormal returns based on different degrees of growth 
perspectives, proxied by the market-to-book value of the seller, the sample was divided 
into four groups. The results for this variable are somewhat inconclusive. The highest 
returns are observed for the first and fourth quartile; for the second quartile, the 
abnormal returns are not even significant for all event windows (Table 73).  
 
MTB N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
1st Quartile 76 1.59*** 1.76*** 2.15*** 2.32*** 
2nd Quartile 68 0.37 0.44 0.83* 0.91** 
3rd Quartile 73 1.08** 0.99** 1.12** 1.03** 
4th Quartile 72 2.06*** 2.00*** 1.69*** 1.63** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 73: Selloff CAARs by Seller Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
The bivariate regressions, including the market-to-book ratio as continuous variable as 
well as dummy variable based on quartiles, show highly insignificant results (Table 74 
and Table 125, Appendix, p. 241). Hence, against the expectation, the growth 
perspectives do not seem to directly influence abnormal returns in this sample.  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MTB 0.011 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
Cons 0.594*** 0.443*** 0.489*** 0.418*** 
F-Statistic 0.77 0.23 0.04 0.36 
R² 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 74: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Market-to-Book Ratio (Continuous) 
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5.2.1.15 Hypothesis 19 – Seller Performance Prospects 
 
Hypothesis 19: The stock performance of the seller in the period before the 
announcement on average has a significantly positive impact on shareholder wealth 
creation. 
 
In order to capture the influence of the performance prospects of the seller, the buy-and-
hold return in the estimation period was applied as a proxy. Distinguishing between 
sellers with a positive and sellers with a negative buy-and-hold return prior to the 
divestiture announcement, it appears that sellers with a negative pre-divestiture stock 
performance obtain higher abnormal returns, although the returns for both groups are 
significantly positive in all event windows (Table 75). 
 
STOCK N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Positive 180 1.05*** 1.11*** 1.02*** 1.08*** 
Negative 110 1.59*** 1.47*** 2.14*** 2.02*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 75: Selloff CAARs by Seller Performance Prospects 
 
The statistical tests come to the same conclusion and assign higher abnormal returns to 
sellers with a negative stock performance in the estimation period (Table 76). This 
could be interpreted in the way that the divestiture is regarded by the capital market as a 
way out to overcome the unfavourable outlook and improve the seller’s future 
prospects. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
STOCK -0.506* 
(0.290) 
-0.399* 
(0.226) 
-0.395* 
(0.232) 
-0.356* 
(0.202) 
Cons 0.932*** 0.696*** 0.729*** 0.625*** 
F-Statistic 3.06* 3.11* 2.91* 3.09* 
R² 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 76: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Performance Prospects 
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5.2.1.16 Hypothesis 20 – Seller Profitability 
 
Hypothesis 20: The profitability of the seller on average has a significantly positive 
impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Solely looking at the generic abnormal returns, there is no obvious relationship between 
the profitability of the seller and divestiture performance. A positive profitability shows 
higher abnormal returns in the [0] and [-1;0] event windows, whereas a negative 
profitability leads to higher abnormal returns in the [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows 
(Table 77). The standardised abnormal returns, however, are insignificantly positive for 
sellers with a negative return on assets but highly significantly positive for sellers with a 
positive return on assets. Hence, a positive effect of the profitability on the abnormal 
returns is assumed. 
 
ROA N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Positive 236 1.57*** 1.67*** 1.41*** 1.51*** 
Negative 42 0.94 0.67 2.01 1.74 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 77: Selloff CAARs by Seller Profitability  
 
The bivariate regression, where the return on assets is included as a quantitative 
variable, shows a highly significantly positive influence of the profitability of the seller 
on abnormal returns. The coefficients are highly significant in every event window and 
the 𝑅² is also of a considerable size, compared to other variables (Table 78). This 
supports the theory that sellers, which are in a strong financial condition, are not subject 
to the pressure of an immediate sale but can instead negotiate more favourable 
conditions which influences the abnormal return positively. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
ROA 0.048*** 
(0.014) 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
Cons 0.298** 0.209 0.252** 0.205** 
F-Statistic 11.21*** 11.77*** 26.3***5 27.68*** 
R² 0.134 0.122 0.093 0.092 
Observations 278 278 278 278 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 78: Regression of SCAARs on the Seller Profitability  
 
 
5.2.1.17 Hypothesis 21 – Seller Liquidity 
 
Hypothesis 21: The degree of liquidity of the seller on average has a significantly 
positive impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
The quick ratio states whether a company is able to meet its short-term liabilities with 
its liquid assets. Hence, a quick ratio above one indicates that the seller is in a healthy 
condition, whereas values below one are rather problematic. Nevertheless, the 
acceptable values regarding the quick ratio vary between industries and no strict rule 
exists which denotes a healthy seller or a seller that suffers from financial distress. 
Similar to the profitability of the seller, it seems that for the event windows [0] and [-
1;0], a quick ratio above one influences abnormal returns positively. However, the 
picture changes looking at the [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows. For both groups, the 
abnormal returns are significantly positive at the 1% alpha level (Table 79).  
 
QUICK N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Above 1 110 2.03*** 2.05*** 1.40*** 1.41*** 
Below 1 166 1.03*** 1.10*** 1.43*** 1.50*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 79: Selloff CAARs by Seller Liquidity 
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Testing for the differences between the two groups shows no significant differences 
(Table 126, Appendix, p. 241). However, including the quick ratio as a continuous 
variable in a bivariate regression model, the quick ratio appears to be positively related 
to the abnormal returns, at least in the [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows (Table 80). 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
QUICK 0.002 
(0.276) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
0.036** 
(0.015) 
0.0030** 
(0.014) 
Cons 0.619*** 0.452*** 0.397*** 0.336 
F-Statistic 0.01 0.02 5.49** 4.76** 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.017 
Observations 276 276 276 276 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 80: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Liquidity 
 
 
5.2.1.18 Hypothesis 22 – Seller Leverage 
 
Hypothesis 22: The degree of leverage of the seller on average has a significantly 
negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Looking at the leverage of the sellers, applying the debt/equity ratio, they seem to 
obtain higher abnormal returns with a lower leverage. Abnormal returns tend to be 
higher for the first two quartiles regarding the debt/equity ratio and are highly 
significantly positive, whereas significantly positive abnormal returns for the third 
quartile are only reported in one event window. For the last quartile, i.e. the sellers with 
the highest debt/equity ratio, abnormal returns are again significantly positive, although 
of a smaller magnitude and not as significant as for the first two quartiles (Table 81). 
 
DE N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
1st Quartile 70 2.12*** 2.50*** 2.40*** 2.78*** 
2nd Quartile 68 2.25*** 1.84*** 1.93*** 1.62** 
3rd Quartile 69 0.25 0.48* 0.08 0.31 
4th Quartile 70 1.29** 1.27* 1.58** 1.56** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 81: Selloff CAARs by Seller Leverage 
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The regression results support the finding of a negative relationship between the degree 
of leverage and the abnormal returns. Both the dummy regression, including the 
quartiles (Table 127, Appendix, p. 242), as well as the regression including the 
debt/equity ratio as continuous variable (Table 82), show a significantly negative 
influence of the degree of leverage on the abnormal returns, although the results 
regarding the continuous variable are economically insignificant.  
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
DE -0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Cons 0.658*** 0.486*** 0.506*** 0.431*** 
F-Statistic 0.48 5.28** 8.74*** 18.74*** 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 82: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Leverage  
 
 
5.2.1.19 Hypothesis 23 – Seller Probability of Bankruptcy 
 
Hypothesis 23: Financial distress, respectively the probability of bankruptcy of the 
seller, on average has a significantly negative impact on shareholder wealth creation. 
 
Including the z’’-score as a quantitative variable, instead of a dummy as for hypothesis 
6, also supports the result that financial distress has a negative influence on abnormal 
returns. The coefficient for the z’’-score is highly significantly positive for the [0;1] and 
[-1;1] event windows, attributing higher abnormal returns to sellers with a higher z’’-
score, i.e. sellers with a lower risk of bankruptcy (Table 83). 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
ZSCORE 0.027 
(0.034) 
0.018 
(0.024) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
Cons 0.513*** 0.378*** 0.298*** 0.256*** 
F-Statistic 0.65 0.55 9.59*** 7.70*** 
R² 0.009 0.006 0.027 0.022 
Observations 273 273 273 273 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 83: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Probability of Bankruptcy 
 
 
5.2.1.20 Further Bivariate Findings 
 
Economic Environment 
The economic environment at the time of the divestiture announcement seems to play a 
definite role in explaining abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are significantly positive 
for both groups, but seem to be higher for abnormal returns announced in times of 
recession, except the [-1;1] event window (Table 84).  
 
CYCLE N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Boom 223 0.87*** 1.00*** 1.34*** 1.47*** 
Recession 67 2.52*** 2.04*** 1.81** 1.33** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 84: Selloff CAARs by Economic Environment 
 
However, a significant difference can only be confirmed regarding the [0] event 
window. For the other event windows, the results are insignificant and for the [-1;0] and 
[0;1] event windows, even the sign of the coefficient changes (Table 85). 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
RECESSION -0.537* 
(0.317) 
0.229 
(0.253) 
0.028 
(0.243) 
-0.100 
(0.217) 
Cons 0.493*** 0.396*** 0.478*** 0.428*** 
F-Statistic 2.87* 0.82 0.01 0.21 
R² 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 85: Regression of SCAARs on Economic Environment 
 
Type of Asset 
Looking at the type of the divested asset, abnormal returns are highest if the divested 
asset is a subsidiary. Also for fully integrated business units, abnormal returns are 
significantly positive, although smaller than for subsidiaries. For all other groups no 
significant abnormal returns can be reported, however, their sample is too small to apply 
parametric tests (Table 86). 
 
ASSET N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Subsidiary 142 1.81*** 1.87*** 2.07*** 2.13*** 
Business unit 92 0.88*** 0.85*** 1.05*** 1.02** 
Property 25 0.63 0.75 0.81 0.93 
Plant 20 0.40 0.06 0.63 0.30 
Rights 9 0.30 -0.14 -0.25 -0.69 
Unknown 2 -0.45 -1.05 -0.82 -1.41 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 86: Selloff CAARs by Type of Asset Sold 
 
The regression results (Table 87) reveal a significant influence of the type of the 
divested asset on shareholder value gains. Especially if the sold assets are rights, the 
abnormal returns tend to be lower, as well as in the case when the assets sold are not 
disclosed and, hence, the type of asset is unknown. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
PLANT -0.712* 
(0.391) 
-0.598* 
(0.313) 
-0.432 
(0.387) 
-0.431 
(0.332) 
PROPERTY -0.579 
(0.431) 
-0.306 
(0.321) 
-0.318 
(0.294) 
-0.177 
(0.247) 
RIGHTS -0.786** 
(0.327) 
-0.714*** 
(0.262) 
-0.643*** 
(0.236) 
-0.654*** 
(0.230) 
SUBSIDIARY -0.096 
(0.329) 
0.004 
(0.257) 
0.148 
(0.252) 
0.177 
(0.221) 
UNKNOWN -1.317*** 
(0.286) 
-1.314*** 
(0.389) 
-1.073** 
(0.416) 
-1.190* 
(0.623) 
Cons 0.797*** 
(0.280) 
0.546** 
(0.214) 
0.495** 
(0.194) 
0.391** 
(0.168) 
F-Statistic 14.20*** 4.91*** 4.24*** 4.02*** 
R² 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.022 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
BU omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 87: Regression of SCAARs on the Type of Asset Sold 
 
Change in Seller’s Systematic Risk 
A change in the systematic risk of the seller through the divestiture, measured by a 
significant increase or decrease in the seller’s beta factor, appears to influence the 
abnormal returns in the sense that an increase in the systematic risk is related to lower 
abnormal returns as in the case of no significant change. Table 88 shows a highly 
significantly positive abnormal return only for the cases where the systematic risk does 
not significantly change; all other returns seem to be lower.  
 
BETA N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Increase 28 0.85 0.86 0.22 0.23 
Decrease 34 1.03* 1.07* 0.16 0.20 
No change 226 1.74*** 1.69*** 2.13*** 2.08*** 
Unknown 2 -44.55 -40.64 -37.19 -33.27 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 88: Selloff CAARs by Change in the Seller’s Systematic Risk 
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The F-statistic of the regression (Table 89) indicates a significant influence only in the 
[0;1] event window where – as expected – an increase in the systematic risk leads to 
lower abnormal returns as in the case where the systematic risk does not significantly 
change in the course of the acquisition. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
UNKNOWN -4.426 
(2.955) 
-2.918 
(1.864) 
-2.798* 
(1.666) 
-2.113* 
(1.178) 
DECREASE -0.181 
(0.365) 
-0.153 
(0.273) 
-0.316 
(0.275) 
-0.278 
(0.224) 
INCREASE -0.512** 
(0.239) 
-0.369 
(0.237) 
-0.511* 
(0.265) 
-0.423 
(0.277) 
Cons 0.719*** 0.522*** 0.589*** 0.493*** 
F-Statistic 2.22* 1.58 2.28* 2.06 
R² 0.033 0.024 0.025 0.020 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NO_CHANGE omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 89: Regression of SCAARs on the Change in the Seller’s Systematic Risk 
 
Seller/Target Degree of Relationship 
The relatedness of the seller and target in the sense if the transaction contained the 
divestiture of an asset directly or indirectly (via a subsidiary) held by the seller shows 
no influence on the abnormal returns (Table 90). Magnitude and significance of 
abnormal returns are noticeably similar in both groups, which is supported by the 
regression results (Table 128, Appendix, p. 242). 
 
DIRECT N AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
Direct 206 1.26*** 1.27*** 1.43*** 1.45*** 
Indirect 84 1.24*** 1.17*** 1.49*** 1.42*** 
Abnormal returns in % 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 90: Selloff CAARs by Seller/Target Degree of Relationship 
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5.2.2 Spinoff Event Study Results 
 
Regarding the single-day average abnormal returns in the event period, spinoffs seem to 
create shareholder value on average, referring to the actual announcement date and the 
pre- and succeeding trading day (Table 91). However, because of the small size of the 
spinoffs sample with only 22 cases, no parametric tests were conducted and 
significances are exclusively reported for the proportion of positive abnormal returns 
based on a non-parametric sign test. The sign test shows a significantly positive 
proportion of abnormal returns only on the day prior to the announcement as well as for 
day [-7]. Ignoring the violated normality assumption and incorrectly applying the 
standardised cross-sectional test would lead to the same result with regard to the 
immediate announcement. 
 
Trading Day AAR SAAR Median AR 
Proportion 
positive ARs 
Absolute 
AAR 
-10 0.21 0.07 -0.18 40.91 -1.81 
-9 -0.21 -0.14 -0.15 45.45 -5.81 
-8 -0.38 -0.26 -0.42 36.36 3.19 
-7 0.44 0.37 0.22 68.18** 21.27 
-6 0.04 -0.01 0.07 50.00 -21.45 
-5 0.07 0.13 0.23 63.64* 2.29 
-4 0.71 0.31 0.35 63.64* 38.22 
-3 0.16 0.20 0.13 54.55 18.48 
-2 -0.53 -0.32 -0.30 40.91 1.94 
-1 0.97 0.47 0.39 68.18** -11.88 
 0 0.95 1.31 0.38 54.55 63.91 
 1 0.86 -0.06 -0.03 50.00 -36.32 
 2 -1.05 -0.18 -0.21 45.45 -30.09 
 3 0.52 0.42 -0.10 50.00 33.39 
 4 0.51 0.18 -0.05 45.45 6.94 
 5 0.51 0.20 -0.03 45.45 -2.83 
 6 -0.41 -0.28 0.08 59.09 30.10 
 7 -0.16 -0.04 0.01 50.00 34.66 
 8 -0.44 -0.29 -0.36 36.36 -22.58 
 9 0.36 -0.20 -0.20 40.91 -22.05 
 10 -0.67 -0.32 -0.35 45.45 1.57 
AAR and proportion of positive AR in %; absolute AAR in EUR 1,000,000. 
N=22; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed Fisher’s exact test. 
Table 91: Daily Average Abnormal Spinoff Returns in the Event Period 
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Regarding the different event windows within the event period, all cumulative average 
abnormal returns are positive (Table 92). Likewise, the absolute cumulative average 
abnormal returns and also the proportion of abnormal returns are positive, except the [-
2;2] window for the absolute cumulative average abnormal return. However, also here, 
significances are only reported for the proportion of positive cumulative abnormal 
returns based on a sign test. The sign test indicates significances for the event windows 
[-1;0], [-1;1], [-2;2] and [-5;5]. 
 
 
Figure 24: Event Period Daily and Cumulative Standardised Average Abnormal Spinoff Returns 
 
Event Window CAAR SCAAR Absolute CAAR Proportion positive CARs 
[-1;0] 1.92 1.25 52.03 68.18** 
[-1;1] 2.78 0.99 15.71 72.73** 
[0;1] 1.81 0.89 27.58 63.64* 
[-2;2] 1.20 0.54 -12.44 68.18** 
[-3;3] 1.88 0.69 39.43 63.64* 
[-5;5] 3.67 0.78 84.06 86.18** 
[-10;10] 2.45 0.41 115.02 59.09 
CAAR and proportion of positive CAR in %; absolute CAAR in EUR 1,000,000. 
N=22; *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed Fisher’s exact test. 
Table 92: Spinoff CAARs in the Event Period 
 
Although due to the small sample size, parametric significance tests cannot be applied, 
the mostly significantly positive proportion of cases with positive abnormal returns 
supports the hypothesis that corporate spinoffs are also net shareholder value-creating 
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corporate activities. The results for the D-A-CH region are thus in line with previous 
research, which without exception report positive average abnormal returns for spinoffs. 
 
 
5.3 Multivariate Results 
 
5.3.1 Multivariate Results – Relative Size, Financial Performance and Growth 
Perspectives 
 
In order to validate the bivariate findings, the hypotheses are again tested including the 
variables in a multivariate regression model. Therefore, the author works with a basic 
model, which includes the seller related variables as well as the relative deal size, as this 
seems to be the variable with the most significant influence on abnormal returns. Hence, 
the basic model initially includes the relative size as categorical variable, the market-to-
book ratio of the seller and the stock performance of the seller in the estimation period 
(as dummy variable), as well as the seller’s return on assets, quick ratio, debt/equity 
ratio and the z’’-score (Table 93). 
 
As this initial model suffers from multicollinearity between the market-to-book ratio 
and the debt/equity ratio, the latter was removed from the model as there are still 
enough variables that account for the financial situation of the seller. As the 
multicollinearity is caused by a few outliers, these could have been removed 
alternatively. However, removing those cases would have caused the loss of valuable 
information. As in the bivariate analysis, the market-to-book ratio, which serves as a 
proxy for the growth perspectives of the seller, shows to be insignificant except in the 
[0] event window (Table 129, Appendix, p. 243). Thus, the author also removes the 
market-to-book value from the basic model. Although the debt-equity ratio could be 
reconsidered in the model, the author refuses to do so. Even though, the debt-equity 
ratio shows to be significantly negative, supporting the view that selloffs conducted 
from a position of strength are viewed favourably, the coefficient is economically 
highly insignificant.  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.764** 
(0.294) 
0.571** 
(0.236) 
0.861*** 
(0.237) 
0.731*** 
(0.209) 
LARGE 2.055*** 
(0.582) 
1.597*** 
(0.454) 
1.257** 
0.514) 
1.143*** 
(0.429) 
MTB 0.186 
(0.131) 
0.145 
(0.090) 
0.104 
(0.088) 
0.095 
(0.071) 
STOCK -0.683*** 
(0.258) 
-0.548*** 
(0.206) 
-0.467** 
(0.214) 
-0.436** 
(0.187) 
ROA 0.039*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.102*** 
(0.039) 
-0.065** 
(0.032) 
-0.017 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.023) 
DE -0.078 
(0.059) 
-0.063 
(0.041) 
-0.048 
(0.040) 
-0.046 
(0.032) 
ZSCORE 0.038 
(0.044) 
0.016 
(0.036) 
0.020 
(0.032) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
Cons 0.026 
(0.247) 
0.046 
(0.193) 
0.037 
(0.195) 
0.054 
(0.165) 
F-Statistic 5.62*** 4.57*** 10.68*** 11.48*** 
R² 0.281 0.256 0.181 0.182 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 93: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller Related Variables and Relative Size 
 
Hence, the basic model (Table 94) consists of the relative size of the deal as well as the 
stock performance of the seller in the estimation period, the seller’s profitability (return 
on assets), liquidity (quick ratio) and the z’’-score as a measure for the degree of 
financial distress. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.675** 
(0.280) 
0.503** 
(0.229) 
0.806*** 
(0.232) 
0.677*** 
(0.206) 
LARGE 1.946*** 
(0.582) 
1.519*** 
(0.456) 
1.208** 
(0.505) 
1.102*** 
(0.421) 
STOCK -0.681** 
(0.261) 
-0.544*** 
(0.208) 
-0.462** 
(0.213) 
-0.429** 
(0.187) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.021) 
Cons 0.297 
(0.214) 
0.244 
(0.172) 
0.165 
(0.175) 
0.164 
(0.150) 
F-Statistic 6.17*** 5.69*** 16.28*** 13.89*** 
R² 0.266 0.243 0.174 0.173 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 94: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller Related Variables and Relative Size (Basic Model) 
 
As expected, the relative size of the deal still has a highly significantly positive effect on 
the abnormal returns when controlling for other variables. Moreover, the relative size is 
also the variable that explains most of the variation in the abnormal returns with an R² 
between 11.16% and 13.82% dependent on the event window. This supports the 
hypothesis that if divestitures are shareholder value-creating corporate activities, the 
degree of restructuring influences the shareholder value creation positively. The result is 
in line with the majority of previous divestiture research (cf. i.a. Hearth and Zaima, 
1984; Servaes and Zenner, 1994; Lang et al., 1995; Borde et al., 1998; Hanson and 
Song, 2000; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Clayton and Reisel, 2013 for the US; Afshar et 
al., 1992; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 1995; Lasfer et al., 1996; Wang, 2000; Alexandrou and 
Sudarsanam, 2001; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002 for Europe). 
For the D-A-CH region, only Stienemann (2003) reports a positive influence of the 
relative size on the abnormal returns; Löffler (2001) and Ostrowski (2007), by contrast, 
do not find any impact of this variable. 
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Also, the bivariate result regarding the stock performance as an indicator for the future 
prospects of the seller seems to be robust. A negative stock performance in the 
estimation period is related to significantly higher announcement returns compared to a 
positive stock performance. The reason for this finding may lie in the fact that in the 
case of an unfavourable outlook, the divestiture is seen as a game changer, which may 
lead to increased performance prospects.  
 
The outcomes regarding the liquidity level, however, differ from the bivariate results as 
the coefficient for the quick ratio turns negative when including the variable in the 
multivariate model. A possible explanation for this effect may be related to the 
principal-agent-theory. If a seller’s liquidity is already at a considerable level, the fear 
of emerging agency costs through investment decisions regarding the sale proceeds that 
are beneficial for the management rather than for the shareholders may result in lower 
abnormal returns. 
 
The multivariate findings regarding the seller’s current performance, i.e. the return on 
assets, and the threat of financial distress, i.e. the z’’-score, are in line with the bivariate 
findings and indicate that generally, a strong financial constitution of the seller is 
favourable with respect to the announcement returns. The most reasonable rationale for 
this relationship is the strong negotiation position, which allows the seller to consider 
the different options very carefully without any pressure. The results are in line with the 
findings of Bartsch (2005) who also reports a positive influence of a strong financial 
situation of the seller. The other studies concerning the same economic region do not 
find any influence regarding their variables. The findings of Löffler (2001) are 
insignificant, as are the findings of Stienemann (2003) regarding financial distress of the 
seller. For the profitability of the seller, the results of Stienemann (2003) are 
ambiguous. Also, regarding US and European studies, the results in respect to the 
seller’s profitability vary between the studies. A negative impact of financial distress is, 
however, only reported by Wang (2000), whereas the majority either finds a positive or 
insignificant influence. 
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5.3.2 Multivariate Results – Selloff Motive 
 
5.3.2.1 Multivariate Results – Increase in Corporate Focus 
 
Looking at the effect of an increase in the corporate industrial focus through the 
transaction, the multivariate results support the bivariate findings. Divesting an asset, 
which is unrelated to the seller’s core business, shows to have a significantly positive 
influence in the [-1;0], [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows (Table 95). On the announcement 
day, the p-value of the coefficient in a right-tailed test slightly exceeds 10%. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.660** 
(0.277) 
0.480** 
(0.224) 
0.791*** 
(0.231) 
0.654*** 
(0.202) 
LARGE 1.981*** 
(0.579) 
1.574*** 
(0.447) 
1.244** 
(0.508) 
0.155*** 
(0.420) 
STOCK -0.691*** 
(0.262) 
-0.559*** 
(0.207) 
-0.471** 
(0.214) 
-0.443** 
(0.187) 
ROA 0.039** 
(0.015) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.135*** 
(0.029) 
-0.098*** 
(0.024) 
-0.043** 
(0.021) 
-0.037* 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.077** 
(0.032) 
0.053* 
(0.027) 
0.049** 
(0.024) 
0.039* 
(0.022) 
IFOCUS_S 0.289 
(0.231) 
0.456** 
(0.184) 
0.295 
(0.195) 
0.448*** 
(0.171) 
Cons 0.156 
(0.200) 
0.021 
(0.164) 
0.020 
(0.181) 
-0.055 
(0.147) 
F-Statistic 5.32*** 5.29*** 14.93*** 13.33*** 
R² 0.271 0.261 0.181 0.196 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 95: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on an Increase in Focus Incl. Controls 
 
Hence, the robust finding of a positive effect of selling unrelated assets proves the 
hypothesis that due to such transactions, harmful unrelated diversification can be 
mitigated, resources can be moved to higher valued uses and agency costs can be 
reduced. In this way, corporate divestitures create value for the seller’s shareholders. 
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This result supports the theories for value creation of Kirchmaier (2003), Sewing (2010) 
and Fischer et al. (2013) and is in line with the majority of previous research (cf. i.a. 
Afshar et al., 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 1995; Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta, 1996; Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999; Bergh et al., 2008; 
Coakley et al., 2008). Regarding the D-A-CH region only, the results support the 
findings of Löffler (2001) and Ostrowski (2007) but are in contrast to the finding of no 
influence of Eichinger (2001) and Stienemann (2003) or to Bartsch’s (2005) finding of a 
negative influence. 
 
Also, the results regarding the degree of diversification seem to be robust when 
controlling for the relative deal size and the seller’s financial characteristics. Neither the 
degree of diversification itself, i.e. the number of two-digit SIC codes, nor the 
interaction term is significant (Table 96). Moreover, the coefficient that accounts for an 
increase in focus also becomes insignificant, except the [-1;1] event window in a right-
tailed test. This, as in the bivariate results, may, however, be caused by multicollinearity 
between this variable and the interaction terms, which leads to increased standard errors 
and, hence, insignificant coefficients. Thus, the results neither reveal an influence of the 
degree of diversification itself, nor of the interaction term, but have to be regarded with 
caution, as the insignificant results may be misleading. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.635** 
(0.275) 
0.468** 
(0.224) 
0.783*** 
(0.234) 
0.651*** 
(0.207) 
LARGE 1.930*** 
(0.562) 
1.549*** 
(0.438) 
1.242** 
(0.501) 
1.162*** 
(0.415) 
STOCK -0.671*** 
(0.255) 
-0.549*** 
(0.202) 
-0.467** 
(0.212) 
-0.443** 
(0.185) 
ROA 0.039** 
(0.015) 
0.029** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.015** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.135*** 
(0.029) 
-0.098*** 
(0.024) 
-0.043** 
(0.021) 
-0.037* 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.078** 
(0.032) 
0.054* 
(0.027) 
0.049** 
(0.024) 
0.039* 
(0.022) 
IFOCUS_S 0.410 
(0.651) 
0.529 
(0.503) 
0.564 
(0.513) 
0.659 
(0.454) 
NO2 -0.076 
(0.102) 
-0.035 
(0.081) 
0.057 
(0.088) 
0.062 
(0.072) 
IFOCUS_S*NO2 -0.014 
(0.169) 
-0.011 
(0.133) 
-0.092 
(0.140) 
-0.077 
(0.121) 
Cons 0.348 
(0.316) 
0.109 
(0.255) 
-0.129 
(0.290) 
-0.217 
(0.243) 
F-Statistic 4.18*** 4.18*** 12.69*** 11.12*** 
R² 0.274 0.262 0.183 0.197 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 96: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on an Increase in Focus, the Degree of Diversification and an 
Interaction Term of Both Variables Incl. Controls 
 
The positive influence of a major restructuring or strategic shift in the corporate focus 
through the transaction, which was observed in the bivariate analysis, does not prove to 
be robust including controls in the regression analysis. Although constantly positive, the 
coefficients are insignificantly different from zero in all four tested event windows 
(Table 97). 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.664** 
(0.285) 
0.493** 
(0.234) 
0.788*** 
(0.237) 
0.659*** 
(0.210) 
LARGE 1.909*** 
(0.568) 
1.482*** 
(0.444) 
1.143** 
(0.484) 
1.039** 
(0.398) 
STOCK -0.680** 
(0.261) 
-0.543** 
(0.208) 
-0.459** 
(0.213) 
-0.426** 
(0.187) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.073** 
(0.031) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.046* 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.022) 
MAJ_RES 0.194 
(0.408) 
0.195 
(0.323) 
0.340 
(0.345) 
0.326 
(0.307) 
Cons 0.276 
(0.215) 
0.223 
(0.173) 
0.128 
(0.176) 
0.129 
(0.151) 
F-Statistic 5.25*** 4.81*** 12.93*** 11.00*** 
R² 0.267 0.244 0.178 0.179 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 97: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on a Major Restructuring Incl. Controls 
 
The divestiture of a foreign asset, i.e. an increase in the geographic corporate focus, still 
shows a significant negative influence when controlling for the seller’s financial 
constitution and the relative size of the deal. Although the coefficients are not as highly 
significant as in the bivariate model, the coefficients are significantly negative at the 5% 
level in a left-tailed test for all event windows tested (Table 98). This supports the 
argument that an increase in the geographic focus leads to decreasing economies of 
scale, a weakened competitive position or signals a prior mistake which influences the 
shareholder value creation negatively. The finding of a negative influence of an increase 
in the geographic focus is in line with the results of Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995) for 
European divestitures and Eichinger (2001) for German divestitures but is in contrast to 
the findings of Stienemann (2003). 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.581** 
(0.270) 
0.420** 
(0.224) 
0.716*** 
(0.230) 
0.590*** 
(0.208) 
LARGE 1.860*** 
(0.562) 
1.443*** 
(0.441) 
1.126** 
(0.497) 
1.022** 
(0.414) 
STOCK -0.688*** 
(0.261) 
-0.550*** 
(0.208) 
-0.468** 
(0.214) 
-0.435** 
(0.187) 
ROA 0.039*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.128*** 
(0.027) 
-0.088*** 
(0.022) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
-0.027 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.073** 
(0.030) 
0.047* 
(0.026) 
0.045** 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
FOREIGN -0.324* 
(0.184) 
-0.286* 
(0.155) 
-0.310* 
(0.177) 
-0.299* 
(0.160) 
Cons 0.481* 
(0.256) 
0.407** 
(0.203) 
0.341 
(0.209) 
0.334* 
(0.184) 
F-Statistic 5.40*** 5.00*** 15.28*** 13.13*** 
R² 0.272 0.250 0.182 0.183 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 98: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Foreign vs Domestic Incl. 
Controls 
 
The results regarding the second variable measuring an increase in the geographic 
focus, i.e. if the divested asset is a non-European asset, become insignificant when 
included in a multivariate model (Table 130, Appendix, p. 244). 
 
 
5.3.2.2 Multivariate Results – Financial Distress 
 
When omitting the z’’-score from the basic model and instead including a binary 
indicator for financial distress, the results differ from the bivariate findings. Whereas the 
subjective measure, i.e. the announcement of financial distress as the motive for the 
divestiture, indicates a significantly negative impact on the abnormal returns (Table 99), 
the objective measure, i.e. the z’’-score as binary variable, is insignificant for all event 
windows (Table 131, Appendix, p. 245). However, as the generic z’’-score as 
continuous variable, which is included in the basic model, shows a positive impact on 
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abnormal returns, it seems that financial distress of the seller is harmful for the 
shareholder value creation in divestiture transactions. This supports the ‘fire sale theory’ 
as described previously, which expects higher abnormal returns for healthy firms, due to 
a strong negotiation position. The result is in contrast to the majority of previous 
research. Only Wang (2000), for UK foreign divestitures, comes to the same results. 
Afshar et al. (1992), Lasfer et al. (1996), Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) and Gadad and 
Thomas (2005) for Europe, and Borde et al. (1998), Kiymaz (2003), as well as Clayton 
and Reisel (2013) for the US find a positive impact of financial distress on shareholder 
wealth creation. For Germany, Stienemann (2003) reports ambiguous results. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.560** 
(0.274) 
0.435* 
(0.223) 
0.715*** 
(0.229) 
0.613*** 
(0.201) 
LARGE 1.915*** 
(0.592) 
1.519*** 
(0.465) 
1.226** 
(0.505) 
1.134*** 
(0.426) 
STOCK -0.261** 
(0.252) 
-0.465** 
(0.200) 
-0.389* 
(0.205) 
-0.374** 
(0.178) 
ROA 0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
QUICK -0.053*** 
(0.017) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
DISTRESS_A -1.899*** 
(0.458) 
-1.094*** 
(0.393) 
-1.307*** 
(0.360) 
-0.864** 
(0.421) 
Cons 0.400* 
(0.211) 
0.306* 
(0.169) 
0.236 
(0.173) 
0.212 
(0.150) 
F-Statistic 5.91*** 5.17*** 19.65*** 16.24*** 
R² 0.262 0.244 0.174 0.176 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 99: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy 
(Announced) Incl. Controls 
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5.3.2.3 Multivariate Results – Regulatory Issues 
 
The effect of an involuntary motive for the selloff, i.e. when the selloff is either directly 
forced by antitrust authorities or indirectly by changes in the legislation or regulatory 
issues, disappears when controlling for other characteristics. Whereas the bivariate 
results indicated significantly lower abnormal returns for forced divestitures, the 
multiple regression only shows a significantly negative effect in the [0;1] event window 
at the 10% alpha level in a left-tailed test (Table 100). Hence, a negative effect, as 
expected for such transactions, cannot be reliably claimed. This differs from the results 
of Boudreaux (1975), Montgomery et al. (1984) and Meschi (2005), who find lower 
returns for involuntary divestitures, although the significance of their results is 
unknown. Stienemann (2003) comes to the same result for Germany and finds no 
difference in the abnormal returns between voluntary and involuntary selloffs. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.662** 
(0.284) 
0.493** 
(0.232) 
0.783*** 
(0.235) 
0.657*** 
(0.209) 
LARGE 1.933*** 
(0.584) 
1.509*** 
(0.457) 
1.185** 
(0.507) 
1.082** 
(0.423) 
STOCK -0.684*** 
(0.262) 
-0.547*** 
(0.209) 
-0.467** 
(0.214) 
-0.434** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.088*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
INVOLUNT -0.171 
(0.226) 
-0.135 
(0.236) 
-0.305 
(0.234) 
-0.261 
(0.218) 
Cons 0.313 
(0.221) 
0.256 
(0.178) 
0.192 
(0.181) 
0.187 
(0.155) 
F-Statistic 5.37*** 4.92*** 14.92*** 12.66*** 
R² 0.266 0.243 0.175 0.175 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 100: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Voluntariness of the Deal Incl. Controls 
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5.3.3 Multivariate Results – Use of Proceeds 
 
The way in which the proceeds of the asset sale are used still has a significant influence 
on abnormal returns when adding controls to the regression model. A joint test on the 
coefficients of the proceeds variable is significant for all four event windows. The 
announcement to pay out the proceeds to the shareholders in particular leads to 
significantly higher abnormal returns. Referring to a left-tailed test, the effect of the 
decision to retain or reinvest the proceeds is negative in the [0;1] and [-1;1] event 
windows compared to the case where the use of proceeds is unknown and significantly 
lower than the reduce debt sample in the [-1;1] event window (Table 101). The 
coefficient for using the proceeds to reduce debt is significantly negative in comparison 
to the cases where the intended use of proceeds is unknown in the [0] event window 
only, again referring to a left-tailed test.  
 
The results correspond to the author’s expectations that paying out the proceeds to the 
shareholders should be related to the highest abnormal returns and that retaining or 
reinvesting the proceeds is considered to be the least favourable option from a 
shareholder’s perspective. This is in line with the findings of Lang et al. (1995), Kaiser 
and Stouraitis (2001) and Bates (2005) who report a positive impact of the intention to 
pay out the proceeds to the seller’s shareholders, and also to the results of Lang et al. 
(1995) and Bates (2005) who additionally report an underperformance of firms retaining 
or reinvesting the proceeds versus firms using the proceeds to repay debt. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.747** 
(0.336) 
0.581** 
(0.272) 
0.947*** 
(0.270) 
0.814*** 
(0.243) 
LARGE 2.080*** 
(0.604) 
1.605*** 
(0.491) 
1.418** 
(0.565) 
1.266** 
(0.485) 
STOCK -0.621** 
(0.259) 
-0.503** 
(0.207) 
-0.441** 
(0.217) 
-0.413** 
(0.190) 
ROA 0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.150*** 
(0.028) 
-0.105*** 
(0.023) 
-0.043** 
(0.019) 
-0.034* 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.063** 
(0.032) 
0.040 
(0.028) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.023) 
PAYOUT 2.990*** 
(1.038) 
2.163*** 
(0.619) 
0.803 
(0.586) 
0.699 
(0.634) 
DEBT -0.434 
(0.307) 
-0.163 
(0.266) 
-0.283 
(0.278) 
-0.114 
(0.246) 
REINVEST -0.213 
(0.472) 
-0.421 
(0.358) 
-0.552 
(0.372) 
-0.614** 
(0.306) 
Cons 0.371 
(0.228) 
0.283 
(0.185) 
0.222 
(0.189) 
0.200 
(0.164) 
F-Statistic 7.13*** 11.20*** 17.10*** 9.97*** 
R² 0.289 0.264 0.188 0.192 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
UNKNOWN use of proceeds omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 101: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Use of Proceeds Incl. Controls 
 
As before, the interaction terms mostly show no effect on abnormal returns. Only the 
coefficient for the debt reduction term based on the financial condition of the sellers 
shows to be significantly positive in the [-1;0] event window in a right-tailed test (Table 
102). This could be interpreted as the higher the seller’s probability for financial 
distress, the lower the abnormal returns if the proceeds are used to pay down debt. 
Hence, the finding is in contrast to Lang et al. (1995) who report higher abnormal 
returns for distressed firms using the proceeds to reduce debt, but in line with Brown et 
al. (1995) who find a negative effect for distressed firms if the proceeds are used to 
repay debt.  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.669* 
(0.342) 
0.519* 
(0.277) 
0.910*** 
(0.272) 
0.778*** 
(0.247) 
LARGE 2.107*** 
(0.603) 
1.628*** 
(0.488) 
1.412** 
(0.578) 
1.264** 
(0.496 
STOCK -0.654** 
(0.262) 
-0.541** 
(0.209) 
-0.455** 
(0.220) 
-0.437** 
(0.193) 
ROA 0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.165*** 
(0.032) 
-0.109*** 
(0.027) 
-0.050** 
(0.024) 
-0.035 
(0.022) 
ZSCORE 0.076** 
(0.034) 
0.043 
(0.030) 
0.047* 
(0.027) 
0.030 
(0.025) 
PAYOUT 3.180*** 
(1.069) 
2.244*** 
(0.610) 
0.910 
(0.613) 
0.742 
(0.671) 
DEBT -0.750* 
(0.449) 
-0.524 
(0.349) 
-0.391 
(0.429) 
-0.314 
(0.337) 
DEBT*ZSCORE 0.165 
(0.174) 
0.184 
(0.113) 
0.057 
(0.140) 
0.101 
(0.093) 
REINVEST -0.515 
(0.528) 
-0.503 
(0.402) 
-0.647 
(0.405) 
-0.643* 
(0.332) 
MTB -0.041 
(0.070) 
-0.012 
(0.059) 
-0.034 
(0.063) 
-0.014 
(0.057) 
REINVEST*MTB 0.069 
(0.075) 
0.027 
(0.062) 
0.041 
(0.067) 
0.016 
(0.059) 
Cons 0.470* 
(0.250) 
0.343* 
(0.206) 
0.302 
(0.213) 
0.256 
(0.191) 
F-Statistic 5.39*** 9.57*** 17.37*** 8.02*** 
R² 0.299 0.273 0.189 0.195 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
UNKNOWN use of proceeds omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 102: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Use of Proceeds and Interaction Terms Incl. Controls 
 
The finding corresponds to the argumentation that in the case of serious financial 
distress, using the proceeds to repay debt could be perceived as a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to debtholders and thus leads to a negative reaction of the stock market. 
Regarding the interaction term for the option of retaining or reinvesting the proceeds 
and the growth perspectives of the sellers, multicollinearity prevents eventual 
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significant findings. Hence, the interaction terms seem to have no explanatory power 
regarding the abnormal returns. 
 
 
5.3.4 Multivariate Results – Transparency 
 
The multivariate results regarding the transparency variables support the bivariate 
findings. The only observed significances are for the announcement of the transaction 
price in the [0;1] event window (positive) in a right-tailed test (Table 103), the 
announcement of the deal purpose (negative) in the [0] event window (Table 132, 
Appendix, p. 246), and the use of proceeds in the [0;1] and [-1;1] event windows 
(negative) in a left-tailed test (Table 133, Appendix, p. 247). Announcing a possible 
book effect (Table 134, Appendix, p. 248) or the form of consideration (Table 135, 
Appendix, p. 249) has no significant effect on the abnormal returns. Hence, as 
significant effects are quite exceptional and, furthermore, even the signs of the 
coefficients change between the different event windows, an influence of the 
transparency of the deal cannot be claimed. The finding somewhat contrasts with 
previous research since the majority of researchers report a positive influence of 
transparency on abnormal returns (cf. Klein, 1986; Sicherman and Pettway, 1992; 
Afshar et al., 1992; Sentis, 1996; Eichinger, 2001; Ostrowski, 2007). However, the 
result is in line with Stienemann (2003) and Bartsch (2005) for Germany and also 
Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995) for Europe.  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.630** 
(0.284) 
0.542** 
(0.233) 
0.787*** 
(0.237) 
0.718*** 
(0.210) 
LARGE 1.924*** 
(0.586) 
1.526*** 
(0.458) 
1.218** 
(0.500) 
1.128*** 
(0.418) 
STOCK -0.677** 
(0.267) 
-0.529** 
(0.213) 
-0.488** 
(0.217) 
-0.440** 
(0.191) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.127*** 
(0.027) 
-0.091*** 
(0.024) 
-0.036* 
(0.020) 
-0.030 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.070** 
(0.031) 
0.048* 
(0.027) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
UNKNOWN -0.226 
(0.335) 
-0.148 
(0.306) 
0.412 
(0.293) 
0.344 
(0.277) 
PRICE_A 0.061 
(0.256) 
-0.241 
(0.237) 
0.304 
(0.234) 
0.015 
(0.223) 
Cons 0.293 
(0.256) 
0.415* 
(0.229) 
-0.083 
(0.223) 
0.104 
(0.207) 
F-Statistic 5.06*** 5.07*** 12.39*** 10.73*** 
R² 0.268 0.245 0.178 0.178 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
Price NOT_ANNOUNCED omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 103: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Transaction Price Incl. Controls 
 
 
5.3.5 Multivariate Results – Participation in the Buyer’s Value Creation 
Potential 
 
Although an expected positive effect in the case of a strategic fit between the asset sold 
and the buyer, i.e. if the asset sold is operating in the same four-digit industry as the 
buyer, can be observed in all event windows, the coefficient is only significantly 
positive in the [-1;0] event window in a right-tailed test (Table 104).  
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.682** 
(0.285) 
0.515** 
(0.230) 
0.812*** 
(0.236) 
0.687*** 
(0.207) 
LARGE 1.966*** 
(0.585) 
1.550*** 
(0.455) 
1.224** 
(0.514) 
1.129*** 
(0.426) 
STOCK -0.669*** 
(0.252) 
-0.524** 
(0.201) 
-0.451** 
(0.206) 
-0.411** 
(0.180) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.027) 
-0.088*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.019) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.046* 
(0.026) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.021) 
FIT 0.197 
(0.324) 
0.314 
(0.242) 
0.158 
(0.265) 
0.273 
(0.229) 
Cons 0.239 
(0.205) 
0.151 
(0.170) 
0.118 
(0.175) 
0.083 
(0.151) 
F-Statistic 5.98*** 5.13*** 14.70*** 11.63*** 
R² 0.268 0.249 0.175 0.180 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 104: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer Incl. Controls 
 
Combining an increase in the corporate industrial focus and the relatedness of buyer and 
seller in one categorical variable, a certain influence on the abnormal returns can be 
observed (Table 105). A joint test on the coefficients of this variable shows significant 
results for the [-1;0] and [-1;1] event windows. Divestitures increasing the corporate 
industrial focus of the seller to a buyer with a strategic fit to the assets sold outperform 
selloffs of related assets to buyers that are not related to the disposed asset. Also, sellers 
that increase their corporate industrial focus, but sell the assets to a buyer that is not 
operating in the industry as the asset disposed, outperform non-focus-increasing sellers. 
The coefficient is, however, smaller. Hence, a certain influence of a strategic fit 
between asset disposed and buyer cannot be rejected, which supports the findings of 
John and Ofek (1995) and Clubb and Stouraitis (2002). However, the results have to be 
considered with caution as they are only significant in some event windows. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.621** 
(0.266) 
0.477** 
(0.219) 
0.754*** 
(0.222) 
0.643*** 
(0.198) 
LARGE 1.950*** 
(0.596) 
1.593*** 
(0.449) 
1.213** 
(0.516) 
1.164*** 
(0.421) 
STOCK -0.668*** 
(0.248) 
-0.534*** 
(0.197) 
-0.452** 
(0.202) 
-0.420** 
(0.177) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.029** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.138*** 
(0.030) 
-0.098*** 
(0.024) 
-0.046** 
(0.022) 
-0.038* 
(0.020) 
ZSCORE 0.082** 
(0.034) 
0.055** 
(0.028) 
0.053** 
(0.026) 
0.042* 
(0.023) 
FOCUS_NOFIT 0.076 
(0.228) 
0.404** 
(0.193) 
0.095 
(0.191) 
0.365** 
(0.171) 
FOCUS_FIT 0.836 
(0.581) 
0.939** 
(0.445) 
0.446 
(0.503) 
0.923** 
(0.442) 
NOFOCUS_FIT -0.209 
(0.371) 
0.213 
(0.271) 
-0.217 
(0.280) 
0.118 
(0.226) 
Cons 0.193 
(0.201) 
-0.060 
(0.177) 
0.063 
(0.203) 
-0.109 
(0.169) 
F-Statistic 4.58*** 4.34*** 12.57*** 10.26*** 
R² 0.282 0.271 0.196 0.208 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
NOFOCUS_NOFIT 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 105: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Combination of Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer 
and Increase in Focus Incl. Controls 
 
 
5.3.6 Multivariate Results – Type of Buyer 
 
Distinguishing between the different types of buyers, i.e. strategic buyers, financial 
buyers or own management, only the event windows [0] and [-1;0] show significant 
differences (Table 106). Here, selloffs to financial investors underperform compared to 
those to strategic buyers which is in line with the author’s expectations. The significant 
outperformance of management buyouts towards selloffs to strategic investors 
disappears in the multivariate model, whereas the outperformance compared to financial 
investors remains. Whilst the finding regarding financial investors versus strategic 
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buyers can be explained by the argumentation presented in chapter three, the findings 
regarding management buyouts are unexpected and no reasonable rationale can be 
provided. The findings are also interesting when relating them to previous research. 
Whereas the result contrasts with to John and Ofek (1995), who find support for their 
hypothesis and report higher abnormal returns for financial investors, Ostrowski (2007) 
cannot support that for the German market. Stienemann (2003) and Bartsch (2005) do 
not find that sellers receive higher abnormal returns in the case of strategic buyers. 
Regarding management buyouts, Hite and Vetsuypens (1989), as well as Stouraitis 
(2003), find neither superior nor inferior performance. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.690** 
(0.294) 
0.528** 
(0.240) 
0.770*** 
(0.237) 
0.659*** 
(0.212) 
LARGE 1.961*** 
(0.607) 
1.540*** 
(0.464) 
1.231** 
(0.543) 
1.128** 
(0.452) 
STOCK -0.678** 
(0.260) 
-0.547*** 
(0.208) 
-0.437** 
(0.213) 
-0.413** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.120*** 
(0.027) 
-0.081*** 
(0.023) 
-0.035* 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.064** 
(0.029) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.029 
(0.201) 
MBO 0.712 
(0.736) 
0.497 
(0.582) 
0.046 
(0.491) 
0.035 
(0.427) 
PE -0.458* 
(0.259) 
-0.366* 
(0.215) 
-0.168 
(0.211) 
-0.171 
(0.192) 
Cons 0.406* 
(0.239) 
0.337* 
(0.191) 
0.185 
(0.202) 
0.194 
(0.173) 
F-Statistic 5.67*** 5.16*** 13.78*** 11.59*** 
R² 0.279 0.255 0.176 0.176 
Observations 271 271 271 271 
SMALL deals omitted 
STRATEGIC buyer omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 106: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Type of Buyer Incl. Controls 
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5.3.7 Multivariate Results – Form of Payment 
 
Regarding the form of payment, the multiple regression confirms the bivariate results 
that no relationship between the form of payment and the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns can be observed (Table 107). The finding of no influence is in line with the 
findings of Kaiser and Stouraitis (1995), Slovin et al. (2005) and Brauer and Wiersema 
(2012), and in contrast to Stienemann (2003), who reports higher abnormal returns for 
cash deals and Hege et al. (2009), who report higher abnormal returns for share deals. 
Due to the structure of the data with a large proportion, where the consideration is 
unknown and otherwise majorly cash transactions, the results may be biased and should 
be regarded with caution. However, the variable PAYM, which distinguishes between 
the forms CASH, OTHER and UNKNOWN payments, also shows an insignificant 
effect (Table 136, Appendix, p. 250). Hence, an influence of the type of consideration 
cannot be proved. 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.673** 
(0.283) 
0.506** 
(0.231) 
0.807*** 
0.234 
0.681*** 
(0.206) 
LARGE 1.943*** 
(0.582) 
1.525*** 
(0.456) 
1.211** 
(0.508) 
1.111*** 
(0.424) 
STOCK -0.681** 
(0.262) 
-0.545*** 
(0.209) 
-0.462** 
(0.214) 
-0.430** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
CASH 0.026 
(0.220) 
-0.044 
(0.178) 
-0.020 
(0.191) 
-0.066 
(0.167) 
Cons 0.287 
(0.242) 
0.263 
(0.190) 
0.173 
(0.200) 
0.191 
(0.168) 
F-Statistic 5.45*** 4.89*** 14.22*** 11.99*** 
R² 0.266 0.243 0.174 0.174 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 107: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Form of Consideration Incl. Controls  
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5.3.8 Multivariate Results – Further Findings 
 
Likewise, the timing of the divestiture in respect to the current economic environment 
also shows to have no influence on the abnormal returns (Table 137, Appendix, p. 251). 
This finding is in contrast to the assumption of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and also the 
results of Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001). Whereas Alexandrou and Sudarsanam 
(2001) find higher abnormal returns for selloffs conducted during recessions, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992) theoretically predict lower abnormal returns for divestitures 
conducted during an industry- or economy-wide recession as assets would be highly 
illiquid in these times since the buyers with the highest value creation potential are 
likely to be in financial trouble themselves. The result additionally reveals that both, the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble as well as the financial crisis as consequence of the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers did not have any influence on divestiture performance. 
 
Looking at the type of asset, a joint test on the coefficients of this variable reveals a 
significant influence except for the [0;1] event window. Rights and also plants in 
particular are related to lower abnormal returns, whereas business units create the 
highest abnormal returns (Table 108).  
 
Also, changes in the systematic risk through the divestiture, measured by significant 
changes in the seller’s beta before and after the announcement, do not influence 
abnormal returns (Table 138, Appendix, p. 252). 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.626** 
(0.286) 
0.457** 
(0.233) 
0.769*** 
(0.240) 
0.637*** 
(0.212) 
LARGE 1.949*** 
(0.585) 
1.492*** 
(0.456) 
1.182** 
(0.510) 
1.057** 
(0.421) 
STOCK -0.656** 
(0.258) 
-0.537** 
(0.208) 
-0.460** 
(0.214) 
-0.435** 
(0.190) 
ROA 0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.124*** 
(0.028) 
-0.086*** 
(0.024) 
-0.036* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.066** 
(0.031) 
0.043 
(0.027) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
PLANT -0.596 
(0.376) 
-0.514 
(0.322) 
-0.281 
(0.389) 
-0.305 
(0.344) 
PROPERTY -0.335 
(0.404) 
-0.111 
(0.308) 
-0.102 
(0.291) 
0.018 
(0.250) 
RIGHTS -0.696* 
(0.403) 
-0.634** 
(0.259) 
-0.588** 
(0.253) 
-0.596*** 
(0.213) 
SUBSIDIARY -0.338 
(0.281) 
-0.167 
(0.225) 
-0.081 
(0.223) 
-0.009 
(0.197) 
UNKNOWN -0.698*** 
(0.230) 
-0.827** 
(0.344) 
-0.566 
(0.400) 
-0.734 
(0.612) 
Cons 0.564* 
(0.291) 
0.411* 
(0.232) 
0.268 
(0.231) 
0.231 
(0.196) 
F-Statistic 6.41*** 4.15*** 9.60*** 8.65*** 
R² 0.275 0.253 0.179 0.183 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
BU omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 108: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Type of Asset Sold Incl. Controls 
 
Indirect selloffs, i.e. if the selloff is conducted by a subsidiary and not by the ultimate 
parent itself, are related to significantly higher abnormal returns in the [0;1] and [-1;1] 
event windows in a right-tailed test. The p-values in the [0] and [-1;0] event windows 
slightly exceed 10% (Table 109). This finding may be related to the corporate focus 
hypothesis, i.e. through divestitures of assets that are only indirectly related to the 
ultimate parent, complexity can be reduced. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.746*** 
(0.283) 
0.563** 
(0.235) 
0.886*** 
(0.238) 
0.749*** 
(0.217) 
LARGE 2.007*** 
(0.587) 
1.570*** 
(0.460) 
1.276** 
(0.509) 
1.163*** 
(0.426) 
STOCK -0.678** 
(0.260) 
-0.542*** 
(0.207) 
-0.458** 
(0.212) 
-0.426** 
(0.186) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.132*** 
(0.030) 
-0.091*** 
(0.024) 
-0.040** 
(0.020) 
-0.031* 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.076** 
(0.032) 
0.048* 
(0.027) 
0.048** 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.022) 
DIRECT -0.300 
(0.242) 
-0.251 
(0.202) 
-0.334 
(0.213) 
-0.305 
(0.206) 
Cons 0.478* 
(0.281) 
0.395* 
(0.229) 
0.365 
(0.230) 
0.347 
(0.215) 
F-Statistic 5.52*** 4.95*** 13.71*** 11.74*** 
R² 0.270 0.247 0.181 0.182 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 109: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller/Target Degree of Relationship Incl. Controls 
 
Finally, between Germany and Switzerland, who represent the majority of the sample, 
no differences regarding the announcement effects can be detected (Table 110). 
Austrian divestitures alone seem to underperform both German and Swiss divestitures, 
but due to the small number of cases that represent the Austrian sample, the finding 
should be regarded with extreme caution. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.691** 
(0.277) 
0.498** 
(0.228) 
0.809*** 
(0.232) 
0.666*** 
(0.210) 
LARGE 1.930*** 
(0.579) 
1.461*** 
(0.456) 
1.194** 
(0.507) 
1.053** 
(0.424) 
STOCK -0.690** 
(0.269) 
-0.576*** 
(0.213) 
-0.469** 
(0.219) 
-0.455** 
(0.190) 
ROA 0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.130*** 
(0.030) 
-0.094*** 
(0.025) 
-0.038* 
(0.021) 
-0.033* 
(0.020) 
ZSCORE 0.073** 
(0.033) 
0.050* 
(0.028) 
0.045* 
(0.024) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
AUSTRIA -1.615*** 
(0.453) 
-0.797*** 
(0.233) 
-0.569 
(0.450) 
-0.183 
(0.138) 
SWITZERLAND -0.008 
(0.247) 
-0.152 
(0.197) 
-0.030 
(0.212) 
-0.142 
(0.190) 
Cons 0.312 
(0.230) 
0.307 
(0.186) 
0.180 
(0.186) 
0.218 
(0.161) 
F-Statistic 5.60*** 4.51*** 12.65*** 10.92*** 
R² 0.270 0.246 0.175 0.175 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
GERMANY omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 110: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller Nation Incl. Controls 
 
 
5.4 Summary of Research Results 
 
The following table (Table 111) summarises the findings of the thesis. Despite the 
overall effect, which is significantly positive in the cross-section, ‘+’ indicates a 
significantly positive effect on the abnormal returns, ‘-’ indicates a significantly 
negative effect and ‘’ indicates an insignificant or ambiguous influence on the 
abnormal returns. A ‘’ indicates a significant effect, which cannot be expressed in ‘+’ 
or ‘–’ due to the nature of the variable. 
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INVESTIGATION OBJECT HYPOTHESIS EXPECTED INFLUENCE RESULT 
Overall effect 1 + + 
Increase in industrial focus 2 + + 
Degree of diversification of focus 
increasing divestitures 
3 +  
Major restructuring/strategic shift 4 +  
Increase in geographic focus 5  - 
Financial distress 6 - - 
Involuntary divestiture 7 -  
Use of proceeds 8   
Using the proceeds to reduce debt based 
on the seller’s financial condition 
9/10   
Reinvesting the proceeds based on 
growth opportunities 
11   
Transparency 12 +  
Strategic fit 13 +  
Combination of increase in industrial 
focus and strategic fit 
14  
Type of buyer 15   
Form of payment 16   
Relative size 17 + + 
Growth opportunities 18 +  
Performance prospects 19 + - 
Profitability 20 + + 
Liquidity 21 + - 
Leverage 22 - - 
Probability of bankruptcy 23   
Economic environment –  
Type of asset –  
Systematic risk of the seller –  
Degree of relationship –  
Nationality of the seller –   
Table 111: Summary of Findings 
 
Inferences and conclusions relating to the research results presented in this chapter will 
be discussed within chapter 6.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Summary of Research 
 
The aim of the research was to analyse whether corporate divestitures in Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland create value for the divestor’s shareholders, i.e. if corporate 
divestitures are viable strategic options for managers of publicly traded companies. 
Furthermore, the aim was to identify and assess which factors influence shareholder 
value creation in corporate divestiture transactions in a positive or negative way. Those 
factors included not only characteristics related to the deal itself, but also characteristics 
related to the parties involved in the transactions. Through understanding the sources of 
shareholder value creation, this research is intended to help unlock shareholder value 
potential that is currently lost. 
 
The research is part of the field of capital market studies. Hence, the performance of 
corporate divestitures, i.e. the shareholder value creation, is evaluated based on changes 
in the market capitalisation of the divestor immediately at the announcement of the 
transaction using event study methodology. In contrast to the German speaking market, 
where only a small number of studies exist, which often suffer from small samples, 
there has been substantial research undertaken on this topic for the US and also the UK 
markets. The results, which are described in an exhaustive literature review, show that 
in these markets corporate divestitures are shareholder value-creating corporate 
activities. The average abnormal returns reach from 0.20% to 3.55% in selloff 
transactions and from 1.32% to 5.56% in spinoff transactions, which shows a slight 
outperformance of spinoffs compared to selloffs. Moreover, US transactions seem to 
yield higher abnormal returns than UK or continental European transactions. Regarding 
factors influencing the magnitude of shareholder value creation, previous research 
shows that the disposal of assets unrelated to the divestor’s core business in particular, 
as well as the disposed assets’ size in relation to the size of the divestor, influence the 
abnormal returns positively. Financial distress and the disclosure of the transaction 
details are related to positive announcement effects. Moreover, significant influences on 
the magnitude of the abnormal returns are often reported for the intended use of 
proceeds and agency variables. Regarding other characteristics such as the divestor’s 
operating performance, the empirical evidence is ambiguous.  
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In order to answer the research questions, a unique sample of corporate selloffs and 
spinoffs conducted between 2000 and 2014 was drawn from the SDC Platinum 
database. After some adjustments related to the research methodology, the final sample 
consisted of 290 selloff and 22 spinoff cases conducted by publicly traded companies 
from Austria, Germany and Switzerland. To assess the performance of the individual 
divestiture cases, the crucial point was the isolation of the pure effect of the divestiture 
from effects unrelated to the divestiture itself. The aforementioned event study 
methodology, which constitutes the central research element, provides the solution for 
this issue. The event study methodology is based on the assumption of information 
efficient capital markets in the semi-strong form, i.e. stock prices adjust immediately to 
new information. This allows assessing the shareholder value creation of divestiture 
transactions by examining the changes in the stock price of the seller immediately at the 
first public announcement. However, the stock prices would probably also change 
independently from the divestiture announcement, for example, due to market-wide 
swings. Hence, the gross change has to be adjusted by the return that would have been 
expected without the event to obtain the net change (abnormal return) that can be 
attributed to the divestiture itself. Therefore, the market model was applied where the 
gross change is adjusted by the proportion of the return that is related to market-wide 
movements. In a second step following the event studies, a regression analysis was 
applied to analyse the factors influencing the magnitude of the abnormal returns. 
 
 
6.2 Overview of Results and Policy Recommendations 
 
The findings of this research support previous evidence in respect to the overall effect of 
corporate divestitures. Hence, policy makers, i.e. management of companies, should 
regard divestitures as a viable strategic option and should make use of this instrument 
more proactively and from a position of strength to develop their business and increase 
the value of the firm. Thereby, the findings of the research should be considered in 
order to maximise the scope for shareholder value creation. The results of this research 
helping policy makers are summarised hereinafter. 
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Divestitures Create Shareholder Value 
The results of the research show that also in the D-A-CH region, corporate divestitures 
are value-creating corporate activities. For selloffs, the abnormal return averages a 
highly significant 1.25% at the day of the announcement and also in several other event 
windows surrounding the announcement, the abnormal returns are constantly positive 
and range between 1.24% in the [-1;0] event window and 1.88% in the [-3;3] event 
window. Also, the proportion of selloffs that create shareholder value is significantly 
positive with 58.97% on the announcement date, just as the absolute abnormal return, 
which averages 57.48 million Euros on the same day. The abnormal returns for the 
spinoff sample show the same positive result. However, due to the small sample size, no 
parametric significance tests were undertaken. A sign test on the proportion of positive 
abnormal returns reveals a significant positive influence in the [-1;0] and [-1;1] event 
windows, but not on the announcement date itself. The abnormal returns average 0.95% 
on the announcement day and 1.92% respectively 2.78% in the commonly reported [-
1;0] and [-1;1] event windows. Hence, the results are in line with previous research in 
the US and UK and confirm the positive effects on shareholder value for Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland. A further analysis of factors influencing the magnitude of 
the abnormal returns was only undertaken for the sample of selloffs since the spinoff 
sample was too small to draw any statistically valid inferences.  
 
Relative Size of the Deal is the Most Important Factor 
As in previous studies, the relative size of the divestiture transaction in particular shows 
to have a positive influence on the abnormal returns; the higher the proportion of the 
deal value in relation to the market value of the seller, i.e. the more radical the 
restructuring, the higher are the abnormal returns. This result should encourage 
managers to be more open towards corporate divestitures. In contrast to the stigma that 
clings to divestitures (signal of weakness or failure), they, in fact, create significant 
value. 
 
Strong Sellers Receive Higher Abnormal Returns 
Regarding the characteristics of the seller, its financial situation in particular has an 
impact on the success of the divestitures. The results can, however, not be generalised, 
but have to be differentiated as follows: the profitability of the seller, which is 
represented by the return on assets, shows a positive influence on the abnormal return. 
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Likewise, the z’’-score as an indicator of financial distress reveals that a lower 
probability of bankruptcy influences the shareholder wealth creation positively. Both 
findings speak for a positive influence of a strong financial position of the seller, which 
may be caused by a good negotiation position in such cases. Contrary to that, the better 
the liquidity situation of the seller, proxied by the quick ratio, the smaller the abnormal 
returns. A rationale for this finding may be possibly emerging agency costs if the 
seller’s liquidity is already at a considerable level and the selloff may lead to even more 
excess cash that is not subject to monitoring by the shareholders. A negative outlook on 
the future performance, which is indicated by a negative stock market performance 
preceding the divestiture announcement, influences the abnormal returns in a positive 
way. This finding makes sense as well if the divestiture is expected to serve as an 
instrument to improve the performance prospects of the seller. The growth perspectives 
of the seller do not show to influence the abnormal returns in any way; the debt level 
shows a statistically significantly negative effect which is, however, economically 
insignificant. Hence, regarding the financial situation of the seller, managers can 
generate the highest returns for shareholders if the performance prospects worsen, but 
they can still act out of a position of strength. However, they should not have too much 
liquidity as shareholders may fear agency costs, which would lower the announcement 
gains. 
 
Concentration on Core Pays Off 
Looking at the deal characteristics, the research supports the often-reported finding that 
especially the disposal of assets that are unrelated to the seller’s core business 
significantly drive shareholder value creation. Referring to the resource-based view, this 
relationship appears to be reasonable as selling unrelated assets reduces eventually 
harmful unrelated diversification and allows transfer of the excess resources to markets 
close to the company’s core business. Also, agency costs through capital misallocations 
and cross-subsidisation can be mitigated in this way. The seller’s degree of 
diversification before the selloff is unrelated to the abnormal returns, which is 
unexpected for the researcher. The same is true if the announced purpose is a complete 
strategic shift, which can be seen as a more radical increase in the corporate focus. 
Connected to the argumentation regarding focus-increasing divestitures, it was also 
expected that selling assets to a buyer operating in the same industry as the asset 
disposed is viewed positively by the market because of the possibility to participate in 
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the value creation potential of the buyer. Although an isolated effect of an industrial fit 
between buyer and target cannot be shown, the results reveal that focus-increasing 
selloffs to buyers that fit the target obtain significantly higher abnormal returns than 
focus-increasing selloffs to buyers that operate in an industry unrelated to the target. For 
this reason, managers should chiefly divest assets that are unrelated to the company’s 
core business if they want to maximise the shareholder value created through this 
transaction. If possible, i.e. if they are able to act out of a position of strength, they 
should moreover rather sell to buyers that operate in the same industry as the disposed 
asset for the chance of participation in the buyer’s potential for synergies. 
 
In contrast to an increase in the corporate industrial focus, the increase of the corporate 
geographic focus is related to significantly lower abnormal returns than in the case of 
divestitures of domestic assets. The reason may lie in the view that the decreasing 
presence in foreign markets may either be seen as admission of a prior mistake or lead 
to a weakened competitive position towards internationally oriented peers. Thus, 
divestors should very carefully evaluate the divestiture of foreign assets or even the 
retreat from certain markets.  
 
Looking at divestitures that are conducted involuntarily, the expected underperformance 
cannot be proven. 
 
Distributing the Proceeds to Shareholders Drives Shareholder Value Creation 
The intended use of the sale proceeds also affects the abnormal returns. As expected, the 
distribution of the proceeds to the seller’s shareholders in particular is related to higher 
abnormal returns than the other forms. The results regarding the other forms are not as 
robust since significant differences can only be reported for some event windows. 
However, it appears that retaining the proceeds in the company to reinvest them in other 
projects would lead to lower abnormal returns than if the intended use of proceeds is the 
reduction of debt or even unknown. Interestingly, no effect of (1) the growth 
perspectives when reinvesting the proceeds, and of (2) the financial situation when 
using the proceeds to reduce debt, could be detected. Solely looking from a shareholder 
perspective, this result makes sense as the uncertainty about how the proceeds may be 
utilised disappears and it is the shareholders that can decide on their own. Yet, the 
management should carefully evaluate if it can afford a distribution of the proceeds to 
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the shareholders as, especially in a distressed financial situation, raising money through 
the capital market for investments or service debt may be very costly.  
 
The Market Regards Private Equity Investors Unfavourably  
The type of buyer also seems to play a role in explaining the abnormal returns. In the 
[0] and [-1;0] event windows, management buyouts and selloffs to strategic investors 
lead to higher abnormal returns than the sale to private equity investors. Due to the 
possibilities to create synergies, this result regarding strategic buyers was expected. The 
result regarding management buyouts, by contrast, was not anticipated as due to the 
threat of managerial self-dealing, they were rather expected to yield lower abnormal 
returns. Since it may be that the result is a coincidence due to the small sample of 
management buyouts, it should be treated with particular caution. 
 
No Influence of Deal Transparency and Economic Environment 
No influence on divestiture performance can be attributed to the transparency of the 
deal, i.e. if major transaction details are already reported at the announcement date, and 
also for the form of payment. Due to the limited substance of the data regarding these 
variables, the results also have to be considered with caution. Also, the timing of the 
divestiture in regard to the economic environment appears to have no influence on the 
abnormal returns. 
 
Despite these focus variables it appears that abnormal returns are lower if rights and no 
real assets are divested. Moreover, Austrian selloffs underperform their German and 
Swiss counterparts significantly, at least in the [0] and [-1;0] event windows. A change 
in the systematic risk of the seller due to the divestiture does not affect the abnormal 
returns. 
 
Table 112 compares the findings of this research with previous research in the D-A-CH 
region. 
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D-A-CH 
Löffler (2001) (-) +                 
Eichinger (2001) +       + - -         
Müller-Stewens et al. 
(2001) 
(+) (+)                 
Stienemann (2003) +  +    -  +          
Bartsch (2005) + -  +               
Ostrowski (2007) + +    + - +           
Prugovecki (2011) (+)                  
This research + + + + - -   -          
Key 
  Significant influence 
 No, ambiguous, or insignificant influence 
+ Significantly positive influence 
- Significantly negative influence 
(parentheses) Significance unclear 
Agency variables 
Long-term compensation plans, ownership structure, MBOs & managerial self-dealing, bank debt, agency 
costs of free cash flow… 
Others 
Industry, form of divestiture (i.e. horizontal, vertical etc.), capital market/macroeconomic development 
(boom, recession etc.) asset liquidity, takeover defence, life cycle stage, wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders, tax reforms, exchange rate changes, industrial classification of country… 
Table 112: Comparison of Research Results with Prior Research in the D-A-CH Region 
 
 
6.3 Limitations 
 
Despite all the care taken, the research results are subject to certain limitations. First, the 
main limitation is certainly that the results rely on the assumptions of the event study 
analysis, i.e. efficient capital markets in the semi-strong form and also the ability of the 
market model to explain the expected returns of an individual security. Although event 
study methodology seems to be the best method in order to assess the shareholder value 
effects of divestiture transactions and the results regarding the cross-sectional average 
should be robust, it may be that for certain cases the conclusions may be misleading. 
Second, the number of cases in the original sample had to be reduced due to different 
issues such as confounding news, ambiguous announcement dates or the lack of data. 
This prevented a further analysis of the factors influencing spinoff transactions. 
Regarding the still large selloff sample, the number of observations for specific 
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characteristics was too small to detect statistically reliable results. Third, some analysed 
characteristics rely on management announcements. As they may be biased, these 
results should be considered with particular caution. Due to these limitations, there is 
still some scope for future research in this topic regarding the D-A-CH region. Larger 
samples could improve the data and the number of observations regarding specific deal 
characteristics. This would not only allow further improvement of the results regarding 
selloff transactions but also enable a deeper analysis of the results regarding spinoffs or 
even other forms such as equity carve-outs as well. Also, collecting data on an ongoing 
basis over several years, instead of an ex post collection via financial databases, should 
improve the quality of the sample and reduce missing data. In this regard, the 
elimination of many cases due to confounding news could be mitigated if the event 
studies are conducted on an intraday rather than on a daily basis. Moreover, access to 
private information, as for example the deal multiples, could contribute to being able to 
increase the proportion of the variation in the abnormal returns that can be explained. So 
far, only a certain proportion of the abnormal returns can explained. Similarly, other 
techniques for multivariate analyses, for example quantile regressions, may provide 
further insights into the origins of shareholder value creation in corporate divestiture 
transactions.  
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Appendix 
 
A Overview Spinoff Sample 
 
Sample 
No. 
Announcement 
Year Parent Target 
1 2014 E On SE E ON SE-Fossil Fuel Assets 
2 2014 Allgemeine Baugesellschaft-A 
Porr AG 
PIAG Immobilien AG 
3 2014 Conzzeta Holding AG Plazza AG 
4 2014 Walter Meier AG WM Technologie AG 
5 2014 Immofinanz AG BUWOG AG 
6 2013 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Deutsche Lufthansa-Miles&More 
7 2012 Siemens AG OSRAM Licht AG 
8 2012 Metall ZUG AG Zug Estates Holding AG 
9 2012 Zeal Network SE Tipp24 SE-Lotto24 Lottery 
Business 
10 2011 Rieter Holding AG Autoneum Holding AG 
11 2010 Envio AG Bebra Biogas Holding AG 
12 2009 Oppmann Immobilien AG Sektkellerei J. Oppmann AG/New 
13 2008 Jelmoli Holding AG Jelmoli-Investment Business 
14 2008 Cham Paper Group Holding AG Hammer Retex AG 
15 2007 Sattler & Partner AG Immovaria Real Estate AG 
16 2006 Gurit Holding AG Medisize Holding AG 
17 2005 BWT AG Christ Water Technology AG 
18 2005 EMS-Chemie Holding AG Dottikon ES Holding AG 
19 2004 Bayer AG Lanxess AG 
20 2003 Hypo Vereinsbank AG Hypo Real Estate Holding AG 
21 2001 Depfa Deutsche Pfandbrief Bank DEPFA Bank AG 
22 2001 Sulzer AG Sulzer Medica AG 
Table 113: Overview Spinoff Sample 
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B Overview Selloff Sample 
 
Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
1 2002 RWE AG Mineraloel Polska Sp zoo 
2 2002 Max Automation AG Stefan Nau GmbH(MAX Holding) 
3 2002 E On SE SKW Gelatin & Specialties 
4 2002 Nestle AG Food Ingredients Specialities SA 
5 2002 Daimler AG DaimlerChrysler Capital Services-
Portfolio 
6 2002 Bayer AG Bayer Pharma-Generic Operations 
7 2002 Infineon Technologies AG Infineon Tech-Gallium Semicon 
8 2002 Roche Holding AG Roche-Filgrastm & Pegrilgrastm 
9 2002 Siemens AG Unisphere Networks Inc 
10 2002 Roche Holding AG NBPL Investments 
11 2002 Hochtief AG Helfmann Park Complex-Assets 
12 2002 Babcock Borsig Balcke Cooling Products Group 
13 2002 ABB Ltd N ABB Ltd-Swedish Real Estate 
14 2002 Siemens AG Siemens-Engineering Units(7) 
15 2002 Hucke AG Basler GmbH 
16 2002 Roche Holding AG Roche Holding AG-Vitamins 
17 2002 Zimmer Switzerland Holdings 
LLC 
Centerpulse-Intratherapeutics 
18 2002 Pfleiderer AG Pfleiderer-Insulation Technology 
Business 
19 2002 ABB Ltd N ABB Ltd-Metering Business 
20 2002 Clariant AG Clariant AG-European Emulsions 
Business 
21 2002 Novartis AG Novartis AG-Food & Beverage 
22 2002 Bayer AG Bayer-Household Insecticide 
Business 
23 2002 Celanese GmbH Trespaphan GmbH(Celanese AG) 
24 2002 Zimmer Switzerland Holdings 
LLC 
Centerpulse-Hearth Valve 
Business 
25 2002 Clariant AG Clariant Intl.-Hydrosulphite 
Operations 
26 2003 Draegerwerk AG & Company 
KGaA 
Drager Aerospace GmbH 
27 2003 Philipp Holzmann AG Ast-Holzmann GmbH 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
28 2003 LEICA GEOSYSTEMS  
HOLDINGS AG 
Leica Vectronix AG 
29 2003 Nestle AG Avidesa SA-Ice Cream Factory 
30 2003 Novartis AG Novatis AG-Fiorinal Brands 
31 2003 Deutsche Telekom AG TeleCash Kommunikations Service 
GmbH 
32 2003 Schwarz Pharma AG Schwarz Pharma-Niferex Product 
Line 
33 2003 Ta Triumph-Adler AG TA Triumph-Adler AG-Remaining 
Portfolio 
34 2003 ABB Ltd N ABB Gebaeudetechnik GmbH 
35 2003 Nestle AG Nestle Prepared-Ortega Brand 
36 2003 Siemens AG Siemens Med-Life Support 
37 2003 Babcock Borsig BBP Service GmbH 
38 2003 RWE AG Npower-Voice Telephony 
39 2003 Celanese GmbH Celanese AG-Acrylates Business 
40 2003 Dinkelacker AG Dinkelacker-Schwaben Braeu 
41 2003 Curasan AG curasan AG-Pharmasparte AINS 
42 2003 Roche Holding AG Roche Holding AG-Zenapax Right 
43 2003 Eurobike AG Hein Gericke Deutschland GmbH 
44 2003 ABB Ltd N ABB Ltd-Oil Gas Petrochemicals 
45 2003 BASF SE BASF AG-Agricultural Soil 
46 2003 Daimler AG MTU Aero Engines GmbH 
47 2003 Philipp Holzmann AG JA Jones Inc-Military Housing 
48 2003 ABB Ltd N Sirius Insurance Co(ABB Asea) 
49 2003 Philipp Holzmann AG Lockwood Greene Engineers Inc 
50 2003 GEA Group AG Rapidcharge Frigofrance SAS 
51 2003 RWE AG RSB LOGISTIC Projektspedition 
52 2004 Actelion Limited Hesperion Ltd 
53 2004 Roche Holding AG Hoffman-Soriatane Rights 
54 2004 Merck KGaA VWR International Group 
55 2004 Pfleiderer AG Newmark International Inc 
56 2004 Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Heidelberg Digital LLC 
57 2004 Linde AG Linde AG-Refrigeration 
58 2004 Nestle AG Goplana 
59 2004 GEA Group AG Dynamit Nobel AG 
60 2004 Adecco SA Jobpilot AG 
61 2004 Infineon Technologies AG Infineon Tech AG-Fiber Optics 
62 2004 Roche Holding AG F Hoffman-Tasmar Rights 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
63 2004 4MBO INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTRONIC AG 
Jenimage Europe GmbH 
64 2004 Mikron Holding AG Axxicon Mould Technology BV 
65 2004 ABB Ltd N ABB KMT Waterjet Systems AB 
66 2004 Clariant AG Lancaster Synthesis UK 
67 2004 Roche Holding AG Roche Holding AG-OTC Business 
68 2004 Clariant AG AZ Electronic Materials 
69 2004 GEA Group AG Dynamit Nobel AIS GmbH 
70 2004 E On SE Graninge AB-Hydroelectric 
71 2004 Valora Holding AG Valora Hldg AG-Real Estate 
Properties 
72 2004 Clariant AG Clariant Polymer 
73 2004 Teles Informationstechnologie AG Teles AG-Webhosting Division 
74 2004 Bayer AG NPS BioTherapeutics Inc 
75 2005 Deutz AG Deutz AG-Marine Engine Service 
76 2005 Novartis AG Novartis AG-Brand Rights(2) 
77 2005 Merck KGaA Merck-Electronic Chem Business 
78 2005 RWE AG Amer Water Works Co-Ashbrook 
79 2005 Nobel Biocare Holding Ltd Entific Medical Systems 
80 2005 E On SE E ON Sverige-power plants(20) 
81 2005 Atevia N Web.de AG- Internetportal 
Business  
82 2005 Adidas AG adidas-Salomon AG-Salomon 
83 2005 E On SE Viterra AG 
84 2005 Ascom Holding AG Ascom Business Systems AG 
85 2005 Ascom Holding AG Ascom (Schweiz) AG-Network 
86 2005 Siemens AG Siemens AG-Mobile Phone 
Division 
87 2005 E On SE Ruhrgas Industries GmbH 
88 2005 Clariant AG Clariant (Acetyl Bldg Blocks) 
89 2005 Ascom Holding AG Ascom(Schweiz)AG-Transport 
90 2005 Primacom AG Multikable NV 
91 2005 UMS United Medical Systems 
International 
Pet Scans of America Corp 
92 2005 Duerr AG Schenck Process GmbH 
93 2005 118000 AG Varetis Solutions GmbH 
94 2005 Roche Holding AG Roche Holding AG-API Business 
95 2005 Porsche Automobil Holding SE CTS Fahrzeug-Dachsysteme 
GmbH 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
96 2005 Lanxess AG iSL Chemie GmbH & Co KG 
97 2005 Marseille Klinik Marseille-Kliniken AG-care 
98 2005 E On SE Simeo Srl 
99 2005 Lanxess AG Lanxess AG-Paper Chemicals 
100 2006 RHI AG Heraklith Baustoffe AG 
101 2006 Metro AG Metro AG-Praktiker DIY Stores 
102 2006 Siemens AG Siemens Swiss-certain assets 
103 2006 Hornbach Holding AG Hornbach Holding AG-DIY(7) 
104 2006 Ciba Holding AG Ciba Specialty Chemicals- 
105 2006 Pfleiderer AG Pfleiderer AG-Track Systems 
Business 
106 2006 Volkswagen AG Europcar International SA 
107 2006 Man SE MAN Roland Druckmaschinen AG 
108 2006 Ciba Holding AG Ciba Specialty Chem-Textile 
109 2006 Continental AG CTNA-OTR Tire Mnfr Facility 
110 2006 Clariant AG Clariant International AG- 
111 2006 Augusta Technologie AG ND SatCom GmbH 
112 2006 Infineon Technologies AG Infeneon Technologies-Munich 
113 2006 Ahlers AG Eterna Mode AG 
114 2006 RWE AG Obragas Holding NV 
115 2006 Xstrata PLC Xstrata Coal Au-Cook Coking 
116 2006 Bayer AG Bayer Healthcare-Diagnostic 
117 2006 Fuchs Petrolub AG LIPPERT-UNIPOL GMBH 
118 2006 Daimler AG DaimlerChrysler AG-German 
119 2006 Bayer AG Bayer CropScience AG-Certain 
120 2006 Linde AG Linde AG-US Air Separation 
121 2006 Lindner Holding Kgaa Lindner Holding AG-Business 
122 2006 RWE AG Thames Water PLC 
123 2006 Nestle AG Nestle SA-Tea Pot Brand Name 
124 2006 Thyssenkrupp AG ThyssenKrupp Budd Co-North 
125 2006 Ascom Holding AG Ascom Italia SpA 
126 2006 Otto Stumpf AG Otto Stumpf GmbH 
127 2006 Linde AG KION Group 
128 2006 Lanxess AG Lanxess AG-Textile Processing 
129 2006 Bayer AG HC Starck GmbH und Co KG 
130 2006 Xstrata PLC Normex 
131 2006 Evotec AG Evotec Technologies GmbH 
132 2006 Novartis AG Novartis Medical Nutrition 
133 2006 Bayer AG Wolff Walsrode AG 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
134 2006 Balda AG Albea Kunststoff-technik GmbH 
135 2006 Deutsche Telekom AG Viajar.com Viajes SL 
136 2007 Infineon Technologies AG sci-worx GmbH 
137 2007 Hochtief AG Hochtief AG-Westendduo Towers 
138 2007 United Internet AG twenty4help Knowledge Service 
139 2007 Altana AG Sangtec Molecular Diagnostics 
140 2007 Balda AG Balda-Heinze GmbH & Co KG 
141 2007 Henkel AG & Company KGaA Henkel KGaA-European 
Household 
142 2007 Linde AG Linde AG-Packaged Gas Business 
143 2007 Novartis AG Gerber Products Company 
144 2007 GEA Group AG Lurgi AG 
145 2007 Deutsche Telekom AG T-Online France SAS 
146 2007 Merck KGaA Merck KGaA-Generic Drugs 
147 2007 Xstrata PLC Xstrata Nickel-Nickel Exploration 
Properties(10) 
148 2007 Geberit AG Geberit International AG-PVC 
149 2007 Deutsche Telekom AG T-Online Telecommunications 
150 2007 Daimler AG Mitsubishi Fuso Truck & Bus-
Property Portfolio (184) 
151 2007 Heidelbergcement AG Maxit Holding GmbH 
152 2007 Kontron AG Kontron America-Mobile Rugged 
153 2007 ABB Ltd N ABB Lummus Global Inc 
154 2007 Lanxess AG Borchers GmbH 
155 2007 Evotec AG Evotec AG-Chemical 
Development 
156 2007 Heidelbergcement AG Symingtons 
157 2007 Stada Arzneimittel AG STADA Medical GmbH 
158 2007 Schuler AG Schuler AG-Goeppingen Plant & 
159 2007 aligna DeltaSelect GmbH-Generics 
160 2007 Sartorius AG Sartorius Bearing Technology 
161 2007 Deutsche Telekom AG T-Systems Media&Broadcast 
GmbH 
162 2007 Linde AG BOC Edwards Pharmaceutical 
Systems 
163 2007 Metro AG Metro AG-German Supermarkets 
164 2008 E On SE Karskar Energi AB 
165 2008 Thyssenkrupp AG Thyssenkrupp GmbH 
166 2008 Allgeier SE Allgeier DL GmbH 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
167 2008 Coltene Holding AG Medisize Medical 
168 2008 Fraport AG ICTS Europe Holding BV 
169 2008 Datacolor AG Eichhof Beverages 
170 2008 Solon SE Solon AG Fuer Solartechnik- 
171 2008 Kloeckner & Co SE Namasco Ltd 
172 2008 Bayer AG Bayer AG-Puteaux Properties(3) 
173 2008 Schweiter Technologies AG Satisloh Holding AG 
174 2008 Vossloh AG Vossloh Infrastructure Service 
175 2008 Nestle AG Nestle Au-Yogurt,Dairy Business 
176 2008 Kloeckner & Co SE Koenig Verbindungstechnik AG 
177 2008 Gerresheimer AG Gerresheimer AG-Technical 
178 2008 Roche Holding AG Roche Holding AG- 
179 2008 Bilfinger Berger SE Razel SA 
180 2008 Systaic Systaic AG-Solar Plants 
181 2008 Clariant AG Dick Peters BV 
182 2008 Datacolor AG Eichhof Real Estate 
183 2008 Volkswagen AG Volkswagen Caminhoes e Onibus 
184 2008 Metro AG Metro AG-Commercial Real 
185 2009 Xstrata PLC Xstrata Coal South America- 
186 2009 E On SE E ON AG-Hydro Power Plants(13) 
187 2009 Freenet AG freenet Breitband Services GmbH 
188 2009 Sedo Holding AdLINK Internet Media AG- 
189 2009 Infineon Technologies AG Infineon Tech-Wireline 
Communications Business 
190 2009 Lafargeholcim Ltd Holcim Ltd-Panama & Carribean 
Assets 
191 2009 E On SE Thuega AG 
192 2009 Deutsche Lufthansa AG British Midland Airways Ltd 
193 2009 Plenum AG DOM Digital Online Media GmbH 
194 2009 Biotest AG Biotest AG-Med Diagnostics 
195 2009 Sunways AG MHH Solartechnik GmbH 
196 2009 E On SE E.ON AG-High Voltage Network 
197 2009 Freenet AG Strato AG 
198 2009 Deutsche Telekom AG Deutsche Telekom AG-Office 
Complex 
199 2010 Hochtief AG maxCologne Building,Cologne 
200 2010 Augusta Technologie AG DLoG GmbH 
201 2010 Metro AG Metro AG-Shopping Mall Giessen 
202 2010 E On SE E.ON US LLC 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
203 2010 Kuros Biosciences Cytos Biotech-Platform 
Technology 
204 2010 Versat Versatel Kabel GmbH 
205 2010 Tecan Group AG REMP AG 
206 2010 Arcandor AG Afibel SAS 
207 2010 Infineon Technologies AG Infineon Technologies AG-
Wirelesssolutions Business 
208 2010 Metro AG Metro AG-Suppermarket(1) 
209 2010 Merck KGaA Merck KGaA-Theramex Business 
210 2010 Georg Fischer AG Charmilles-Production Site 
211 2010 Conergy AG Epuron GmbH-Wind Assets 
212 2010 Merck KGaA EMD/Merck Crop BioScience Inc 
213 2010 E On SE E.ON Rete Srl 
214 2010 Bilfinger Berger SE Valemus Ltd 
215 2010 Colexon Energy Colexon Italia-Solar Plants(3) 
216 2011 A-TEC Industries AG DST GmbH 
217 2011 Dorma Kaba Hold AG Kaba-Door Automation Business 
218 2011 E On SE Central Networks PLC 
219 2011 Biotest AG Biotest-Microbiology Business 
220 2011 3U Holding AG LambdaNet Communications AG 
221 2011 K + S AG Compo GmbH & Co KG 
222 2011 Mayr-Melnhof Karton AG Mayr-Melnhof Swiss Timber AG 
223 2011 E On SE E ON AG-Natural Gas Pipeline 
224 2011 Continental AG Phoenix Dichtungstechnik GmbH 
225 2011 Nestle AG Nestle Purina PetCare Company - 
Steel Can making Assets 
226 2011 Mensch Und Maschine Software Mensch&Maschine Software-
Distribution Business 
227 2011 BASF SE BASF-Fertilizer Prod Plant 
228 2011 K + S AG K+S-Nitrogen fertilizer Business 
229 2011 Bayer AG Viverso GmbH 
230 2011 Forbo Holding AG Forbo-Adhesives Operations 
231 2011 Pfleiderer AG Uniboard-MDF & Particleboard 
232 2012 Kontron AG Kontron Design Mnfr-Assets 
233 2012 Mybet Holding N JAXX SE-Lottery Business 
234 2012 Ascom Holding AG Ascom Holding AG-Defence Unit 
235 2012 OC Oerlikon Corp. AG Oerlikon Solar Holding AG 
236 2012 Alpiq Holding AG Alpiq Anlagentechnik-ETT 
237 2012 E On SE Open Grid Europe GmbH 
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Sample No. 
Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
238 2012 Metro AG Makro Self Service Wholesalers 
239 2012 Metro AG METRO-Kaufhof Stores(2) 
240 2012 Thyssenkrupp AG ThyssenKrupp-Color/Construction 
Division 
241 2012 Deutsche Rohstoff AG Deutsche Rohstoff Australia 
242 2012 Deutsche Post AG DHL International GmbH-Plant 
243 2012 Pfleiderer AG Pergo AG 
244 2012 Metro AG Metro-Eastern Europe Real(91) 
245 2012 OC Oerlikon Corp. AG OC Oerlikon-Natural Textiles 
246 2012 Morphosys AG MorphoSys AG-Serotec Research 
247 2012 Clariant AG Clariant AG-Businesses(3) 
248 2013 Daimler AG Daimler Buses North America-
Certain Assets 
249 2013 Nestle AG Nestle SA-Infant Nutritional 
250 2013 Hochtief AG Hochtief Airport GmbH 
251 2013 Kardex AG Kardex AG-Stow Division 
252 2013 Hochtief AG HOCHTIEF-Services Solutions 
253 2013 Informa PLC Informa PLC-Corporate Training 
Businesses (5) 
254 2013 Axel Springer AG Axel Springer-Regional Newspap 
255 2013 Glencore PLC Joe White Maltings Pty Ltd 
256 2013 Rhoen-Klinikum AG Rhoen Klinikum-Hospitals(40) 
257 2013 Glencore PLC Agricore United Holdings Inc 
258 2013 BASF SE BASF SE-Paints Division 
259 2013 Clariant AG Clariant-Det,Intermediates Bus 
260 2013 Baywa Registered AG BayWa renewableenergy GmbH-
Wind Park,Everswinkel 
261 2013 Siemens AG Siemens Water Tech Corporation 
262 2013 MSG Life AG COR&FJA Banking Solutions 
GmbH 
263 2013 RWE AG Electricity Plus Supply Ltd 
264 2013 Metro AG real,- SB-Warenhaus GmbH-Store 
265 2014 RWE AG RWE AG-Gas Power Plant 
266 2014 Sulzer AG Sulzer Metco AG 
267 2014 AAP Implantate AG EMCM BV 
268 2014 RWE AG RWE Dea AG 
269 2014 ABB Ltd N Thomas & Betts Corp-Heating 
270 2014 Thyssenkrupp AG ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems 
AB 
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Announcement 
Year Seller Target 
271 2014 GEA Group AG GEA-Heat Exchangers Business 
272 2014 ABB Ltd N Power-One Inc-Power Solutions 
273 2014 Clariant AG Clariant-Leather Services Unit 
274 2014 Bayer AG Bayer-Interventional Division 
275 2014 ABB Ltd N Thomas & Betts Corp-Meyer Steel 
276 2014 Heidelberger Druckmaschinen Heidelberger-Packaging Assets 
277 2014 Siemens AG Siemens AG-Health Info Tech 
278 2014 UMS United Medical Systems 
International 
United Medical Systems Inc 
279 2014 Deutsche Telekom AG Deutsche Telekom-Office 
Buildings (5) 
280 2014 Deutsche Post AG DHL Supply Chain Ltd- 
Distributionwarehouse 
281 2014 SAG Solarstrom AG SAG Solarstrom-Operating 
Business 
282 2014 BASF SE BASF India Ltd - Textile 
Chemicals 
283 2014 Clariant AG Clariant AG-Energy Storage 
Business 
284 2014 Lafargeholcim Ltd Holcim Ltd-Cement Operations 
285 2014 RWE AG RWE AG-Electricity Network 
286 2014 Sartorius AG Sartorius Mechatronics T&H 
287 2014 Nestle AG Nestle Mexico-Ice Cream 
288 2014 Bilfinger Berger SE Bilfinger-Construction Business 
289 2014 Heidelbergcement AG Hanson Building Products North 
America 
290 2014 Takkt AG Plant Equipment Group 
Table 114: Overview Selloff Sample 
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C Summary of Hypotheses 
 
INVESTIGATION OBJECT HYPOTHESIS 𝐻0 𝐻1 
Overall effect 1 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 > 0 
Increase in industrial focus 2 𝛽𝐼𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐴 = 0 
𝛽𝐼𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝑆 = 0 
𝛽𝐼𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐴 > 0 
𝛽𝐼𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝑆 > 0 
Degree of diversification of focus 
increasing divestitures 
3 𝛽𝑁𝑂2 = 0 𝛽𝑁𝑂2 > 0 
Major restructuring/strategic shift 4 𝛽𝑀𝐴𝐽_𝑅𝐸𝑆 = 0 𝛽𝑀𝐴𝐽_𝑅𝐸𝑆 > 0 
Increase in geographic focus 5 𝛽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 = 0 
𝛽𝑁𝑂𝑁_𝐸𝑈 = 0 
𝛽𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 ≠ 0 
𝛽𝑁𝑂𝑁_𝐸𝑈 ≠ 0 
Financial distress 6 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝐴 = 0 
𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑍 = 0 
𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝐴 < 0 
𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆_𝑍 < 0 
Involuntary divestiture 7 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑇 = 0 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈𝑁𝑇 < 0 
Use of proceeds 8 𝛽𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇 = 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = 0 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇, 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 
Using the proceeds to reduce debt based on 
the seller’s debt level 
9 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇∗𝐷𝐸 = 0 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇∗𝐷𝐸 ≠ 0 
Using the proceeds to reduce debt based on 
the seller’s degree of financial distress 
(z’’-score) 
10 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇∗𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 0 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇∗𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 ≠ 0 
Reinvesting the proceeds based on growth 
opportunities 
11 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇∗𝑀𝑇𝐵 = 0 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇∗𝑀𝑇𝐵 ≠ 0 
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INVESTIGATION OBJECT HYPOTHESIS 𝐻0 𝐻1 
Transparency 12 𝛽𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸_𝐴 = 𝛽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 = 0 
𝛽𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁_𝐴 = 0 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸_𝐴 = 0 
𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆_𝐴 = 0 
𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷_𝐴 = 0 
𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐴, 𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 
𝛽𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁_𝐴 > 0 
𝛽𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸_𝐴 > 0 
𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆_𝐴 > 0 
𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷_𝐴 > 0 
Strategic fit 13 𝛽𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 0 𝛽𝐹𝐼𝑇 > 0 
Combination of increase in industrial focus 
and strategic fit 
14 𝛽𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝑁𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇
= 𝛽𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 𝛽𝑁𝑂𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑇 = 0 
𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗
= 𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝑁𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇, 𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑇, 𝑁𝑂𝐹𝑂𝐶𝑈𝑆_𝐹𝐼𝑇
Type of buyer 15 𝛽𝑀𝐵𝑂 = 𝛽𝑃𝐸 = 0 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑀𝐵𝑂, 𝑃𝐸 
Form of payment 16 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 = 0 
𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 = 𝛽𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 = 0 
𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 > 0 
𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻, 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 
Relative size 17 𝛽𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀 = 𝛽𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸 = 0 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀, 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸 
Growth opportunities 18 𝛽𝑀𝑇𝐵 = 0 𝛽𝑀𝑇𝐵 > 0 
Performance prospects 19 𝛽𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 = 0 𝛽𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 > 0 
Profitability 20 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 0 𝛽𝑅𝑂𝐴 > 0 
Liquidity 21 𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾 = 0 𝛽𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾 > 0 
Leverage 22 𝛽𝐷𝐸 = 0 𝛽𝐷𝐸 < 0 
Probability of bankruptcy 23 𝛽𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 0 𝛽𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 > 0 
Economic environment – 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 = 0 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 ≠ 0
Type of asset – 𝛽𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇 = 𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑌 = 𝛽𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑆
= 𝛽𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌
= 𝛽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 = 0
𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗
= 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑌, 𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑆, 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌, 𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁
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INVESTIGATION OBJECT HYPOTHESIS 𝐻0 𝐻1 
Systematic risk of the seller – 𝛽𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 = 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸 = 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸
= 0
𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝑈𝑁𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁, 𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸, 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸
Seller/target degree of relationship – 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 = 0 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇 < 0
Nationality of the seller – 𝛽𝐴𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐴 = 𝛽𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝑍𝐸𝑅𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 = 0 𝛽𝑗 ≠ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑗 = 𝐴𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐴, 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑍𝑅𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 
Table 115: Summary of Hypotheses 
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D Deal related Information collected from SDC Platinum 
 
CATEGORY INFORMATION COLLECTED 
General Information SDC Deal Number 
 Date Deal was Last Updated in SDC Database 
 Sources of Deal Info  
Dates Date Announced 
 Date Effective 
 Date Withdrawn 
 Date of Target Financials 
Deal Specifics Deal Status 
 Deal Status Rollup 
 Deal Synopsis 
 Deal Purpose Code 
 Deal Purpose Code Description 
 Deal Purpose Test 
 Percent of Shares Acquired in Transaction 
 Percent of Shares Owned after Transaction 
 Regulatory Agencies Required to Approve Deal 
Deal Value Source used for Deal Valuation 
 Currency of Deal 
 Deal value as-of Date 
 Deal Value (Euro Mil) 
 Deal Value (Host Mil) 
 Deal Value at Effective Date (Euro Mil) 
 Deal Value at Effective Date (Host Mil) 
 Implied Deal Value (Euro Mil) 
 Implied Deal Value (Host Mil) 
 Analyst Estimated Value (Host Mil) 
 Ranking Value inc. Net Debt of Target (Euro Mil) 
 Ranking Value inc. Net Debt of Target (Host Mil) 
Consideration Value of Cash (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Cash (Host Mil) 
 Value of Common Stock (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Common Stock (Host Mil) 
 Value of Common Stock at Effective Date (Euro 
Mil) 
 Value of Common Stock at Effective Date (Host 
Mil) 
 Value of Convertible Debt (Euro Mil) 
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CATEGORY INFORMATION COLLECTED 
 Value of Convertible Debt (Host Mil) 
 Value of Convertible Preferred Stock (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Convertible Preferred Stock (Host Mil) 
 Value of Debt (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Debt (Host Mil) 
 Equity Value at Announcement (Euro Mil) 
 Equity Value at Announcement (Host Mil) 
 Value of Other Consideration (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Other Consideration (Host Mil) 
 Value of Stake Purchase (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Stake Purchase (Euro mil) 
 Value of Undisclosed Consideration (Euro Mil) 
 Value of Undisclosed Consideration (Host Mil) 
 Consideration Sought  
 Consideration Offered 
 Consideration Structure Description 
 Final Consideration Structure 
 Other Consideration 
 Number of Consideration Types Sought 
 Number of Consideration Types Offered 
Acquirer related Information Acquirer Name 
 Acquirer 6-digit CUSIP 
 Acquirer Macro Industry 
 Acquirer Mid Industry 
 Acquirer Primary SIC Code 
 Acquirer Nation 
 Acquirer Business Description (Short) 
 Acquirer Business Description (Full) 
 Acquirer Primary Ticker Symbol 
Target related Information Target Name 
 Target 6-digit CUSIP 
 Target Macro Industry 
 Target Mid Industry 
 Target Primary SIC Code 
 Target Nation Name 
 Target Business Description (Short) 
 Target Business Description (Full) 
 Target Ultimate Parent Business Description (Full) 
 Target Primary Ticker Symbol 
 Target Ultimate Parent Primary Ticker Symbol 
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CATEGORY INFORMATION COLLECTED 
Seller related Information Seller Ultimate Parent Name 
 Seller Ultimate Parent 6-digit CUSIP 
 Seller Ultimate Parent Macro Industry 
 Seller Ultimate Parent Mid Industry 
 Seller Ultimate Parent SIC Code 
 Seller Ultimate Parent Nation 
 Seller Immediate Parent Name 
 Seller Immediate Parent 6-digit CUSIP 
 Seller 6-digit CUSIP 
 Seller Macro Industry 
 Seller Mid Industry 
 Seller SIC Code 
 Seller Nation  
Table 116: Deal Related Information Collected from SDC Platinum 
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E Explanation of Variables 
 
VARIABLE EXPLANATION CHARACTERISTICS 
MOTIVE Indicates the motive of the transaction announced by the 
management 
Categorical variable with the manifestations IFOCUS_A for an increase in 
the corporate industrial focus, MAJ_RES if the divestiture is part of a major 
restructuring, INVOLUNT, if the divestiture was conducted due to changes 
in the legislation or regulatory pressure, RAISECASH if the transaction was 
conducted to finance an acquisition, UNDERPERF if the target was sold 
because it was underperforming or even loss making, SALE&LB if the 
transaction was a sale and lease back transaction, DISTRESS_A if the parent 
conducted the divestiture due to financial distress, BM if the sale belongs to 
the business model of the seller and UNKNOWN if the motive was not 
announced36 
   
IFOCUS_A Indicates an increase in the corporate industrial focus of the seller 
through the divestiture based on the announcement by the 
management 
Binary variable 
   
IFOCUS_S Indicates an increase in the corporate industrial focus of the seller 
through the divestiture based on the seller’s and target’s two-digit 
SIC Codes 
Binary variable 
   
NO2 Gives the number of two-digit SIC codes that are assigned to the 
seller 
Discrete variable from 1 to 7  
   
MAJ_RES Indicates a major restructuring or a complete strategic shift through 
the divestiture based on the announcement by the management 
Binary variable 
   
DISTRESS_A Indicates that the selloff is conducted due to financial distress based 
on the announcement of the management 
Binary variable 
   
DISTRESS_Z Indicates financial distress of the seller based on the z’’-score Binary variable 
   
                                                 
36 For the motives which are subject to a deeper analysis in this thesis, i.e. IFOCUS_A, MAJ_RES, INVOLUNT and DISTRESS_A, the author additionally generated binary variables based on the characteristics of the 
MOTIVE variable. 
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VARIABLE EXPLANATION CHARACTERISTICS 
INVOLUNT Indicates an involuntary divestiture due to regulatory issues or 
changes in the legislation based on the announcement of the 
management 
Binary variable 
   
FOREIGN Indicates if the asset sold is a foreign asset or a domestic asset Binary variable 
   
NON_EU Indicates if the asset sold is a non-European asset or an European 
asset 
Binary variable 
   
PROCEEDS Indicates the intended use of proceeds with the forms reduce debt 
(DEBT), retain/reinvest (REINVEST) or payout to shareholders 
(PAYOUT) 
Categorical variable with the manifestations DEBT if the proceeds are used 
to repay debt, REINVEST of the proceeds are retained/reinvested, PAYOUT 
if the proceeds are distributed to the shareholders and UNKNOWN otherwise 
   
PRICE_A Indicates if the transaction price is immediately announced by the 
management 
Categorical variable with the manifestations PRICE_A, 
NOT_ANNOUNCED, and UNKNOWN 
   
BOOKGAIN_A Indicates if a possible book effect of the transaction is immediately 
announced by the management 
Binary variable 
   
MOTIVE_A Indicates if the motive of the transaction is immediately announced 
by the management 
Binary variable 
   
PROCEEDS_A Indicates if the intended use of proceeds is immediately announced 
by the management 
Binary variable 
   
CONSID_A Indicates if the form of payment is immediately announced by the 
management 
Binary variable 
   
FIT Indicates if buyer and target operate in the same industry based on 
the four-digit SIC code 
Binary variable 
   
FOCUS_FIT Combination of the variables IFOCUS_S and FIT Categorical variable with the four manifestations FOCUS_FIT, 
NOFOCUS_FIT, FOCUS_NOFIT, NOFOCUS_NOFIT 
   
BUYER Indicates the type of buyer Categorical variable with the manifestations PE if the buyer is a private 
equity company, STRATEGIC if the buyer is a strategic buyer and MBO if 
the management acts as buyer 
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VARIABLE EXPLANATION CHARACTERISTICS 
CASH Indicates the form of payment Binary variable with the manifestations CASH if the form of payment is cash 
and NON_CASH otherwise. 
   
PAYM Indicates the form of payment (detailed) Categorical variable with the manifestations CASH if the form of payment is 
cash, OTHER and UNKNOWN 
   
RELSIZE Indicates the relative size of the deal in relation to the seller’s 
market capitalization 
Continuous variable 
   
SIZE Indicates the relative size of the real in relation to the seller’s 
market capitalization 
Categorical variable with the manifestations SMALL (relative deal value 
between 0% and 10%), MEDIUM (relative deal value between 10% and 
50%), and LARGE (relative deal value 50% or more) 
   
MTB Indicates the growth perspectives of the seller, proxied by the 
market-to-book ratio 
Continuous variable 
   
MTBD Indicates the growth perspectives of the seller proxied by the 
market-to-book ratio 
Categorical variable divided by MTB quartiles 
   
STOCK Indicates the positive performance prospects proxied by a positive 
buy-and-hold return of the seller’s stock in the estimation period 
Binary variable 
   
ROA Indicates the seller’s current performance, proxied by the return on 
assets 
Continuous variable 
   
QUICK Indicates the seller's degree of liquidity, proxied by the quick ratio Continuous variable 
   
QUICKD Indicates a quick ratio above one Binary variable 
   
DE Indicates the seller’s leverage, proxied by the debt/equity ratio Continuous variable 
   
ZSCORE Indicates if the seller is likely to become bankrupt within the next 
two years 
Continuous variable 
   
DIRECT Indicates if the relationship between seller and target is direct or 
indirect 
Binary variable 
   
SELLERNAT Indicates the nationality of the seller Categorical variable with the manifestations AUSTRIA, GERMANY, and 
SWITZERLAND 
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VARIABLE EXPLANATION CHARACTERISTICS 
   
BUYERREG Indicates the origin of the buyer Categorical variable with the manifestations EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, 
ASIA, OCEANIA, MIDDLE EAST, CENTRAL AMERICA, RUSSIA, 
SOUTH AMERICA, UNKNOWN, and AFRICA 
   
TARGETREG Indicates the origin of the target Categorical variable with the manifestations EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, 
ASIA, OCEANIA, CENTRAL AMERICA, and SOUTH AMERICA 
   
BETA Indicates a significant change (at the 5% alpha level) in the seller’s 
systematic risk (beta) following the announcement of the 
transaction37 
Categorical variable with the manifestations NO_CHANGE, INCREASE, 
DECREASE and UNKNOWN 
   
CYCLE Indicates the economic environment at the time of the 
announcement 
Binary variable with the manifestations BOOM and RECESSION 
   
ASSET Indicates the type of asset sold Categorical variable with the manifestations BU if the asset is a business unit, 
PLANT if the asset is a plant, PROPERTY if the asset is property, RIGHTS 
if rights are sold, SUBSIDIARY is the asset an independent entity, and 
UNKNOWN if the type of asset is not disclosed 
   
DV Indicates the deal value Continuous variable 
   
MV Indicates the seller’s market value 10 trading days prior to the 
announcement 
Continuous variable 
   
INDUSTRY Indicates the industry of the seller based on the ICB classification 
benchmark 
Categorical variable 
   
YEAR Indicates the year of the announcement of the transaction Categorical variable from 2000 to 2014 
Table 117: Explanation of Variables 
 
                                                 
37 The beta coefficients were estimated over a period of 200 trading days before and after the divestiture announcement. 
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F Supporting Content 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
ASIA -0.508 
(0.519) 
-0.299 
(0.392) 
-0.610 
(0.394) 
-0.448 
(0.338) 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
0.165 
(0.376) 
0.003 
(0.313) 
-0.253 
(0.474) 
-0.301 
(0.443) 
EUROPE 0.422 
(0.263) 
0.262 
(0.218) 
0.191 
(0.276) 
0.124 
(0.228) 
OCEANIA -0.103 
(0.314) 
-0.722** 
(0.321) 
-0.818* 
(0.453) 
-1.198*** 
(0.357) 
SOUTH 
AMERICA 
0.425 
(0.941) 
-0.676 
(0.652) 
-0.904*** 
(0.346) 
-1.534* 
(0.896) 
Cons 0.291 
(0.212) 
0.271 
(0.180) 
0.376 
(0.247) 
0.362* 
(0.200) 
F-Statistic 1.35 2.75** 4.62*** 4.56*** 
R² 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.029 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NORTH AMERICA omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 118: Regression of SCAARs on Target Region 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
AFRICA 0.803*** 
(0.161) 
-1.760*** 
(0.135) 
0.353** 
(0.160) 
-1.609*** 
(0.137) 
ASIA -0.762 
(0.643) 
-0.258 
(0.476) 
-0.146 
(0.566) 
0.109 
(0.465) 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
0.185 
(0.474) 
-0.157 
(0.297) 
-0.208 
(0.641) 
-0.405 
(0.491) 
EUROPE 0.604** 
(0.253) 
0.495** 
(0.204) 
0.344 
(0.221) 
0.335* 
(0.193) 
MIDDLE EAST 0.017 
(0.415) 
-0.488 
(0.470) 
0.375 
(0.488) 
-0.104 
(0.475) 
OCEANIA 0.231 
(0.349) 
0.217 
(0.401) 
-0.150 
(0.331) 
-0.081 
(0.401) 
RUSSIA -0.106 
(0.595) 
0.305 
(0.774) 
-0.615 
(0.586) 
-0.193 
(0.763) 
SOUTH 
AMERICA 
-0.365 
(0.674) 
0.218 
(0.552) 
-0.504 
(0.666) 
-0.024 
(0.602) 
UNKNOWN -0.468** 
(0.232) 
-0.898*** 
(0.151) 
1.617 
(1.238) 
0.860 
(0.974) 
Cons 0.312* 
(0.161) 
0.194 
(0.135) 
0.291* 
(0.160) 
0.216 
(0.137) 
F-Statistic Not reported38 Not reported Not reported Not reported 
R² 0.033 0.034 0.018 0.019 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
Africa omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 119: Regression of SCAARs on Acquirer Region 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
BOOKGAIN_A -0.016 
(0.536) 
0.120 
(0.426) 
-0.065 
(0.380) 
0.050 
(0.354) 
Cons 0.619*** 
(0.131) 
0.439*** 
(0.104) 
0.489*** 
(0.109) 
0.401*** 
(0.096) 
F-Statistic 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.02 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
No omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 120: Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of a Book Effect 
                                                 
38 Not reported to not be misleading. 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MOTIVE_A -0.350 
(0.350) 
-0.224 
(0.289) 
0.048 
(0.299) 
0.059 
(0.279) 
Cons 0.902*** 
(0.323) 
0.631** 
(0.268) 
0.444 
(0.27) 
0.357 
(0.262) 
F-Statistic 1.00 0.60 0.03 0.04 
R² 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
No omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 121: Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Motive 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
PROCEEDS_A 0.286 
(0.291) 
0.236 
(0.228) 
0.262 
(0.240) 
0.240 
(0.204) 
Cons 0.524*** 
(0.143) 
0.371*** 
(0.116) 
0.398*** 
(0.117) 
0.326*** 
(0.107) 
F-Statistic 0.96 1.07 1.19 1.38 
R² 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
No omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 122: Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
CONSID_A 0.274 
(0.254) 
0.127 
(0.203) 
0.169 
(0.209) 
0.084 
(0.185) 
Cons 0.487*** 
(0.173) 
0.388*** 
(0.134) 
0.403*** 
(0.146) 
0.365*** 
(0.124) 
F-Statistic 1.16 0.39 0.66 0.20 
R² 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
No omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 123: Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Form of Consideration 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
CASH 0.219 
(0.252) 
0.081 
(0.204) 
0.145 
(0.218) 
0.058 
(0.194) 
OTHER 0.799 
(0.907) 
0.566 
(0.676) 
0.406 
(0.354) 
0.332 
(0.295) 
Cons 0.487*** 
(0.173) 
0.388*** 
(0.134) 
0.403*** 
(0.146) 
0.365*** 
(0.124) 
F-Statistic 0.68 0.39 0.72 0.63 
R² 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 124: Regression of SCAARs on the Form of Consideration (Detailed) 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
2nd QUARTILE -0.563* 
(0.333) 
-0.336 
(0.270) 
-0.390 
(0.289) 
-0.266 
(0.251) 
3rd QUARTILE -0.119 
(0.380) 
-0.121 
(0.302) 
-0.253 
(0.293) 
-0.235 
(0.262) 
4th QUARTILE 0.187 
(0.389) 
0.114 
(0.303) 
-0.086 
(0.310) 
-0.081 
(0.275) 
Cons 0.739*** 0.536** 0.663*** 0.551*** 
F-Statistic 2.08 1.12 0.72 0.48 
R² 0.016 0.009 0.07 0.005 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
1st QUARTILE omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 125: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Market-to-Book Ratio (Quartile Dummies) 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
QUICKD 0.282 
(0.276) 
0.202 
(0.218) 
0.084 
(0.208) 
0.071 
(0.187) 
Cons 0.510*** 
(0.138) 
0.376*** 
(0.113) 
0.421*** 
(0.127) 
0.356*** 
(0.108) 
F-Statistic 1.04 0.86 0.16 0.14 
R² 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 
Observations 276 276 276 276 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 126: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Liquidity (Dummy) 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
2nd QUARTILE 0.144 
(0.456) 
-0.194 
(0.354) 
-0.311 
(0.364) 
-0.491 
(0.327) 
3rd QUARTILE -0.917*** 
(0.343) 
-0.678** 
(0.277) 
-0.888*** 
(0.298) 
0.748*** 
(0.265) 
4th QUARTILE -0.682* 
(0.373) 
-0.602** 
(0.299) 
-0.596* 
(0.321) 
-0.584** 
(0.279) 
Cons 1.021*** 
(0.322) 
0.851*** 
(0.251) 
0.946*** 
(0.270) 
0.876*** 
(0.239) 
F-Statistic 5.00*** 2.68** 3.78** 2.72** 
R² 0.044 0.027 0.034 0.032 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
1st QUARTILE omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 127: Regression of SCAARs on Seller Leverage (Quartile Dummies) 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
DIRECT 0.050 
(0.257) 
0.022 
(0.206) 
-0.016 
(0.216) 
-0.025 
(0.198) 
Cons 0.582*** 
(0.202) 
0.433*** 
(0.163) 
0.495*** 
(0.173) 
0.422** 
(0.163) 
F-Statistic 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 128: Regression of SCAARs on Seller/Target Degree of Relationship 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.666** 
(0.280) 
0.499** 
(0.230) 
0.806*** 
(0.233) 
0.678*** 
(0.207) 
LARGE 1.977*** 
(0.583) 
1.534*** 
(0.457) 
1.209** 
(0.509) 
1.096** 
(0.424) 
MTB 0.021** 
(0.100) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
STOCK -0.673** 
(0.260) 
-0.541** 
(0.208) 
-0.461** 
(0.214) 
-0.430** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.136*** 
(0.030) 
-0.091*** 
(0.025) 
-0.037* 
(0.201) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.077** 
(0.034) 
0.048* 
(0.029) 
0.044* 
(0.024) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
Cons 0.230 
(0.217) 
0.213 
(0.177) 
0.164 
(0.179) 
0.176 
(0.153) 
F-Statistic 5.25*** 4.84*** 14.33*** 12.00*** 
R² 0.270 0.244 0.174 0.174 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 129: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller Related Variables and Relative Size (Without 
Seller Leverage) 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.646** 
(0.280) 
0.479** 
(0.230) 
0.772*** 
(0.232) 
0.646*** 
(0.212) 
LARGE 1.920*** 
(0.578) 
1.497*** 
(0.453) 
1.178** 
(0.510) 
1.074** 
(0.424) 
STOCK -0.663** 
(0.266) 
-0.529** 
(0.211) 
-0.441** 
(0.214) 
-0.410** 
(0.190) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.073** 
(0.032) 
0.047* 
(0.027) 
0.046* 
(0.024) 
0.033 
(0.022) 
NON_EU -0.180 
(0.208) 
-0.153 
(0.183) 
-0.209 
(0.205) 
-0.189 
(0.199) 
Cons 0.329 
(0.210) 
0.281 
(0.171) 
0.201 
(0.177) 
0.197 
(0.152) 
F-Statistic 5.25*** 4.87*** 14.71*** 12.54*** 
R² 0.267 0.244 0.176 0.176 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 130: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Non-European vs European 
Incl. Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.606** 
(0.278) 
0.457** 
(0.227) 
0.764*** 
(0.229) 
0.644*** 
(0.204) 
LARGE 1.851*** 
(0.588) 
1.448*** 
(0.461) 
1.151** 
(0.507) 
1.052** 
(0.425) 
STOCK -0.655** 
(0.279) 
-0.515** 
(0.220) 
-0.447** 
(0.225) 
-0.408** 
(0.200) 
ROA 0.045*** 
(0.014) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.021** 
(0.009) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
QUICK -0.068*** 
(0.018) 
-0.051*** 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
DISTRESS_Z -0.359 
(0.295) 
-0.160 
(0.235) 
-0.228 
(0.272) 
-0.113 
(0.226) 
Cons 0.537** 
(0.263) 
0.374* 
(0.210) 
0.315 
(0.210) 
0.254 
(0.191) 
F-Statistic 4.71*** 4.83*** 14.31*** 13.07*** 
R² 0.253 0.233 0.166 0.167 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 131: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (z’’-
Score) Incl. Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.772*** 
(0.288) 
0.564** 
(0.236) 
0.803*** 
(0.244) 
0.667*** 
(0.217) 
LARGE 2.046*** 
(0.585) 
1.581*** 
(0.459) 
1.205** 
(0.508) 
1.092** 
(0.425) 
STOCK -0.687*** 
(0.259) 
-0.548*** 
(0.207) 
-0.461** 
(0.214) 
-0.428** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.128*** 
(0.029) 
-0.088*** 
(0.024) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.071** 
(0.033) 
0.045 
(0.029) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.021) 
PURPOSE_A -0.484* 
(0.276) 
-0.300 
(0.235) 
0.015 
(0.217) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
Cons 0.667** 
(0.262) 
0.474** 
(0.233) 
0.153 
(0.232) 
0.128 
(0.224) 
F-Statistic 5.33*** 4.91*** 13.94*** 11.94*** 
R² 0.274 0.248 0.174 0.174 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 132: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Motive Incl. Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.792** 
(0.323) 
0.585** 
(0.263) 
0.937*** 
(0.262) 
0.782*** 
(0.238) 
LARGE 2.164*** 
(0.614) 
1.670*** 
(0.494) 
1.452** 
(0.559) 
1.299*** 
(0.482) 
STOCK -0.681** 
(0.261) 
-0.544*** 
(0.208) 
-0.461** 
(0.213) 
-0.428** 
(0.187) 
ROA 0.039*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.126*** 
(0.028) 
-0.087*** 
(0.023) 
-0.034* 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.071** 
(0.032) 
0.044* 
(0.027) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.030 
(0.021) 
PROCEEDS_A -0.336 
(0.294) 
-0.234 
(0.243) 
-0.376 
(0.257) 
-0.305 
(0.230) 
Cons 0.354 
(0.224) 
0.284 
(0.181) 
0.228 
(0.188) 
0.215 
(0.164) 
F-Statistic 5.35*** 4.94*** 11.59*** 10.25*** 
R² 0.270 0.246 0.182 0.180 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 133: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Intended Use of Proceeds Incl. 
Controls 
 
Appendix 
248 
 
 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.699** 
(0.297) 
0.504** 
(0.239) 
0.833*** 
(0.239) 
0.685*** 
(0.209) 
LARGE 0.195*** 
(0.583) 
1.519*** 
(0.456) 
1.209** 
(0.506) 
1.102*** 
(0.422) 
STOCK -0.677** 
(0.263) 
-0.544** 
(0.209) 
-0.457** 
(0.214) 
-0.427** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.021) 
BOOKGAIN_A -0.190 
(0.461) 
-0.005 
(0.391) 
-0.208 
(0.364) 
-0.068 
(0.349) 
Cons 0.306 
(0.213) 
0.245 
(0.171) 
0.174 
(0.175) 
0.167 
(0.150) 
F-Statistic 5.43*** 4.91*** 14.48*** 12.05*** 
R² 0.267 0.243 0.175 0.174 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 134: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of a Book Effect Incl. Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.670** 
(0.283) 
0.503** 
(0.231) 
0.806*** 
(0.234) 
0.679*** 
(0.206) 
LARGE 1.939*** 
(0.580) 
1.519*** 
(0.455) 
1.208** 
(0.507) 
1.106*** 
(0.423) 
STOCK -0.680** 
(0.262) 
-0.544** 
(0.209) 
-0.162** 
(0.214) 
-0.430** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.130*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
CONSID_K 0.083 
(0.222) 
-0.001 
(0.179) 
0.002 
(0.188) 
-0.046 
(0.164) 
Cons 0.260 
(0.567) 
0.245 
(0.201) 
0.164 
(0.205) 
0.185 
(0.172) 
F-Statistic 5.38*** 4.86*** 14.25*** 12.07*** 
R² 0.267 0.243 0.174 0.174 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 135: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Announcement of the Form of Consideration Incl. 
Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.671** 
(0.284) 
0.504** 
(0.233) 
0.807*** 
(0.234) 
0.680*** 
(0.207) 
LARGE 1.955*** 
(0.584) 
1.534*** 
(0.458) 
1.215** 
(0.509) 
1.114*** 
(0.425) 
STOCK -0.681** 
(0.263) 
-0.545** 
(0.209) 
-0.462** 
(0.215) 
-0.430** 
(0.188) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.014) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.027) 
-0.088*** 
(0.023) 
-0.037* 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
CASH 0.053 
(0.225) 
-0.026 
(0.182) 
-0.010 
(0.196) 
-0.060 
(0.172) 
OTHER 0.366 
(0.617) 
0.245 
(0.459) 
0.124 
(0.296) 
0.089 
(0.234) 
Cons 0.262 
(0.256) 
0.246 
(0.200) 
0.164 
(0.205) 
0.185 
(0.173) 
F-Statistic 4.89*** 4.40*** 12.33*** 10.55*** 
R² 0.267 0.244 0.174 0.174 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
UNKNOWN form of payment omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 136: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Form of Consideration (Detailed) Incl. Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.695** 
(0.276) 
0.500** 
(0.229) 
0.793*** 
(0.231) 
0.651*** 
(0.205) 
LARGE 1.943*** 
(0.581) 
1.520*** 
(0.457) 
1.211** 
(0.506) 
1.106*** 
(0.422) 
STOCK -0.637** 
(0.271) 
-0.551** 
(0.218) 
-0.490** 
(0.220) 
-0.483** 
(0.193) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.129*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.038* 
(0.020) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
ZSCORE 0.073** 
(0.031) 
0.045* 
(0.026) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
RECESSION 0.190 
(0.257) 
-0.030 
(0.215) 
-0.123 
(0.216) 
-0.235 
(0.195) 
Cons 0.222 
(0.236) 
0.257 
(0.195) 
0.214 
(0.198) 
0.257 
(0.171) 
F-Statistic 5.84*** 4.91*** 13.87*** 11.87*** 
R² 0.268 0.243 0.175 0.178 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 137: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on Economic Environment Incl. Controls 
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 SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 0.667** 
(0.285) 
0.498** 
(0.233) 
0.807*** 
(0.233) 
0.678*** 
(0.209) 
LARGE 1.948*** 
(0.582) 
1.519*** 
(0.455) 
1.193** 
(0.503) 
1.088** 
(0.419) 
STOCK -0.677** 
(0.261) 
-0.541** 
(0.208) 
-0.455** 
(0.214) 
-0.423** 
(0.189) 
ROA 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
QUICK -0.130*** 
(0.028) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.034* 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
ZSCORE 0.072** 
(0.031) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
DECREASE 0.137 
(0.337) 
0.078 
(0.249) 
-0.218 
(0.281) 
-0.192 
(0.218) 
INCREASE -0.110 
(0.239) 
-0.101 
(0.243) 
-0.214 
(0.299) 
-0.195 
(0.309) 
Cons 0.394 
(0.212) 
0.246 
(0.174) 
0.213 
(0.177) 
0.207 
(0.154) 
F-Statistic 4.65*** 4.28*** 12.45*** 10.58*** 
R² 0.267 0.244 0.177 0.176 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
NO CHANGE omitted, UNKNOWN omitted because of collinearity. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 138: Multiple Regression of SCAARs on the Change in the Seller's Systematic Risk Incl. Controls 
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G Additional Information – Standardised Abnormal Returns 
 
YEAR N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
2002 25 0.622* 0.159 0.298* 0.016 
2003 25 0.660 0.567 0.718 0.667 
2004 24 0.406 0.260 0.359** 0.272 
2005 26 0.549 0.450 0.352 0.337 
2006 35 0.088 0.122 0.452* 0.416* 
2007 28 0.464* 0.151 0.291 0.094 
2008 22 1.640* 1.324* 0.714 0.714 
2009 12 0.675 0.298 0.396 0.177 
2010 16 0.204 0.222 -0.021 0.047 
2011 18 1.150 1.015 1.096 1.063* 
2012 16 0.852* 0.657*** 0.912 0.789* 
2013 18 1.414 1.147 0.758 0.739 
2014 25 -0.014 -0.009 0.199 0.164 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 139: Selloff SCAARs by Year 
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INDUSTRY N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Automobile & 
Parts 
10 -0.099 -0.027 -0.110 -0.055 
Basic Resources 9 0.378 -0.129 -0.217 -0.499 
Chemicals 43 0.162 -0.039 0.150 -0.003 
Constr. & 
Materials 
21  0.752* 0.644 0.523 0.520 
Food & Beverage 11 1.646 0.981 1.202 0.839 
Health Care 42  0.761*** 0.551**  0.636*** 0.531*** 
Industrial Gds. & 
Serv. 
61  0.567*** 0.372**  0.463** 0.354** 
Media 4 3.473 2.340 2.202 1.703 
Oil & Gas 4 0.488 0.374 0.839 0.709* 
Pers. & Househ. 
Goods 
5 2.008 1.256 1.264 0.895 
Real Estate 1 7.240* 5.951* 10.568* 9.298* 
Retail 14 0.561 0.435 0.494 0.434 
Technology 26 1.309 1.134 0.649 0.699 
Telecomm-
unication 
10 0.263 0.448 0.516 0.631 
Travel & Leisure 2 0.047 0.900 -0.698 0.138 
Utilities 27 -0.314 -0.070 0.039 0.155 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 140: Selloff SCAARs by Industry 
 
SELLERNAT N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Austria 3 -0.309 0.027 0.138 0.312 
Germany 203 0.568*** 0.447*** 0.487*** 0.434*** 
Switzerland 84 0.770*** 0.467*** 0.487*** 0.336** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 141: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Nation 
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TARGETREG N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Europe 228 0.713*** 0.533*** 0.568*** 0.486*** 
North America 42 0.291* 0.271* 0.376* 0.362** 
Asia 6 -0.217 -0.028 -0.234 -0.086 
Oceania 6 0.188 -0.451 -0.442 -0.836 
Central America 5 0.456 0.274 0.123 0.061 
South America 3 0.716 -0.405 -0.528 1.171 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 142: Selloff SCAARs by Target Region 
 
ACQUIRERREG N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Europe 165 0.917*** 0.689*** 0.635*** 0.551*** 
North America 89 0.312** 0.194* 0.291** 0.216* 
Asia 16 -0.450 -0.065 0.145 0.325 
Oceania 6 0.543 0.411 0.141 0.135 
Middle East 4 0.330 -0.294 0.666 0.113 
Central America 3 0.497 0.037 0.083 -0.188 
Russia 2 0.207 0.499 -0.324 0.024 
South America 2 -0.053 0.412 -0.213 0.192 
Unknown 2 -0.156 -0.704 1.908 1.076 
Africa 1 1.115 -1.566 0.644 -1.392 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 143: Selloff SCAARs by Acquirer Region 
 
MOTIVE N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Increase focus 128 0.581*** 0.390*** 0.464*** 0.362*** 
Major restructuring 34 1.192*** 0.937*** 0.968*** 0.868*** 
Financial Distress 14 -0.299 -0.275 0.251 0.152 
Under-performance 11 0.251 0.653 0.649 0.916 
Regulatory Issues 12 0.000 -0.018 -0.226 -0.199 
Raise cash 18 1.065 0.706 0.748 0.572 
Business model 8 -0.009 0.030 0.131 0.137 
Sale and lease back 11 -0.204 -0.169 0.134 0.087 
Unknown 54 0.902*** 0.631** 0.444* 0.357* 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 144: Selloff SCAARs by Motive 
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IFOCUS_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Increase 128 0.581*** 0.495*** 0.464*** 0.362*** 
No increase 162 0.646*** 0.390*** 0.499*** 0.438*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 145: Selloff SCAARs by Increase in Focus (Announced) 
 
IFOCUS_S N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Increase 144 0.709*** 0.623*** 0.642*** 0.625*** 
No increase 146 0.527*** 0.276** 0.627*** 0.187** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 146: Selloff SCAARs by Increase in Focus (Based on SIC Code) 
 
NO2 N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
1 36 1.267** 0.926** 0.869** 0.733** 
2 80 0.699*** 0.472** 0.453** 0.353** 
3 72 0.437** 0.289* 0.227 0.169 
4 37 0.324* 0.162 0.597*** 0.431** 
5 43 0.479** 0.457** 0.518** 0.519*** 
6 18 0.683 0.674** 0.481 0.549 
7 3 0.269 -0.199 0.981 0.486 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 147: Selloff SCAARs by Degree of Diversification 
 
NO2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Focus increase 1.712 0.929 0.719** 0.233 0.559 0.539 0.269 
Cases 12 23 42 19 33 11 3 
No focus increase 1.045 0.606*** 0.041 0.421 0.216 0.909 - 
Cases 24 57 30 18 10 7 0 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 148: Selloff Announcement Day Standardised Average Abnormal Returns by Increase in Focus 
(Based on SIC Code) and Degree of Diversification 
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MAJ_RES N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Yes 34 1.192*** 0.937*** 0.968*** 0.868*** 
No 256 0.541*** 0.384*** 0.419*** 0.343*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 149: Selloff SCAARs by Major Restructuring 
 
FOREIGN N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Foreign 134 0.264*** 0.152** 0.170* 0.111 
Domestic 156 0.921*** 0.703*** 0.753*** 0.657*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 150: Selloff SCAARs by Origin of Divested Asset: Foreign vs Domestic 
 
NON_EU N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Non-Europe 62 0.266* 0.139 0.174 0.105 
Europe 228 0.713*** 0.533*** 0.568*** 0.486*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 151: Selloff SCAARs by Origin of Divested Asset: European vs Non-European 
 
DISTRESS_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Distress 14 -0.299 -0.275 0.251 0.152 
No distress 276 0.664*** 0.485*** 0.495*** 0.417*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 152: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (Announced) 
 
DISTRESS_Z N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Distress 62 0.201 0.186 0.486 0.248* 
No distress 222 0.696*** 0.482*** 0.262*** 0.389*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 153: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (z''-Score) 
 
INVOLUNT N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Involuntary 12 0.000 -0.018 -0.226 -0.199 
Voluntary 278 0.644*** 0.469*** 0.514*** 0.431*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 154: Selloff SCAARs by Voluntariness of the Deal 
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PROCEEDS N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Payout 4 4.410 3.442 4.810** 4.189** 
Reduce debt 56 0.359* 0.371** 0.387** 0.411*** 
Retain/reinvest 35 1.118** 0.661** 0.622** 0.400* 
Unknown 195 0.524*** 0.371*** 0.398*** 0.326*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 155: Selloff SCAARs by Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
DEBT N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Distress 23 0.041 -0.042 0.415 0.280 
No distress 32 0.604** 0.674*** 0.391* 0.519*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 156: Selloff SCAARs if Proceeds are Used to Repay Debt by Seller Financial Condition 
 
REINVEST N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
1st Quartile MTB 12 0.833 0.749 0.039 0.158 
2nd Quartile MTB 6 -0.518 -0.785 -0.241 -0.539 
3rd Quartile MTB 10 1.312 0.640 1.081 0.646 
4th Quartile MTB 7 2.732*** 1.779** 1.705 1.268 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 157: Selloff SCAARs if Proceeds are Retained or Reinvested by Seller Growth Perspectives 
 
PRICE_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 218 0.725*** 0.470*** 0.582*** 0.441*** 
Not announced 40 0.464*** 0.476*** 0.122 0.222 
Unknown 32 0.080 0.265 0.265 0.386** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 158: Selloff SCAARs by Announcement of Transaction Price 
 
BOOKGAIN_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 23 0.603 0.559 0.424 0.451 
Not announced 267 0.619*** 0.439*** 0.489*** 0.401*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 159: Selloff SCAARs by Announcement of Book Effect 
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MOTIVE_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 236 0.552*** 0.407*** 0.492*** 0.415*** 
Not announced 54 0.902*** 0.631** 0.444* 0.357* 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 160: Selloff SCAARs by Announcement of the Motive 
 
PROCEEDS_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 95 0.809*** 0.607*** 0.659*** 0.566*** 
Not announced 195 0.524*** 0.371*** 0.398*** 0.326*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 161: Selloff SCAARs by Announcement of Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
CONSID_A N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Announced 138 0.761*** 0.515*** 0.572*** 0.448*** 
Not announced 152 0.487*** 0.388*** 0.403*** 0.365*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 162: Selloff SCAARs by Announcement of Form of Consideration 
 
FIT N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Fit 70 0.747** 0.677*** 0.525** 0.552** 
No fit 220 0.576*** 0.376*** 0.470*** 0.358*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 163: Selloff SCAARs by Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer 
 
FOCUSFIT N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Focus & fit 29 1.313 1.098 1.125 1.059 
No focus & fit 41 0.346 0.379* 0.102 0.193 
Focus & no fit 115 0.557*** 0.504*** 0.521*** 0.515*** 
No focus & no fit 105 0.598*** 0.236* 0.415*** 0.185* 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 164: Selloff SCAARs by Combination of Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer and Increase in 
Focus 
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BUYER N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Strategic 213 0.689*** 0.503*** 0.486*** 0.410*** 
Private Equity 68 0.267** 0.193* 0.358*** 0.296** 
Management 8 1.776** 1.309** 1.086 0.943** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 165: Selloff SCAARs by Type of Buyer 
 
CASH N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Cash 125 0.706*** 0.469*** 0.547*** 0.423*** 
No cash 165 0.550*** 0.433*** 0.435*** 0.391*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 166: Selloff SCAARs by Form of Consideration 
 
PAYM N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Cash 125 0.706*** 0.469*** 0.547*** 0.423*** 
Other 13 1.286 0.955 0.809** 0.697 
Unknown 152 0.487*** 0.388*** 0.403*** 0.365*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 167: Selloff SCAARs by Form of Consideration (Detailed) 
 
SIZE N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Small 184 0.185** 0.113* 0.097 0.065 
Medium 61 0.901*** 0.669*** 0.908*** 0.766*** 
Large 45 2.000*** 1.523*** 1.487*** 1.302*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 168: Selloff SCAARs by Relative Size of the Deal 
 
MTB N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
1st Quartile 76 0.739*** 0.536*** 0.663*** 0.551*** 
2nd Quartile 68 0.176 0.200 0.274* 0.285** 
3rd Quartile 73 0.620** 0.415** 0.410** 0.316** 
4th Quartile 72 0.926*** 0.650*** 0.577*** 0.469** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 169: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Market-to-Book Ratio 
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STOCK N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Positive 180 0.425*** 0.297*** 0.334*** 0.270*** 
Negative 110 0.932*** 0.696*** 0.729*** 0.625*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 170: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Performance Prospects 
 
ROA N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Positive 236 0.751*** 0.556*** 0.459*** 0.537*** 
Negative 42 0.121 0.063 0.225 0.299 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 171: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Profitability 
 
QUICK N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Above 1 110 0.792*** 0.578*** 0.505*** 0.427*** 
Below 1 166 0.510*** 0.376*** 0.421*** 0.356*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 172: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Liquidity 
 
DE N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
1st Quartile 70 1.021*** 0.851*** 0.946*** 0.876*** 
2nd Quartile 68 1.165*** 0.656*** 0.635*** 0.385** 
3rd Quartile 69 0.105 0.173* 0.058 0.128 
4th Quartile 70 0.339** 0.248* 0.350** 0.292** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 173: Selloff SCAARs by Seller Leverage 
 
CYCLE N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Boom 223 0.493*** 0.396*** 0.488*** 0.428*** 
Recession 67 1.030*** 0.625*** 0.505** 0.328** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 174: Selloff SCAARs by Economic Environment 
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ASSET N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Subsidiary 142 0.701*** 0.549*** 0.644*** 0.569*** 
Business unit 92 0.797*** 0.547*** 0.495*** 0.391** 
Property 25 0.218 0.239 0.178 0.214 
Plant 20 0.085 -0.053 0.063 -0.039 
Rights 9 0.011 -0.169 -0.148 -0.263 
Unknown 2 -0.521 -0.768 -0.577 -0.799 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 175: Selloff SCAARs by Type of Asset Sold 
 
BETA N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Increase 28 0.206 0.153 0.078 0.069 
Decrease 34 0.538* 0.369* 0.273 0.215 
No change 226 0.719*** 0.522*** 0.589*** 0.493*** 
Unknown 2 -3.708 -2.395 -2.209 1.620 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 176: Selloff SCAARs by Change in the Seller’s Systematic Risk 
 
DIRECT N SAAR [0] SCAAR [-1;0] SCAAR [0;1] SCAAR [-1;1] 
Direct 206 0.632*** 0.455*** 0.479*** 0.397*** 
Indirect 84 0.582*** 0.433*** 0.495*** 0.422*** 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, based on a right-tailed standardised cross-sectional test if 
N>=30 and Fisher’s exact test if N<30. 
Table 177: Selloff SCAARs by Seller/Target Degree of Relationship 
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H Additional Information – Bivariate Regressions with Generic Abnormal 
Returns 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
AUSTRIA -0.506 
(1.353) 
-0.599 
(0.951) 
-0.738 
(1.085) 
-0.831 
(0.823) 
SWITZERLAND 0.024 
(0.731) 
-0.363 
(0.778) 
-0.203 
(0.766) 
-0.590 
(0.815) 
Cons 1.251** 
(0.629) 
1.355** 
(0.658) 
1.512** 
(0.598) 
1.617*** 
(0.604) 
F-Statistic 0.09 0.21 0.23 0.53 
R² 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
GERMANY omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 178: Regression of CAARs on the Seller Nation 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
ASIA -0.692 
(0.484) 
-0.413 
(0.513) 
-1.841** 
(0.740) 
-1.562** 
(0.712) 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
0.015 
(0.475) 
0.376 
(0.714) 
-1.268 
(0.885) 
-0.906 
(1.093) 
EUROPE 1.045 
(0.660) 
1.265* 
(0.696) 
0.125 
(0.858) 
0.345 
(0.831) 
OCEANIA -0.096 
(0.470) 
-0.476 
(0.542) 
-1.838* 
(1.030) 
-2.218** 
(1.009) 
SOUTH 
AMERICA 
2.242 
(2.063) 
-0.884 
(2.814) 
-2.632*** 
(0.686) 
-5.758 
(4.402) 
Cons 0.424 
(0.324) 
0.270 
(0.348) 
1.473** 
(0.659) 
1.319** 
(0.614) 
F-Statistic 1.63 1.47 7.39*** 2.87** 
R² 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.010 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NORTH AMERICA omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 179: Regression of CAARs on Target Region 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
AFRICA -0.662 
(0.574) 
-2.096*** 
(0.762) 
-0.973* 
(0.555) 
-2.407*** 
(0.691) 
ASIA -6.833 
(5.767) 
-5.797 
(5.267) 
-4.701 
(4.915) 
-3.665 
(4.413) 
CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
-1.009 
(0.629) 
-1.098 
(0.813) 
-1.676* 
(0.883) 
-1.765* 
(0.992) 
EUROPE 0.815 
(0.736) 
1.121 
(0.918) 
0.498 
(0.764) 
0.804 
(0.886) 
MIDDLE EAST -0.940 
(0.732) 
-1.667 
(1.046) 
-0.478 
(0.985) 
-1.205 
(1.126) 
OCEANIA -0.195 
(0.748) 
-0.040 
(0.984) 
-0.665 
(0.889) 
-0.510 
(1.076) 
RUSSIA -0.833 
(0.857) 
0.067 
(1.464) 
-1.673* 
(0.949) 
-0.773 
(1.546) 
SOUTH 
AMERICA 
-0.710 
(1.041) 
0.474 
(1.509) 
-1.030 
(1.242) 
0.154 
(1.692) 
UNKNOWN -1.624** 
(0.748) 
-4.027*** 
(0.766) 
7.703 
(6.024) 
5.300 
(5.639) 
Cons 1.217** 
(0.574) 
0.992 
(0.762) 
1.428** 
(0.555) 
1.204* 
(0.691) 
F-Statistic Not reported39 Not reported Not reported Not reported 
R² 0.051 0.041 0.033 0.023 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NORTH AMERICA omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 180: Regression of CAARs on Acquirer Region 
 
                                                 
39 Not reported to not be misleading. 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
BM 1.219 
(7.568) 
2.183 
(7.725) 
-1.082 
(7.198) 
-0.428 
(7.157) 
IFOCUS_A 2.610 
(7.566) 
3.363 
(7.709) 
-0.325 
(6.770) 
0.428 
(6.836) 
MAJ_RES 3.355 
(7.615) 
4.469 
(7.756) 
0.217 
(6.812) 
1.331 
(6.873) 
RAISE CASH 3.353 
(7.634) 
3.659 
(7.794) 
0.569 
(6.951) 
0.875 
(7.047) 
INVOLUNT 1.290 
(7.558) 
2.396 
(7.701) 
-2.197 
(6.769) 
-1.091 
(6.834) 
SALE & LB 1.241 
(7.564) 
1.826 
(7.704) 
-1.176 
(6.784) 
-0.591 
(6.833) 
UNDERPERF 0.879 
(7.607) 
2.703 
(7.745) 
-0.221 
(7.098) 
1.604 
(7.050) 
UNKNOWN 3.098 
(7.586) 
4.093 
(7.739) 
-0.592 
(6.794) 
0.402 
(6.873) 
Cons -1.253 
(7.553) 
-2.085 
(7.694) 
1.183 
(6.755) 
0.981 
(6.820) 
F-Statistic 2.25** 1.82* 1.66 1.46 
R² 0.013 0.015 0.005 0.006 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
DISTRESS omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 181: Regression of CAARs on the Deal Motive 
 
IFOCUS_A AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
IFOCUS_A 0.185 
(0.853) 
0.062 
(0.899) 
0.074 
(0.835) 
-0.049 
(0.856) 
Cons 1.171 
(0.734) 
1.217 
(0.764) 
1.143** 
(0.704) 
1.459** 
(0.720) 
F-Statistic 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 182: Regression of CAARs on an Increase in Focus (Announced) 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
IFOCUS_S -0.483 
(0.908) 
-0.369 
(0.954) 
0.015 
(0.883) 
0.129 
(0.905) 
Cons 1.493*** 
(0.437) 
1.427*** 
(0.488) 
1.43*** 
(0.470) 
1.373*** 
(0.475) 
F-Statistic 0.28 0.15 0.00 0.02 
R² 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 183: Regression of CAARs on an Increase in Focus (Based on SIC Code) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
NO2 -0.142 
(0.269) 
-0.225 
(0.313) 
0.311 
(0.354) 
0.227 
(0.385) 
Cons 1.698 
(1.191) 
1.944 
(1.241) 
0.476 
(1.214) 
0.722 
(1.253) 
F-Statistic 0.28 0.52 0.77 0.35 
R² 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.002 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 184: Regression of CAARs on the Degree of Diversification 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
IFOCUS_S -2.438 
(2.909) 
-1.479 
(2.924) 
-1.799 
(2.819) 
-0.840 
(2.840) 
NO2 -0.469 
(0.307) 
-0.435 
(0.368) 
0.068 
(0.347) 
0.103 
(0.378) 
IFOCUS_S*NO2 0.664 
(0.638) 
0.415 
(0.693) 
0.490 
(0.742) 
0.242 
(0.785) 
Cons 2.752** 
(1.120) 
2.596** 
(1.272) 
1.254 
(1.027) 
1.098 
(1.116) 
F-Statistic 0.83 0.48 0.27 0.12 
R² 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 185: Regression of CAARs on an Increase in Focus, the Degree of Diversification and an 
Interaction Term of Both Variables 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MAJ_RES 0.961 
(1.075) 
1.292 
(1.102) 
0.661 
(0.992) 
0.992 
(0.979) 
Cons 1.140** 
(0.496) 
1.093** 
(0.522) 
1.368*** 
(0.485) 
1.321*** 
(0.498) 
F-Statistic 0.80 1.37 0.44 1.02 
R² 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 186: Regression of CAARs on a Major Restructuring 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
FOREIGN -1.038 
(0.849) 
-1.402 
(0.892) 
-1.403* 
(0.832) 
-1.766** 
(0.851) 
Cons 1.732** 
(0.813) 
1.892** 
(0.847) 
2.094*** 
(0.764) 
2.253*** 
(0.781) 
F-Statistic 1.50 2.47 2.84* 4.31** 
R² 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.013 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 187: Regression of CAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Foreign vs Domestic 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
NON_EU -1.012 
(0.625) 
-1.364** 
(0.661) 
-0.711 
(0.718) 
-1.062 
(0.753) 
Cons 1.469** 
(0.571) 
1.536** 
(0.598) 
1.598*** 
(0.545) 
1.664*** 
(0.556) 
F-Statistic 2.62 4.25** 0.98 1.99 
R² 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 188: Regression of CAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Non-European vs European 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
DISTRESS_A -0.633 
(7.467) 
-3.498 
(7.606) 
0.385 
(6.680) 
-0.479 
(6.744) 
Cons 1.380*** 
(0.286) 
1.413*** 
(0.314) 
1.143*** 
(0.315) 
1.460*** 
(0.329) 
F-Statistic 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.01 
R² 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 189: Regression of CAARs on the Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (Announced) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
DISTRESS_Z 0.860 
(1.816) 
0.891 
(1.877) 
-0.320 
(1.746) 
-0.289 
(1.736) 
Cons 0.526 
(1.790) 
0.462 
(1.847) 
1.585 
(1.720) 
1.521 
(1.705) 
F-Statistic 0.22 0.23 0.03 0.03 
R² 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 190: Regression of CAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (z''-Score) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
INVOLUNT -1.268** 
(0.543) 
-0.973 
(0.594) 
-1.909*** 
(0.626) 
-1.614** 
(0.645) 
Cons 1.305*** 
(0.472) 
1.284** 
(0.496) 
1.525*** 
(0.458) 
1.504*** 
(0.470) 
F-Statistic 5.46** 2.68 9.29*** 6.26** 
R² 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 191: Regression of CAARs on the Voluntariness of the Deal 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
PAYOUT 9.250* 
(5.322) 
9.864* 
(5.215) 
11.000*** 
(2.126) 
11.613*** 
(2.286) 
DEBT -0.327 
(1.915) 
-0.456 
(1.978) 
1.016 
(1.853) 
0.888 
(1.858) 
REINVEST 2.176 
(1.513) 
2.138 
(1.598) 
0.879 
(1.392) 
0.842 
(1.385) 
Cons 0.926*** 
(0.250) 
0.938*** 
(0.287) 
0.992*** 
(0.282) 
1.004*** 
(0.319) 
F-Statistic 1.70 1.80 9.07*** 8.71*** 
R² 0.028 0.028 0.031 0.033 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
UNKNOWN use of proceeds omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 192: Regression of CAARs on the Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
PAYOUT 11.017 
(6.928) 
11.206* 
(6.710) 
7.688*** 
(2.659) 
7.877*** 
(2.651) 
DEBT 0.766 
(1.374) 
0.810 
(1.530) 
1.964 
(2.010) 
2.007 
(1.780) 
ZSCORE -0.036 
(0.097) 
-0.030 
(0.104) 
0.053 
(0.050) 
0.059 
(0.057) 
DEBT*ZSCORE 0.001 
(0.456) 
0.092 
(0.488) 
-0.322 
(0.680) 
-0.230 
(0.603) 
REINVEST -0.903 
(3.984) 
0.708 
(4.303) 
-5.674* 
(3.080) 
-4.063 
(3.077) 
MTB -0.078 
(0.335) 
-0.097 
(0.373) 
-0.466 
(0.286) 
-0.484 
(0.314) 
REINVEST*MTB 1.364 
(1.635) 
0.686 
(1.735) 
2.715** 
(1.353) 
2.037 
(1.372) 
Cons 1.227 
(0.921) 
1.234 
(1.034) 
1.961** 
(0.873) 
1.968** 
(0.968) 
F-Statistic 1.27 1.23 3.14*** 3.02*** 
R² 0.078 0.062 0.089 0.073 
Observations 273 273 273 273 
UNKNOWN use of proceeds omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 193: Regression of CAARs on the Intended Use of Proceeds and Interaction Terms 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
UNKNOWN 0.298 
(1.491) 
0.984 
(1.981) 
0.585 
(1.709) 
1.271 
(2.007) 
PRICE_A -0.179 
(0.738) 
-0.381 
(0.996) 
0.005 
(1.311) 
-0.198 
(1.443) 
Cons 1.354*** 
(0.482) 
1.422* 
(0.828) 
1.378 
(1.207) 
1.445 
(1.353) 
F-Statistic 0.06 0.30 0.10 0.44 
R² 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
Price NOT_ANNOUNCED omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 194: Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Transaction Price 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
BOOKGAIN_A 0.798 
(1.725) 
0.867 
(1.788) 
0.011 
(1.623) 
0.080 
(1.740) 
Cons 1.189** 
(0.470) 
1.175** 
(0.494) 
1.445*** 
(0.459) 
1.431*** 
(0.468) 
F-Statistic 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.00 
R² 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 195: Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of a Book Effect 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MOTIVE_A -0.728 
(0.878) 
-0.939 
(0.992) 
0.288 
(0.878) 
0.066 
(0.991) 
Cons 1.845*** 
(0.698) 
2.008** 
(0.824) 
1.221* 
(0.711) 
1.384 
(0.844) 
F-Statistic 0.69 0.89 0.10 0.00 
R² 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 196: Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Motive 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
PROCEEDS_A 0.998 
(1.305) 
0.934 
(1.356) 
1.386 
(1.240) 
1.322 
(1.249) 
Cons 0.926*** 
(0.249) 
0.938*** 
(0.286) 
0.992*** 
(0.281) 
1.004*** 
(0.318) 
F-Statistic 0.59 0.48 1.25 1.12 
R² 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.007 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 197: Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Intended Use of Proceeds 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
CONSID_A 1.850** 
(0.889) 
1.545 
(0.948) 
1.912** 
(0.868) 
1.607* 
(0.903) 
Cons 0.373 
(0.689) 
0.509 
(0.652) 
0.536 
(0.644) 
0.672 
(0.586) 
F-Statistic 4.33** 2.66 4.85** 3.17* 
R² 0.015 0.009 0.016 0.011 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 198: Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Form of Consideration 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
FIT -0.027 
(0.886) 
0.340 
(0.915) 
-0.538 
(0.887) 
-0.171 
(0.916) 
Cons 1.259** 
(0.555) 
1.162** 
(0.585) 
1.576*** 
(0.535) 
1.478*** 
(0.547) 
F-Statistic 0.00 0.14 0.38 0.03 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 199: Regression of CAARs on the Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
FOCUS_NOFIT -0.827 
(1.079) 
-0.520 
(1.145) 
-0.295 
(1.049) 
0.012 
(1.074) 
FOCUS_FIT -0.107 
(0.894) 
0.197 
(1.050) 
-0.204 
(1.181) 
0.100 
(1.309) 
NOFOCUS_FIT -0.708 
(1.141) 
-0.022 
(1.164) 
-1.038 
(1.094) 
-0.352 
(1.088) 
Cons 1.691*** 
(0.451) 
1.434** 
(0.550) 
1.730*** 
(0.538) 
1.472*** 
(0.553) 
F-Statistic 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.04 
R² 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NOFOCUS_NOFIT omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 200: Regression of CAARs on Combination of Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer and 
Increase in Focus 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MBO 5.727** 
(2.489) 
6.267** 
(3.049) 
8.939* 
(5.222) 
9.479* 
(5.397) 
PE -0.380 
(0.708) 
-0.311 
(0.770) 
0.273 
(0.768) 
0.342 
(0.767) 
Cons 1.187** 
(0.593) 
1.158* 
(0.615) 
1.079** 
(0.520) 
1.050* 
(0.537) 
F-Statistic 3.17** 2.39* 1.49 1.59 
R² 0.016 0.017 0.039 0.041 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
STRATEGIC buyer omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 201: Regression of CAARs on the Type of Buyer 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
CASH 1.652* 
(0.881) 
1.327 
(0.961) 
1.749** 
(0.872) 
1.424 
(0.928) 
Cons 0.541 
(0.651) 
0.672 
(0.619) 
0.692 
(0.603) 
0.823 
(0.550) 
F-Statistic 3.52 1.91 4.03** 2.35 
R² 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.009 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 202: Regression of CAARs on the Form of Consideration 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
CASH 1.820** 
(0.911) 
1.490 
(0.984) 
1.905** 
(0.902) 
1.575* 
(0.951) 
OTHER 2.134 
(1.878) 
2.070 
(1.946) 
1.980 
(1.438) 
1.916 
(1.401) 
Cons 0.373 
(0.690) 
0.509 
(0.653) 
0.536 
(0.645) 
0.672 
(0.587) 
F-Statistic 2.18 1.42 2.50* 1.84 
R² 0.015 0.009 0.016 0.011 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
UNKNOWN form of payment omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 203: Regression of CAARs on the Form of Consideration (Detailed) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.358*** 
(0.456) 
1.423*** 
(0.537) 
2.502*** 
(0.702) 
2.567*** 
(0.745) 
LARGE 4.441 
(2.746) 
4.726* 
(2.851) 
4.694* 
(2.495) 
4.980* 
(2.526) 
Cons 0.278** 
(0.135) 
0.211 
(0.159) 
0.191 
(0.188) 
0.124 
(0.203) 
F-Statistic 5.67*** 4.82*** 7.98*** 7.74*** 
R² 0.042 0.043 0.057 0.060 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 204: Regression of CAARs on the Relative Size of the Deal 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
2nd QUARTILE -1.223 
(1.554) 
-1.317 
(1.607) 
-1.324 
(1.537) 
-1.418 
(1.559) 
3rd QUARTILE -0.505 
(1.546) 
-0.766 
(1.604) 
-1.037 
(1.460) 
-1.298 
(1.468) 
4th QUARTILE 0.467 
(1.656) 
0.236 
(1.713) 
-0.463 
(1.511) 
-0.694 
(1.538) 
Cons 1.588 
(0.492) 
1.759 
(1.542) 
2.152 
(1.379) 
2.323 
(1.407) 
F-Statistic 1.61 1.17 0.47 0.47 
R² 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
1st QUARTILE omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 205: Regression of CAARs on Seller Market-to-Book Ratio (Quartile Dummies) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MTB 0.197 
(0.507) 
0.111 
(0.525) 
-0.123 
(0.467) 
-0.209 
(0.475) 
Cons 0.799 
(1.579) 
1.039 
(1.635) 
1.769 
(1.478) 
2.009 
(1.505) 
F-Statistic 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.19 
R² 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Observations 289 289 289 289 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 206: Regression of CAARs on Seller Market-to-Book Ratio (Continuous) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
STOCK -0.543 
(1.136) 
-0.366 
(1.175) 
-1.112 
(1.099) 
-0.935 
(1.115) 
Cons 1.590 
(1.100) 
1.471 
(1.126) 
2.1366** 
(1.063) 
2.018* 
(1.070) 
F-Statistic 0.23 0.10 1.02 0.70 
R² 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.004 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 207: Regression of CAARs on Seller Performance Prospects 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
ROA 0.100*** 
(0.034) 
0.112*** 
(0.036) 
0.092*** 
(0.024) 
0.104*** 
(0.024) 
Cons 0.734** 
(0.258) 
0.691** 
(0.316) 
0.822** 
(0.341) 
0.779** 
(0.346) 
F-Statistic 8.45*** 9.80*** 14.31*** 18.02*** 
R² 0.108 0.112 0.080 0.095 
Observations 278 278 278 278 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 208: Regression of CAARs on the Seller Profitability 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
QUICKD 1.005 
(0.666) 
0.955 
(0.723) 
-0.035 
(0.645) 
-0.085 
(0.687) 
Cons 1.030*** 
(0.282) 
1.095*** 
(0.330) 
1.431*** 
(0.386) 
1.496*** 
(0.382) 
F-Statistic 2.27 1.75 0.00 0.02 
R² 0.010 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Observations 276 276 276 276 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 209: Regression of CAARs on Seller Liquidity (Dummy) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
QUICK 0.004 
(0.056) 
0.006 
(0.060) 
0.094** 
(0.040) 
0.095** 
(0.044) 
Cons 1.423*** 
(0.295) 
1.467*** 
(0.324) 
1.264*** 
(0.310) 
1.308*** 
(0.322) 
F-Statistic 0.01 0.01 5.40** 4.70** 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.013 
Observations 276 276 276 276 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 210: Regression of CAARs on Seller Liquidity 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
2nd QUARTILE 0.131 
(1.017) 
-0.661 
(1.088) 
-0.470 
(0.974) 
-1.262 
(1.061) 
3rd QUARTILE -1.864** 
(0.731) 
-2.020** 
(0.814) 
-2.316*** 
(0.766) 
-2.472*** 
(0.812) 
4th QUARTILE -0.856 
(0.894) 
-1.234 
(1.017) 
-0.812 
(1.009) 
-1.220 
(1.026) 
Cons 2.116*** 
(0.702) 
2.500*** 
(0.775) 
2.397*** 
(0.705) 
2.781*** 
(0.753) 
F-Statistic 4.72*** 2.93** 4.94*** 3.86*** 
R² 0.026 0.019 0.027 0.026 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
1st QUARTILE omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 211: Regression of CAARs on Seller Leverage (Quartile Dummies) 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
DE 0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
Cons 1.459*** 
(0.298) 
1.526*** 
(0.327) 
1.515*** 
(0.317) 
1.581*** 
(0.331) 
F-Statistic 5.80** 1.52 5.42** 45.19*** 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Observations 277 277 277 277 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 212: Regression of CAARs on Seller Leverage 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
ZSCORE 0.039 
(0.063) 
0.043 
(0.069) 
0.084** 
(0.033) 
0.088** 
(0.037) 
Cons 1.259*** 
(0.366) 
1.265*** 
(0.396) 
1.043*** 
(0.357) 
1.049*** 
(0.362) 
F-Statistic 0.38 0.38 6.68** 5.64** 
R² 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.015 
Observations 273 273 273 273 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 213: Regression of CAARs on Seller Probability of Bankruptcy 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
RECESSION 1.649* 
(0.995( 
1.044 
(1.115) 
0.472 
(0.976) 
-0.133 
(1.064) 
Cons 0.872 
(0.529( 
1.003* 
(0.544) 
1.337** 
(0.515) 
1.468*** 
(0.516) 
F-Statistic 2.75* 0.88 0.23 0.02 
R² 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 214: Regression of CAARs on Economic Environment 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
PLANT -0.486 
(1.245) 
-0.787 
(1.213) 
-0.419 
(1.484) 
-0.721 
(1.341) 
PROPERTY -0.250 
(1.270) 
-0.102 
(1.232) 
-0.240 
(1.187) 
-0.092 
(1.098) 
RIGHTS -0.582 
(1.229) 
-0.993 
(1.134) 
-1.300 
(1.022) 
-1.710* 
(1.001) 
SUBSIDIARY 0.926 
(1.285) 
1.023 
(1.289) 
1.012 
(1.167) 
1.109 
(1.153) 
UNKNOWN -1.333 
(1.175) 
-1.899 
(1.227) 
-1.868 
(1.136) 
-2.434* 
(1.404) 
Cons 0.881 
(1.175) 
0.850 
(1.118) 
1.053 
(1.003) 
1.022 
(0.934) 
F-Statistic 6.71*** 3.21*** 3.80*** 3.79*** 
R² 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.001 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
SUBSIDIARY omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 215: Regression of CAARs on the Type of Asset Sold 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
UNKNOWN -46.295 
(34.075) 
-42.326 
(30.595) 
-39.322 
(27.434) 
-35.353 
(23.954) 
DECREASE -0.715 
(0.920) 
-0.624 
(0.961) 
-1.972** 
(0.828) 
-1.880** 
(0.807) 
INCREASE -0.892 
(0.662) 
-0.832 
(0.795) 
-1.913** 
(0.746) 
-1.853* 
(0.965) 
Cons 1.742*** 
(0.379) 
1.689*** 
(0.456) 
2.133*** 
(0.427) 
2.080*** 
(0.469) 
F-Statistic 1.29 1.04 3.81** 3.08** 
R² 0.249 0.189 0.197 0.153 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
NO CHANGE in beta omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 216: Regression of CAARs on the Change in the Seller's Systematic Risk 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
DIRECT 0.022 
(0.775) 
0.106 
(0.831) 
-0.056 
(0.777) 
0.028 
(0.826) 
Cons 1.237** 
(0.482) 
1.169** 
(0.540) 
1.485*** 
(0.513) 
1.417** 
(0.578) 
F-Statistic 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
R² 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 290 290 290 290 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 217: Regression of CAARs on Seller/Target Degree of Relationship 
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I Additional Information – Multivariate Regressions with Generic Abnormal 
Returns 
 
 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.507*** 
(0.510) 
1.588*** 
(0.589) 
2.709*** 
(0.698) 
2.790*** 
(0.734) 
LARGE 6.828*** 
(1.900) 
7.465*** 
(2.051) 
5.009** 
(2.035) 
5.646*** 
(1.967) 
MTB 0.539 
(0.481) 
0.524 
(0.474) 
0.465 
(0.423) 
0.450 
(0.409) 
STOCK -1.165* 
(0.595) 
-1.120* 
(0.644) 
-1.166* 
(0.664) 
-1.121* 
(0.677) 
ROA 0.068* 
(0.040) 
0.076* 
(0.041) 
0.046 
(0.036) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
QUICK -0.174* 
(0.100) 
-0.185 
(0.124) 
0.009 
(0.091) 
-0.002 
(0.096) 
DE -0.220 
(0.217) 
-0.224 
(0.214) 
-0.216 
(0.191) 
-0.220 
(0.185) 
ZSCORE 0.020 
(0.128) 
0.017 
(0.152) 
-0.024 
(0.119) 
-0.027 
(0.124) 
Cons -0.282 
(0.634) 
-0.362 
(0.662) 
-0.143 
(0.698) 
-0.223 
(0.693) 
F-Statistic 10.40*** 4.09*** 12.09*** 14.80*** 
R² 0.318 0.312 0.195 0.220 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 218: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller Related Variables and Relative Size 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.258*** 
(0.466) 
1.335** 
(0.561) 
2.465*** 
(0.690) 
2.542*** 
(0.731) 
LARGE 6.608*** 
(1.851) 
7.241*** 
(2.015) 
4.794** 
(1.998) 
5.427*** 
(1.925) 
MTB 0.069** 
(0.032) 
0.045 
(0.033) 
0.005 
(0.033) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
STOCK -1.138* 
(0.597) 
-1.093* 
(0.648) 
-1.139* 
(0.666) 
-1.094 
(0.681) 
ROA 0.070* 
(0.040) 
0.078* 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.269*** 
(0.060) 
-0.281*** 
(0.080) 
-0.084 
(0.055) 
-0.097* 
(0.058) 
ZSCORE 0.130* 
(0.069) 
0.129 
(0.092) 
0.083 
(0.058) 
0.083 
(0.064) 
CONS 0.297 
(0.458) 
0.228 
(0.522) 
0.425 
(0.574) 
0.356 
(0.565) 
F-Statistic 5.39*** 4.65*** 18.73*** 20.17*** 
R² 0.302 0.298 0.181 0.206 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 219: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller Related Variables and Relative Size (Without Seller 
Leverage) 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.286*** 
(0.468) 
1.353** 
(0.560) 
2.467*** 
(0.685) 
2.534*** 
(0.727) 
LARGE 6.505*** 
(1.844) 
7.174*** 
(2.007) 
4.787** 
(1.988) 
5.456*** 
(1.915) 
STOCK -1.165* 
(0.603) 
-1.110* 
(0.651) 
-1.141* 
(0.666) 
-1.087 
(0.680) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.248*** 
(0.055) 
-0.268*** 
(0.073) 
-0.083 
(0.051) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.113* 
(0.064) 
0.118 
(0.086) 
0.082 
(0.057) 
0.087 
(0.066) 
CONS 0.522 
(0.467) 
0.375 
(0.517) 
0.441 
(0.566) 
0.294 
(0.555) 
F-Statistic 6.51*** 5.42*** 21.20*** 20.85*** 
R² 0.294 0.296 0.181 0.205 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 220: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller Related Variables and Relative Size (Basic Model) 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.278*** 
(0.466) 
1.333** 
(0.557) 
2.459*** 
(0.669) 
2.516*** 
(0.726) 
LARGE 6.525*** 
(1.846) 
7.221*** 
(2.001) 
4.805** 
(1.974) 
5.501*** 
(1.900) 
STOCK -1.170* 
(0.608) 
-1.123* 
(0.657) 
-1.146* 
(0.667) 
-1.099 
(0.683) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.041) 
0.078* 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.251*** 
(0.056) 
-0.275*** 
(0.074) 
-0.086 
(0.055) 
-0.110* 
(0.062) 
ZSCORE 0.116* 
(0.067) 
0.125 
(0.088) 
0.085 
(0.060) 
0.094 
(0.068) 
IFOCUS_S 0.167 
(0.526) 
0.392 
(0.563) 
0.155 
(0.564) 
0.380 
(0.574) 
CONS 0.441 
(0.483) 
0.183 
(0.530) 
0.366 
(0.649) 
0.108 
(0.606) 
F-Statistic 5.57*** 4.76*** 18.84*** 19.01*** 
R² 0.295 0.297 0.181 0.207 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 221: Multiple Regression of CAARs on an Increase in Focus Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.242** 
(0.479) 
1.317** 
(0.568) 
2.482*** 
(0.702) 
2.557*** 
(0.747) 
LARGE 6.400*** 
(1.804) 
7.122*** 
(1.968) 
4.862** 
(2.004) 
5.584*** 
(1.933) 
STOCK -1.134* 
(0.598) 
-1.100* 
(0.649) 
-1.167* 
(0.672) 
-1.133 
(0.691) 
ROA 0.070* 
(0.040) 
0.077** 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.250*** 
(0.057) 
-0.274*** 
(0.075) 
-0.086 
(0.055) 
-0.110* 
(0.061) 
ZSCORE 0.117* 
(0.067) 
0.126 
(0.089) 
0.084 
(0.060) 
0.093 
(0.068) 
IFOCUS_S -0.517 
(1.437) 
-0.593 
(1.514) 
0.189 
(1.344) 
0.112 
(1.358) 
NO2 -0.409* 
(0.217) 
-0.425 
(0.267) 
0.124 
(0.310) 
0.109 
(0.298) 
IFOCUS_S*NO2 0.303 
(0.350) 
0.393 
(0.391) 
-0.043 
(0.383) 
0.047 
(0.385) 
Cons 1.499** 
(0.734) 
1.283 
(0.833) 
0.046 
(1.003) 
-0.169 
(0.969) 
F-Statistic 4.43*** 3.79*** 14.54*** 14.73*** 
R² 0.300 0.302 0.182 0.208 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 222: Multiple Regression of CAARs on an Increase in Focus, the Degree of Diversification and an 
Interaction Term of Both Variables Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.319*** 
(0.479) 
1.377** 
(0.571) 
2.483*** 
(0.696) 
2.541*** 
(0.738) 
LARGE 6.623*** 
(1.885) 
7.260*** 
(2.060) 
4.843** 
(2.044) 
5.480*** 
(1.970) 
STOCK -1.170* 
(0.601) 
-1.114* 
(0.651) 
-1.144* 
(0.667) 
-1.088 
(0.681) 
ROA 0.072* 
(0.040) 
0.080* 
(0.041) 
0.048 
(0.036) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.248*** 
(0.054) 
-0.268*** 
(0.072) 
-0.083 
(0.052) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.111* 
(0.063) 
0.117 
(0.085) 
0.081 
(0.057) 
0.087 
(0.066) 
MAJ_RES -0.612 
(1.021) 
-0.447 
(1.042) 
-0.293 
(1.039) 
-0.127 
(1.005) 
Cons 0.589 
(0.461) 
0.423 
(0.515) 
0.473 
(0.579) 
0.307 
(0.575) 
F-Statistic 5.67*** 4.70*** 18.98*** 18.26*** 
R² 0.296 0.296 0.181 0.205 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 223: Multiple Regression of CAARs on a Major Restructuring Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.127** 
(0.477) 
1.123* 
(0.563) 
2.299*** 
(0.712) 
2.295*** 
(0.753) 
LARGE 6.360*** 
(1.808) 
6.964*** 
(1.968) 
4.633** 
(1.979) 
5.237*** 
(1.905) 
STOCK -1.176* 
(0.606) 
-1.127* 
(0.652) 
-1.154* 
(0.668) 
-1.104 
(0.679) 
ROA 0.070* 
(0.041) 
0.077* 
(0.042) 
0.046 
(0.037) 
0.053 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.245*** 
(0.053) 
-0.264*** 
(0.070) 
-0.080 
(0.050) 
-0.099* 
(0.057) 
ZSCORE 0.116* 
(0.062) 
0.122 
(0.083) 
0.085 
(0.056) 
0.091 
(0.063) 
FOREIGN -0.547 
(0.421) 
-0.792* 
(0.472) 
-0.576 
(0.537) 
-0.820 
(0.551) 
Cons 0.833 
(0.596) 
0.824 
(0.633) 
0.768 
(0.673) 
0.759 
(0.663) 
F-Statistic 5.71*** 4.76*** 19.00*** 18.60*** 
R² 0.297 0.301 0.184 0.201 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 224: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Foreign vs Domestic Incl. 
Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.177*** 
(0.477) 
1.213** 
(0.564) 
2.437*** 
(0.694) 
2.473*** 
(0.760) 
LARGE 6.407*** 
(1.834) 
7.048*** 
(1.992) 
4.760** 
(2.008) 
5.401*** 
(1.932) 
STOCK -1.098* 
(0.603) 
-1.024 
(0.651) 
-1.123* 
(0.660) 
-1.049 
(0.686) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.041) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.247*** 
(0.056) 
-0.267*** 
(0.074) 
-0.082 
(0.052) 
-0.102* 
(0.060) 
ZSCORE 0.119* 
(0.065) 
0.125 
(0.088) 
0.084 
(0.057) 
0.090 
(0.066) 
NON_EU -0.674* 
(0.369) 
-0.870* 
(0.444) 
-0.183 
(0.481) 
-0.379 
(0.608) 
Cons 0.640 
(0.473) 
0.527 
(0.519) 
0.473 
(0.587) 
0.360 
(0.567) 
F-Statistic 5.73*** 4.83*** 18.46*** 18.64*** 
R² 0.297 0.300 0.181 0.206 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 225: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Origin of Divested Asset: Non-European vs European Incl. 
Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.144** 
(0.457) 
1.224** 
(0.537) 
2.287*** 
(0.674) 
2.367*** 
(0.708) 
LARGE 6.090*** 
(1.853) 
6.790*** 
(2.017) 
4.846** 
(2.037) 
5.545*** 
(1.990) 
STOCK -1.005* 
(0.596) 
-0.935 
(0.642) 
-0.987 
(0.665) 
-0.917 
(0.672) 
ROA 0.085** 
(0.038) 
0.095** 
(0.039) 
0.058 
(0.035) 
0.068* 
(0.035) 
QUICK -0.194*** 
(0.057) 
-0.221*** 
(0.057) 
-0.019 
(0.039) 
-0.046 
(0.039) 
DISTRESS_A 4.501 
(3.325) 
5.586* 
(3.358) 
0.121 
(1.419) 
1.206 
(1.419) 
Cons 0.718 
(0.442) 
0.575 
(0.482) 
0.567 
(0.536) 
0.423 
(0.537) 
F-Statistic 5.79*** 6.31*** 28.52*** 33.18*** 
R² 0.305 0.313 0.185 0.214 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 226: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy 
(Announced) Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.146** 
(0.462) 
1.189** 
(0.545) 
2.346*** 
(0.681) 
2.389*** 
(0.723) 
LARGE 6.237*** 
(1.836) 
6.828*** 
(1.984) 
4.519** 
(1.943) 
5.110*** 
(1.870) 
STOCK -0.983 
(0.663) 
-0.843 
(0.716) 
-0.923 
(0.698) 
-0.782 
(0.735) 
ROA 0.083** 
(0.038) 
0.094** 
(0.039) 
0.059* 
(0.033) 
0.070** 
(0.032) 
QUICK -0.154*** 
(0.049) 
-0.172*** 
(0.049) 
-0.017 
(0.036) 
-0.034 
(0.036) 
DISTRESS_Z 0.135 
(0.797) 
0.529 
(0.877) 
0.530 
(0.926) 
0.924 
(0.895) 
Cons 0.668 
(0.570) 
0.399 
(0.621) 
0.404 
(0.591) 
0.135 
(0.648) 
F-Statistic 4.52*** 4.55*** 20.51*** 20.18*** 
R² 0.286 0.290 0.178 0.205 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 227: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller Financial Condition: Distressed vs Healthy (z’’-
score) Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.268*** 
(0.475) 
1.364** 
(0.568) 
2.425*** 
(0.691) 
2.521*** 
(0.733) 
LARGE 6.487*** 
(1.846) 
7.186*** 
(2.010) 
4.744** 
(1.991) 
5.443*** 
(1.918) 
STOCK -1.169* 
(0.606) 
-1.107* 
(0.654) 
-1.151* 
(0.670) 
-1.090 
(0.683) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.041) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.247*** 
(0.055) 
-0.268*** 
(0.073) 
-0.081 
(0.051) 
-0.102* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.112* 
(0.064) 
0.119 
(0.086) 
0.080 
(0.057) 
0.087 
(0.066) 
INVOLUNT -0.233 
(0.342) 
0.153 
(0.434) 
-0.550 
(0.481) 
-0.165 
(0.509) 
Cons 0.543 
(0.480) 
0.361 
(0.532) 
0.490 
(0.583) 
0.308 
(0.571) 
F-Statistic 5.67*** 4.63*** 18.93*** 18.07*** 
R² 0.294 0.296 0.181 0.205 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 228: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Voluntariness of the Deal Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.165* 
(0.623) 
1.277* 
(0.716) 
2.703*** 
(0.810) 
2.816*** 
(0.889) 
LARGE 6.330*** 
(1.772) 
7.030*** 
(2.003) 
4.915** 
(2.046) 
5.615*** 
(2.050) 
STOCK -0.964* 
(0.578) 
-0.906 
(0.630) 
-1.052 
(0.674) 
-0.994 
(0.688) 
ROA 0.076* 
(0.042) 
0.084* 
(0.043) 
0.054 
(0.038) 
0.063* 
(0.037) 
QUICK -0.327*** 
(0.073) 
-0.349*** 
(0.081) 
-0.123** 
(0.052) 
-0.146** 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.086 
(0.064) 
0.091 
(0.087) 
0.073 
(0.061) 
0.078 
(0.072) 
PAYOUT 11.052** 
(5.123) 
11.262** 
(4.354) 
5.014*** 
(1.892) 
5.224*** 
(1.522) 
DEBT -0.612 
(0.751) 
-0.556 
(0.891) 
0.133 
(0.986) 
0.189 
(1.038) 
REINVEST 0.101 
(1.271) 
-0.149 
(1.336) 
-1.486 
(1.289) 
-1.736 
(1.265) 
Cons 0.618 
(0.472) 
0.471 
(0.522) 
0.477 
(0.562) 
0.330 
(0.554) 
F-Statistic 5.36*** 5.25*** 15.82*** 41.99*** 
R² 0,334 0,330 0,198 0,226 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
UNKNOWN use of proceeds omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 229: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Intended Use of Proceeds Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.100* 
(0.623) 
1.206* 
(0.715) 
2.722*** 
(0.807) 
2.828*** 
(0.882) 
LARGE 6.400*** 
(1.783) 
7.074*** 
(2.000) 
4.864** 
(2.035) 
5.538*** 
(2.042) 
STOCK -0.920 
(0.600) 
-0.892 
(0.654) 
-0.951 
(0.675) 
-0.922 
(0.697) 
ROA 0.075* 
(0.041) 
0.084* 
(0.043) 
0.056 
(0.037) 
0.604* 
(0.037) 
QUICK -0.384*** 
(0.088) 
-0.390*** 
(0.101) 
-0.172** 
(0.077) 
-0.178** 
(0.077) 
ZSCORE 0.137* 
(0.076) 
0.127 
(0.104) 
0.120 
(0.081) 
0.110 
(0.086) 
PAYOUT 11.566** 
(5.364) 
11.661** 
(4.522) 
5.491** 
(2.157) 
5.587*** 
(1.600) 
DEBT -0.363 
(1.157) 
-0.516 
(1.358) 
1.052 
(1.766) 
0.901 
(1.599) 
DEBT*ZSCORE -0.107 
(0.325) 
-0.007 
(0.396) 
-0.448 
(0.583) 
-0.349 
(0.492) 
REINVEST -0.518 
(1.440) 
-0.608 
(1.517) 
-1.979 
(1.495) 
-2.069 
(1.480) 
MTB -0.107 
(0.172) 
-0.090 
(0.190) 
-0.159 
(0.205) 
-0.142 
(0.207) 
REINVEST*MTB 0.192 
(0.187) 
0.149 
(0.206) 
0.191 
(0.220) 
0.148 
(0.221) 
Cons 0.710 
(0.549) 
0.586 
(0.604) 
0.642 
(0.657) 
0.517 
(0.706) 
F-Statistic 4.11*** 4.10*** 11.68*** 21.35*** 
R² 0.345 0.335 0.204 0.229 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
UNKNOWN use of proceeds omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 230: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Intended Use of Proceeds and Interaction Terms Incl. 
Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.302*** 
(0.498) 
1.560*** 
(0.595) 
2.533*** 
(0.701) 
2.791*** 
(0.746) 
LARGE 6.516*** 
(1.857) 
7.236*** 
(2.018) 
4.880** 
(1.978) 
5.600*** 
(1.898) 
STOCK -1.170* 
(0.616) 
-1.067 
(0.660) 
-1.232** 
(0.679) 
-1.128 
(0.686) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.041) 
0.080* 
(0.041) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.248*** 
(0.054) 
-0.277*** 
(0.074) 
-0.085 
(0.052) 
-0.113* 
(0.060) 
ZSCORE 0.114* 
(0.066) 
0.131 
(0.088) 
0.085 
(0.058) 
0.102 
(0.068) 
UNKNOWN 0.158 
(0.874) 
-0.087 
(1.059) 
1.860* 
(1.118) 
1.615 
(0.122) 
PRICE_A 0.019 
(0.566) 
-0.905 
(0.632) 
0.736 
(0.723) 
-0.187 
(0.756) 
Cons 0.488 
(0.520) 
0.946 
(0.604) 
-0.285 
(0.670) 
0.173 
(0.711) 
F-Statistic 5.71*** 5.87*** 16.22*** 16.68*** 
R² 0.294 0.300 0.189 0.216 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
Price NOT_ANNOUNCED omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 231: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Transaction Price Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.510*** 
(0.499) 
1.604*** 
(0.593) 
2.503*** 
(0.715 
2.596*** 
(0.764) 
LARGE 6.734*** 
(1.857) 
7.430*** 
(2.030) 
4.823** 
(2.012 
5.519*** 
(1.954) 
STOCK -1.179** 
(0.598) 
-1.126* 
(0.646) 
-1.144* 
(0.666 
-1.091 
(0.679) 
ROA 0.070* 
(0.040) 
0.078* 
(0.041) 
0.047 
(0.037 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.243*** 
(0.057) 
-0.263*** 
(0.077) 
-0.082 
(0.052 
-0.102* 
(0.060) 
ZSCORE 0.111 
(0.068) 
0.116 
(0.090) 
0.082 
(0.057 
0.087 
(0.067) 
PURPOSE_A -1.112* 
(0.610) 
-1.242* 
(0.729) 
-0.179 
(0.618 
-0.308 
(0.736) 
Cons 1.373** 
(0.576) 
1.324* 
(0.696) 
0.578 
(0.701) 
0.529 
(0.765) 
F-Statistic 5.60*** 4.80*** 17.91*** 17.42*** 
R² 0.302 0.303 0.181 0.206 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 232: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Motive Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.341** 
(0.570) 
1.431** 
(0.672) 
2.624*** 
(0.784) 
2.714*** 
(0.861) 
LARGE 6.608*** 
(1.858) 
7.319*** 
(2.066) 
5.079** 
(2.056) 
5.791*** 
(2.055) 
STOCK -1.164* 
(0.605) 
-1.110* 
(0.653) 
-1.141* 
(0.668) 
-1.086 
(0.681) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.041) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
0.046 
(0.037) 
0.054 
(0.037) 
QUICK -0.246*** 
(0.056) 
-0.265*** 
(0.074) 
-0.078 
(0.052) 
-0.098 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.113* 
(0.064) 
0.117 
(0.086) 
0.080 
(0.057) 
0.085 
(0.066) 
PROCEEDS_A -0.159 
(0.646) 
-0.224 
(0.750) 
-0.452 
(0.787) 
-0.518 
(0.848) 
Cons 0.549 
(0.448) 
0.412 
(0.502) 
0.517 
(0.558) 
0.380 
(0.550) 
F-Statistic 5.61*** 4.72*** 16.77*** 16.63 
R² 0.294 0.296 0.182 0.207 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 233: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Intended Use of Proceeds Incl. 
Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.234** 
(0.534) 
1.298** 
(0.607) 
2.525*** 
(0.729) 
2.590*** 
(0.747) 
LARGE 6.505*** 
(1.846) 
7.174*** 
(2.010) 
4.787** 
(1.993) 
5.456*** 
(1.919) 
STOCK -1.173* 
(0.616) 
-1.119* 
(0.664) 
-1.132* 
(0.677) 
-1.077 
(0.692) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.041) 
0.048 
(0.036) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.247*** 
(0.055) 
-0.267*** 
(0.073) 
-0.083 
(0.052) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.114* 
(0.064) 
0.119 
(0.086) 
0.081 
(0.057) 
0.087 
(0.066) 
BOOKGAIN_A 0.405 
(1.447) 
0.424 
(1.514) 
-0.457 
(1.479) 
-0.438 
(1.593) 
Cons 0.505 
(0.451) 
0.356 
(0.502) 
0.461 
(0.557) 
0.313 
(0.545) 
F-Statistic 5.98*** 5.02*** 18.93*** 18.74*** 
R² 0.295 0.296 0.181 0.206 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 234: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of a Book Effect Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.243*** 
(0.472) 
1.324** 
(0.563) 
2.430*** 
(0.689) 
2.511*** 
(0.726) 
LARGE 6.443*** 
(1.829) 
7.132*** 
(1.996) 
4.735** 
(1.980) 
5.423*** 
(1.910) 
STOCK -1.153* 
(0.602) 
-1.102* 
(0.651) 
-1.132* 
(0.668) 
-1.081 
(0.680) 
ROA 0.072* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.041) 
0.048 
(0.036) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.250*** 
(0.054) 
-0.269*** 
(0.072) 
-0.085* 
(0.050) 
-0.104* 
(0.058) 
ZSCORE 0.111* 
(0.062) 
0.117 
(0.085) 
0.080 
(0.055) 
0.086 
(0.064) 
CONSID_A 0.693 
(0.501) 
0.475 
(0.552) 
0.582 
(0.575) 
0.364 
(0.583) 
Cons 0.209 
(0.558) 
0.160 
(0.592) 
0.178 
(0.696) 
0.129 
(0.652) 
F-Statistic 5.67*** 4.67*** 19.67*** 18.47*** 
R² 0.299 0.298 0.184 0.207 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 235: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Announcement of the Form of Consideration Incl. 
Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.280*** 
(0.474) 
1.360** 
(0.562) 
2.454*** 
(0.690) 
2.534*** 
(0.731) 
LARGE 0.649*** 
(1.852) 
7.193*** 
(2.013) 
4.754** 
(2.002) 
5.456*** 
(1.929) 
STOCK -1.174** 
(0.591) 
-1.098* 
(0.640) 
-1.163* 
(0.657) 
-1.087 
(0.669) 
ROA 0.072* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.248*** 
(0.055) 
-0.267*** 
(0.072) 
-0.083 
(0.051) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.113* 
(0.064) 
0.119 
(0.086) 
0.082 
(0.057) 
0.087 
(0.066) 
FIT -0.144 
(0.641) 
0.194 
(0.652) 
-0.337 
(0.710) 
0.001 
(0.721) 
Cons 0.565 
(0.459) 
0.317 
(0.513) 
0.542 
(0.582) 
0.293 
(0.565) 
F-Statistic 6.18*** 4.77*** 19.54*** 18.06*** 
R² 0.294 0.296 0.182 0.205 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 236: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.247*** 
(0.454) 
1.364** 
(0.553) 
2.426*** 
(0.679) 
2.542*** 
(0.728) 
LARGE 6.482*** 
(1.886) 
7.272*** 
(2.024) 
4.745** 
(1.996) 
5.535*** 
(1.913) 
STOCK -1.174* 
(0.601) 
-1.113* 
(0.649) 
-1.163* 
(0.660) 
-1.102 
(0.674) 
ROA 0.072* 
(0.041) 
0.077* 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.036) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.252*** 
(0.057) 
-0.273*** 
(0.074) 
-0.087 
(0.056) 
-0.108* 
(0.061) 
ZSCORE 0.118* 
(0.069) 
0.124 
(0.089) 
0.086 
(0.063) 
0.092 
(0.069) 
FOCUS_NOFIT 0.034 
(0.574) 
0.519 
(0.629) 
0.025 
(0.577) 
0.510 
(0.594) 
FOCUS_FIT 0.196 
(0.808) 
0.485 
(0.925) 
-0.046 
(1.134) 
0.243 
(1.233) 
NOFOCUS_FIT -0.366 
(0.974) 
0.442 
(0.965) 
-0.531 
(0.977) 
0.278 
(0.925) 
Cons 0.544 
(0.420) 
0.053 
(0.501) 
0.526 
(0.675) 
0.034 
(0.640) 
F-Statistic 5.00*** 3.74*** 15.65*** 14.99*** 
R² 0.295 0.298 0.182 0.207 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
NOFOCUS_NOFIT omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 237: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Combination of Strategic Fit Between Target and Buyer 
and Increase in Focus Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.278*** 
(0.485) 
1.385** 
(0.585) 
2.182*** 
(0.662) 
2.289*** 
(0.729) 
LARGE 6.376*** 
(1.864) 
7.021*** 
(1.967) 
4.537** 
(2.042) 
5.183*** 
(1.921) 
STOCK -1.157* 
(0.600) 
-1.126* 
(0.646) 
-1.024 
(0.658) 
-0.992 
(0.676) 
ROA 0.073* 
(0.040) 
0.081** 
(0.041) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
0.061* 
(0.035) 
QUICK -0.227*** 
(0.054) 
-0.245*** 
(0.072) 
-0.088 
(0.053) 
-0.106* 
(0.062) 
ZSCORE 0.096 
(0.061) 
0.010 
(0.083) 
0.085 
(0.058) 
0.089 
(0.067) 
MBO 3.109 
(2.490) 
3.432 
(2.951) 
2.483 
(2.507) 
2.807 
(2.813) 
PE -1.002 
(0.655) 
-1.024 
(0.710) 
-0.195 
(0.678) 
-0.218 
(0.694) 
Cons 0.732 
(0.566) 
0.607 
(0.609) 
0.336 
(0.641) 
0.211 
(0.638) 
F-Statistic 5.54*** 4.63*** 20.72*** 18.82*** 
R² 0.314 0.314 0.191 0.216 
Observations 271 271 271 271 
SMALL deals omitted 
STRATEGIC omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 238: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Type of Buyer Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.250*** 
(0.470) 
1.330** 
(0.562) 
2.438*** 
(0.691) 
2.518*** 
(0.728) 
LARGE 6.425*** 
(1.826) 
7.123*** 
(1.994) 
4.722* 
(1.988) 
5.419*** 
(1.917) 
STOCK -1.154* 
(0.601) 
-1.103* 
(0.651) 
-1.133* 
(0.668) 
-1.082 
(0.681) 
ROA 0.073* 
(0.040) 
0.080* 
(0.042) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.251*** 
(0.055) 
-0.270*** 
(0.072) 
-0.085* 
(0.051) 
-0.104* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.111* 
(0.063) 
0.117 
(0.085) 
0.080 
(0.055) 
0.086 
(0.065) 
CASH 0.599 
(0.517) 
0.385 
(0.567) 
0.486 
(0.596) 
0.272 
(0.609) 
Cons 0.273 
(0.536) 
0.215 
(0.570) 
0.240 
(0.688) 
0.181 
(0.644) 
F-Statistic 5.63*** 4.64*** 20.25*** 18.69*** 
R² 0.298 0.297 0.183 0.206 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 239: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Form of Consideration Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.244*** 
(0.474) 
1.325** 
(0.565) 
2.432*** 
(0.690) 
2.513*** 
(0.727) 
LARGE 6.457*** 
(1.830) 
7.149*** 
(1.998) 
4.752** 
(1.988) 
5.444*** 
(1.918) 
STOCK -1.154* 
(0.602) 
-1.103* 
(0.652) 
-1.133* 
(0.669) 
-1.082 
(0.682) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.041) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.249*** 
(0.054) 
-0.269*** 
(0.072) 
-0.084* 
(0.051) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.111* 
(0.063) 
0.117 
(0.085) 
0.081 
(0.055) 
0.087 
(0.064) 
CASH 0.669 
(0.524) 
0.444 
(0.578) 
0.552 
(0.605) 
0.327 
(0.618) 
OTHER 0.927 
(1.130) 
0.778 
(1.127) 
0.879 
(1.128) 
0.730 
(1.025) 
Cons 0.210 
(0.558) 
0.161 
(0.592) 
0.180 
(0.698) 
0.131 
(0.654) 
F-Statistic 4.96*** 4.10*** 16.75*** 15.90*** 
R² 0.299 0.298 0.184 0.207 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
UNKNOWN form of payment omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 240: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Form of Consideration (Detailed) Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.372*** 
(0.461) 
1.400** 
(0.566) 
2.468*** 
(0.681) 
2.496*** 
(0.736) 
LARGE 6.490*** 
(1.829) 
7.166*** 
(1.998) 
4.786** 
(1.989) 
5.462*** 
(1.917) 
STOCK -0.980 
(0.595) 
-1.009 
(0.666) 
-1.139* 
(0.660) 
-1.167* 
(0.683) 
ROA 0.068* 
(0.041) 
0.077* 
(0.042) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.057 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.246*** 
(0.055) 
-0.267*** 
(0.073) 
-0.083 
(0.051) 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.116* 
(0.064) 
0.120 
(0.086) 
0.082 
(0.057) 
0.086 
(0.066) 
RECESSION 0.798 
(0.685) 
0.438 
(0.783) 
0.011 
(0.764) 
-0.349 
(0.827) 
Cons 0.205 
(0.476) 
0.200 
(0.562) 
0.437 
(0.592) 
0.433 
(0.610) 
F-Statistic 5.78*** 4.61*** 18.11*** 18.03*** 
R² 0.299 0.297 0.181 0.206 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 241: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Economic Environment Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.177** 
(0.485) 
1.216** 
(0.573) 
2.382*** 
(0.717) 
2.421*** 
(0.751) 
LARGE 6.568*** 
(1.860) 
7.162*** 
(2.028) 
4.823** 
(2.024) 
5.418*** 
(1.941) 
STOCK -1.084* 
(0.599) 
-1.062 
(0.652) 
-1.082 
(0.664) 
-1.059 
(0.685) 
ROA 0.072* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.056 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.233*** 
(0.053) 
-0.567*** 
(0.072) 
-0.071 
(0.052) 
-0.095 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.097 
(0.063) 
0.106 
(0.085) 
0.071 
(0.057) 
0.080 
(0.066) 
PLANT -1.191* 
(0.698) 
-1.408 
(0.860) 
-0.757 
(1.302) 
-0.974 
(1.250) 
PROPERTY -0.116 
(0.802) 
-0.769 
(0.873) 
-0.948 
(0.821) 
-0.602 
(0.836) 
RIGHTS -0.900 
(0.779) 
-1.180* 
(0.619) 
-1.571*** 
(0.586) 
-1.851*** 
(0.652) 
SUBSIDIARY -0.698 
(0.609) 
-0.451 
(0.661) 
-0.748 
(0.664) 
-0.501 
(0.674) 
UNKNOWN -0.836* 
(0.446) 
-1.255* 
(0.652) 
-1.055 
(0.706) 
-1.474 
(1.133) 
Cons 1.075* 
(0.632) 
0.835 
(0.700) 
0.990 
(0.740) 
0.750 
(0.730) 
F-Statistic 6.48*** 3.91*** 13.04*** 15.17*** 
R² 0.301 0.301 0.187 0.211 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
BU omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 242: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Type of Asset Sold Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.282*** 
(0.475) 
1.344** 
(0.568) 
2.488*** 
(0.683) 
2.550*** 
(0.735) 
LARGE 6.518*** 
(1.852) 
7.190*** 
(2.012) 
4.707** 
(1.984) 
5.379*** 
(1.911) 
STOCK -1.168* 
(0.607) 
-0.112* 
(0.655) 
-1.119* 
(0.666) 
-1.062 
(0.686) 
ROA 0.072* 
(0.041) 
0.080* 
(0.042) 
0.045 
(0.037) 
0.053 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.250*** 
(0.058) 
-0.281*** 
(0.075) 
-0.067 
(0.055) 
-0.088 
(0.062) 
ZSCORE 0.114* 
(0.065) 
0.119 
(0.087) 
0.078 
(0.058) 
0.083 
(0.067) 
DECREASE 0.224 
(0.775) 
0.335 
(0.767) 
-1.333* 
(0.805) 
-1.221 
(0.739) 
INCREASE 0.126 
(0.569) 
0.090 
(0.689) 
-0.834 
(0.827) 
-0.870 
(1.061) 
Cons 0.483 
(0.465) 
0.326 
(0.521) 
0.685 
(0.580) 
0.529 
(0.571) 
F-Statistic 4.86*** 4.04*** 16.24*** 15.67*** 
R² 0.294 0.296 0.189 0.212 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
NO CHANGE omitted, UNKNWON omitted because of collinearity. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 243: Multiple Regression of CAARs on the Change in the Seller's Systematic Risk Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.377*** 
(0.498) 
1.453** 
(0.597) 
0.652*** 
(0.728) 
2.727*** 
(0.794) 
LARGE 6.583*** 
(1.871) 
7.259*** 
(2.039) 
4.943** 
(1.977) 
5.619*** 
(1.915) 
STOCK -1.161* 
(0.604) 
-1.106* 
(0.652) 
-1.134* 
(0.662) 
-1.079 
(0.680) 
ROA 0.071* 
(0.040) 
0.079* 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.251*** 
(0.054) 
-0.271*** 
(0.073) 
-0.089* 
(0.052) 
-0.110* 
(0.059) 
ZSCORE 0.118* 
(0.065) 
0.123 
(0.086) 
0.091 
(0.058) 
0.097 
(0.067) 
DIRECT -0.384 
(0.556) 
-0.419 
(0.618) 
-0.775 
(0.585) 
-0.811 
(0.669) 
Cons -0.834 
(0.556) 
0.626 
(0.645) 
0.907 
(0.618) 
0.780 
(0.663) 
F-Statistic 5.65*** 4.66*** 18.03*** 17.85*** 
R² 0.295 0.297 0.185 0.210 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 244: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller/Target Degree of Relationship Incl. Controls 
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 AAR [0] CAAR [-1;0] CAAR [0;1] CAAR [-1;1] 
MEDIUM 1.289*** 
(0.473) 
1.303** 
(0.567) 
2.481*** 
(0.688) 
2.495*** 
(0.747) 
LARGE 6.412*** 
(1.842) 
6.904*** 
(2.005) 
4.771** 
(2.011) 
5.263*** 
(1.945) 
STOCK -1.215* 
(0.624) 
-1.257* 
(0.667) 
-1.149* 
(0.683) 
-1.192* 
(0.682) 
ROA 0.073* 
(0.041) 
0.083** 
(0.041) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.058 
(0.036) 
QUICK -0.255*** 
(0.062) 
-0.291*** 
(0.080) 
-0.084 
(0.057) 
-0.119* 
(0.063) 
ZSCORE 0.120* 
(0.070) 
0.141 
(0.091) 
0.083 
(0.060) 
0.104 
(0.068) 
AUSTRIA -2.232*** 
(0.401) 
-1.933*** 
(0.739) 
-1.430*** 
(0.505) 
-1.131 
(0.707) 
SWITZERLAND -0.220 
(0.493) 
-0.756 
(0.527) 
-0.009 
(0.562) 
0.546 
(0.614) 
Cons 0.620 
(0.504) 
0.672 
(0.543) 
0.455 
(0.595) 
0.506 
(0.574) 
F-Statistic 10.39*** 4.14*** 16.74*** 16.57*** 
R² 0.296 0.300 0.182 0.207 
Observations 272 272 272 272 
SMALL deals omitted 
GERMANY omitted 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 245: Multiple Regression of CAARs on Seller Nation Incl. Controls 
